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ebear's avatar

This is an excellent summary which comports well with the analysis of other commentators such as Andrei Martyanov, Larry Johnson, Douglas Macgregor, Scott Ritter, et al. What isn’t touched upon as much by any of the commentators I follow is the social and psychological composition of the population itself. The basic description of a divided Ukraine is characterized as Ukrainian nationalism vs. Russian cultural identity, but is this the whole story, or merely a superficial construct designed primarily for western consumption? Granted this division is significant, but there are other elements in play here, first of which is the economic and demographic reality of Ukraine since independence in 1991.

I think it’s useful to do a side by side comparison of Russia vs Ukraine post the breakup. They were the most similar of the former republics, and the most significant in economic terms, which meant they were the first to attract the attention of western financiers and their corporate allies. So for the next ten years we had a similar pattern of former apparatchiks acquiring great fortunes with western banking assistance, to the detriment of the population at large. Then the great divergence occurred with the ascent of VVP and his faction, which having gained political power sat the oligarchs down and read them the riot act. You can keep some of your assets, but some you’ll have to return to the state, and by the way, you’re working for Russia now. Anyone who doesn’t agree is welcome to get on their yacht and leave. So sign here, or there’s the door, and I’d like my pen back please.

That never happened in Ukraine, which to me is the defining difference. The looting simply continued and the cynicism of the population increased, whereas in Russia there was a shift in public perception buttressed by a broad nationalism with historic roots that simply doesn't exist in Ukraine as a whole. Ukrainian nationalism, such as it does exist, has a dark past to which only the western portion of the country feels any affinity. For the remainder of the population it was something they either had no part in, would sooner forget, or had family history of opposing. Note, this division does not occur along strictly ethnic lines but includes ethnic Ukrainians who took the side of the USSR, or at least resisted Ukrainian nationalism as defined by the OUN and Bandera elements.

So what does this mean in the current context? Simply that while the ethnic Russian portion of the population is relatively unified, divisions exist on the ethnic Ukrainian side and are widening as a result of a war which a growing portion of ethnic Ukrainians want no part of, and who see it as a continuation of the looting operation described above. The Nationalists know this, and by attempting to root out that element of their own society are simply increasing that division to the point that some of their own people have now turned against them. So a state of paranoia exists within Ukrainian leadership. No one at the top has any delusions about the Nationalist program they're pushing. It’s simply the operational schema for the continued looting of the nation, made all the more attractive by the fact that they’ve drawn their western sponsors into the fray and can loot them as well.

This is the actual background of the war of attrition, in my opinion. It has an obvious military element, but it also consists of aiding Ukrainian oligarchs in the looting of western financial resources on the theory that at some point, it become a political factor leading to a change of leadership in the West. The oligarchs can be dealt with later, as no amount of money can buy them protection from what’s coming, either from their own people, or from Russia herself.

We’ve all seen the map of the 2010 election which is used to illustrate the division between the two ethnicities, but is that the whole picture? Recall that a key element leading to the Maidan protests was the issue of EU membership. I would argue that the split in the electorate had more to do with that than with any ethnic divisions or loyalty to Russia. Consider a 20-something guy in Ukraine with few economic prospects. EU membership would be very attractive as it holds out the potential of employment in the EU. I would argue that was a motivating factor for many young Ukrainians regardless of ethnicity, and would have created the illusion of greater support for the nationalist faction than actually exists. Basically people voted their self-interest, and at the time the EU seemed the best option. Never mind the fact that the eastern industrial sector of Ukraine was an integral part of the USSR, and as such had well developed markets in Russia, whereas they had virtually no markets in the west outside of agricultural products, and no realistic chance of ever competing with Western corporations. That kind of argument takes a back seat when the individual's priority is escape from perpetual poverty. To sum it up, that vote was economically determined and likely had little to do with pro or anti Russian sentiment. It was simply voting for a potential way out of a dire circumstance. Delusional in my opinion, but young people often are.

So that’s my summary of the social and psychological backdrop to the conflict. In short, Ukrainian youth of both ethnic extractions were lured by a false promise held out by an entrenched political elite with no intention of enacting the type of reforms which would have admitted them to the EU. How could they, when they were the very source of the corruption the EU decried? Even if the process had moved ahead, it would have taken much longer than would benefit any young person looking for an immediate way out. So instead of a job in the EU, you’re dragooned into a war you want no part of, and from which you’re unlikely to return. Not exactly the outcome you anticipated, so how much commitment can you expect from that cohort, who now make up the bulk of what’s left of the UAF? This to me is the defining aspect of the war at this point. The hard core element have mostly been killed and the remainder are looking for a way to surrender without being shot by their nationalist minders, a sad replay of soviet era military ‘discipline.’ I suppose the end game depends on how much of the UAF leadership are professional soldiers not implicated in the coup or subsequent horrors, who see the best way to end this is to remove the Ukrainian government and negotiate terms of surrender. How likely this is I can’t say as I’m not familiar with the UAF command structure and their loyalties.

Is that a good summary? I welcome comments and criticism as my analysis is strictly from the outside. Although I have friends on both sides of the conflict, none of them have any enthusiasm for what’s happening, they are just simple guys who feel the same as I do, that a massive tragedy has occurred that never should have happened.

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Extinct Designator's avatar

It's going to end with a rump something. The big question for Putin is how to get a situation where the rump can't do a quickie marriage with NATO. Or if that is impossible, then the rump has to be pretty harmless. That's bad news for Ukraine. In twenty years if we are lucky, we'll wonder why we let the Iraq and Afghan War geniuses set this whole thing up with Maidan and a good grifting along they way. At least the big guy got his 10% and 5 million.

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