The Europeans are a big part of the problem, as well as Zelensky. Trump needs to withdraw all support from Ukraine, and then see how stubborn the war hungry Euros remain.
Support withdrawn means not only logistics from satellites, launch codes, and other intel, supplies of weapons and ammunition, but all the cost of supporting Ukraine as a state, such as pensions, police, ambulance, teacher salaries, etc... Trump needs to completely let go of the proxy if he wants to be taken seriously by Russia.
Europe won't go along with the sanctions relief needed for the ceasefire or grain deals, so let them handle Ukraine and keep the proxy running.
Will we lose European friends? Were they really ever friends, or just entitled dependents with a superiority complex, who want us to back them while they look down on us?
I understand where you are coming from -- and what you suggest would be the most emotionally satisfying resolution to what is going on -- 'just quit'. However, I don't think that Trump (or anyone, not just him) can really just 'do that'. Yes, it is possible that the US wants its 'cake and eat it too' (a geo-political role in Ukraine that continues and a resolution to this crisis) - and at some level I am sure this is 'true'. But, when you think about it, it also become clear that there are too many 'spider webs' tying the US to the Ukraine and Europe to 'just walk away' in one fell swoop. Therefore, it is possible, that what Trump is doing is exactly what you 'want' -- to walk away completely but that to do so, he has to move slowly, step by step, meticulously cutting away 'web after web'. Each move he makes (whether intentionally or not, although I suspect it's intentional) slowly moves the 'Overton Window' on what is discussable and allowable in public and in Congress. Cutting off aid Day 1 of his Presidency would have set off a firestorm (although large portions of his base would have been thrilled). Instead, we are only 90 some days into his office and already that has already happened (briefly) and has become 'discussable' going forward. If Europe or Ukraine 'derails' his 'fine' peace initiative, might such a 'withdrawal' happen (as you wish). I'd say 'probably'. And that's probably the point. Move the needle slowly -- too slowly if this were a 2 hour movie --- but not that slowly in the grand scheme of things (13 part mini-series, probably with multiple seasons!). He is a show-man after all. Just something to consider.
Offer high tensile strength 12.5mm hemp rope as part of a 30 day "free trial"? Return unused portion before end of month, pay only shipping & handling.
I think that's true in politics. And also if they have really specific objectives, like for example appoint the judges X Y and Z to the Court of Appeals, or beat down anti-Israel-killing-Palestinians protesters.
With more open ended objectives tho, like trade agenda... I'm just not seeing it.
In foreign policy, the one that stands out to me is Trump's previous attempts to manipulate the relationship with China, during their first term. Backfired enormously, putting Chinese transition to tech independence which was happening at medium speed, on fast-forward. Because it basically forced Chinese domestic industrials - fiercely competitive and happy to lean hard on foreign tech to get ahead - to cooperate with each other and buy into domestic alternatives which were starting from scratch . All out of fear of the US. And that was when the Trump team didn't have a free hand to make sweeping changes like they do now. The Tariffs policy is shaping up to be an epic fiasco.
I think the 'jury is still out' on all of those topics. You can see the Trump 1.0 and China as a 'fail' (because China has redoubled its efforts at internal development, with some degree of success) -- or you could see it as something that was 'going to happen anyway and soon' (in which case the tariffs from 1.0 -- which are still in place even during the Biden era) as part of a longer term strategy to make the US less dependent on China (which some would argue was essential, regardless of the short term impact to the US or eventual benefit to China). The whole issue of whether China is 'strong' economically and financially or politically at the moment and going forward in the years ahead is also really an open question as well (there is evidence for and against that proposition) -- and how you answer that question plays a factor in assessing Trump 1.0 (and 2.0's) actions and motivations.
There is also a very large open issue with regard to the benefits of tariffs in general (and for the US specifically at this particular point of history). Conventional economic theory maintains that tariffs are pretty much always and everywhere a net negative (unless you are a developing nation with excellent long term leadership and a long term anti-tariff transition plan). However, conventional economics has (arguably) often (some would say always) been 'wrong'. As someone some what trained in several of the various schools of economics, I am no longer a 'believer' in the 'conventional consensus' (i.e. when you see 'how the sausage is made' and have to 'taste' whether the end result is 'fit for human consumption' you start to develop 'some doubts'). Furthermore, there are legitimate arguments for tariffs as a 'end state' (and not just a negotiating tool). These arguments may be wrong as well (or not) -- but they do exist (even if the mainstream economics and press do not honor them with conversation).
European friends are not friends. They are vasals. Elites in Europe work for American empire. Superiorty complex is just a mask to hide that fact from people they are going to send to die in the near future.
You know, like Zelensky is doing that to ukrainians right now.
European friends? American Mexicana has occupied Germany for 80 years, forced the adoption of the Kalergi Plan as the template for the West in the U.N. overseen Germany's implementation of the Kalergi Plan throughout Western Europe, particularly through the E.U. which early on was dominated by American Mexicana controlled Germany.
American Mexicana has, for well over 150 years, actively worked to destroy Europe. The fact is that the greatest fear American Mexicana has is a united Europe.
"Were they really ever friends, or just entitled dependents with a superiority complex, who want us to back them while they look down on us?"
Worse than that, they are Manchurian Candidates that have sold out their own people for globalist banking, media, finance and corporations, taking their cut for taking orders. Unfortunately they are paid off by the lead globalist gang that operate in the US and it seems to me, are still emboldened by them. If Trumps' administration are attempting to do what they say they are, they are faced with their own deep state and those of the Europeans and UK. I agree with you but there are old, deeply layered poisons entrenched within European and even the US (security state) apparatus. Trumps' admin will need all the backing and support from ordinary people they can get. The US is the only Western state that can mount serious opposition to the globalists - the UK and European public and resistance is broken and demoralised.
Trump, I suspect, would happily walk away from Ukraine, but he has domestic political considerations to consider. Namely, a rather large faction of the Congressional GOP are deeply committed to the proxy war. Trump is a much savvier political operator than I think he gets credit for, and he knows this. That’s one reason the likes of Mike Waltz (a one-time aide to the arch-neocon Dick Cheney) is in his administration; he represents that faction’s interests and having him on board as reassurance is probably what allowed Trump to get Hegseth and Gabbard confirmed. That’s also why Waltz still has his job after the fiasco with the Signal chat - Trump can’t afford to alienate the faction Waltz represents (though he’s almost certainly on thin ice now).
I think the likely outcome of all this is that the US eventually gives up on forcing an immediate peace deal. I predict in that case a tightening of Russian sanctions, while at the same time material aid is quietly reduced and back channels with the Russians remain active waiting for the moment when Ukraine starts to concede to the inevitable (or in a less likely scenario, when Russia starts to reach its own limits, be they economic, political or military). We do have things the Russians want, some quite badly, and there will eventually be a time when they want those things as much or more than what they can get out of continuing on the battlefield (which cannot, after all, offer sanctions relief among other things).
I agree with the first paragraph. Tightening sanctions is virtue signaling. The Russians have more resources we want than products we can supply them due to 10 years of sanctions.
Seems to me that Trump uses chaos and BS to keep everyone guessing about his next move.
3) Recognition as a Great Power (at least tacitly).
4) Security concessions such as removal of American troops and weapons from former Soviet Republics (the Baltics) and Warsaw Pact states (Poland and Romania in particular).
5) Barring that, at the very least obtaining commitments not to place nuclear capable missile launchers like Aegis Ashore installations or Typhon medium range missile batteries east of Germany.
6) Tacit recognition of a Russian sphere of influence (or at least interest) in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.
7) Curtailing efforts to destabilize Russia’s near abroad (in Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, etc.).
8) Normalization of relations in general.
In general, I think the Russians are fundamentally uninterested in conquering Europe; their primary concerns are security and securing their national interests in the Russian near abroad (including the rights of Russian speakers in nearby countries). Accordingly, I imagine that they view the current mutual hostility with the West as undesirable and would prefer a modus vivendi or detente in which each side’s interests are mutually recognized and respected. This is something we could offer them. The rub is that they don’t trust any rapprochement to last beyond the next four years (and with good reason). Still, it’s not like we have nothing they want. Eventually they’ll probably want some of these things more than continuing a bloody and costly fight in Ukraine (barring a total military collapse by Ukraine, anyway - which cannot be ruled out).
Russia has to win first, and than can start negotiating. There is absolutely no incentive to negotiate with Russia until Russia wins. And than there will not be much to negotiate.
Things the Russians want ... such as a more stable, peaceful, respectful, and economically beneficial mutual relationship longer term with the US (and maybe Europe).
Some will argue that the 'West' is purely predatory in 'nature' and cannot ever allow for that condition to exist. I would not agree with that position (although I would concede that the Neocon / Neoliberal factions in America and Europe and that the current leadership of the EU, UK, and Ukraine cannot allow that condition) -- but these 'Never Russia' factions are, in the end, factions that aren't 'guaranteed' to be in power in their governments forever (or at least that is my view of the world).
At some point, Russia -- even if it can (or actually does) 'conquer' all of the Ukraine (set your limit -- to the Dnieper, to Lvov, etc) will want to 'relax its limbic system' and have security (without maintaining such war time military expenditures and personnel losses). I am sure that Russia is prepared -- if forced to -- to fight a new 30 year Cold War (or semi-hot insurgency war in Western Ukraine), but I am sure that the 'calmer heads' in Russia don't seek this outcome as a first choice of action. Furthermore, Russia can isolate itself completely from the West and rely on BRICS if need be -- but it doesn't have to -- and Russia could find better geo-political-economic outcomes if it has some degree of engagement or raproachment with the West (define that degree or engagement as wide or as narrow as your wish -- something is better than nothing as long as Russia retains a vibrant and robust economic and technological degree of independence and autonomy). Governments in the West are not permanent (although national interests may be), and it may not be in the national interests long term of either North America or even of Europe to be in a permanent hot or Cold War with Russia (and visa versa).
Therefore the question, for Russia, is whether some sort of dialog, detente, raproachment, etc is feasible -- and with Trump, there may be an opportunity, so it is reasonable for Russia to explore that idea (and take it if it can be mutually agreed to and based on mutual benefit).
In essence, the 'thing being offered' is not territory in Ukraine (Russia can have pretty much whatever it wants, the only question is price to be paid for it in blood and treasure and future wariness and obligation). The 'thing being offered' is not economic benefits or technology or finance either -- it is a 'reset' (although, because of past failures and betrayals that concept is a dirty word). The onus to forge that new relationship (and make it 'real' and not just a 'sound bite' or 'photo op') is on the West -- and the US (via Trump) taking on that 'onus' is the 'offer'. Whether it 'works out' or not is to be determined -- but the 'chance' to escape 'mutual antagonism' is the 'lure' (for both parties -- at least in regard to the US and Russia).
I think Putin only wants the usa to become sane and reasonable. an enormous ask. impossible in fact. it would need the american public to wake up and begin to control their country. and even then it would be immensely difficult because their country of course is split into 50 states. they're divided before they start.
america doesn't exist therefore, the people being missing in action.
we just have the lunatic manipulators.
they will never willingly become sane and reasonable. they can't. they don't understand the concepts.
but they are going to have to. is the point. that putin and the rest of the world knows. time for those lunatics to sit down and be good boys. because they've been found out. and the machine they think they're running ain't the machine they think it is. it hasn't got the strength, the money, the structure, the power, the abilities they think it has.
it exists from sheer habit: the habit of satrapies to do as they're told.
the 'hereditary' instinctive belief everyone has in the 'might' of america.
its all a sham like the emperor's clothes.
it's not that the world wants something from america so much as they just want, need, america to get out of the way.
which means those lunatics, of course. i say again: there is no 'america'. 350 million people are totally discounted and might well be discounted, too, for they are dumb, disorganised, disinterested, unknowing, ineffectual.
so it means those lunatics. they need to get out of the way.
and the world grows more sophisticated.
soon if they don't get out of the way they will be pushed out of the way. it is going sooner or later to start getting up front close and personal for them.
i think the place will probably accelerate its own destruction any time soon. trump is murdering it.
but things the russians want? things the world wants? get out of the way. go back to your own little island and look after your own business after one hundred years of interfering in the business of the world and hampering the world in every possible way.
A comprehensive master-class complete with relevant historical references--coherent, systematic and well-written. I cannot thank you enough. Superb. (And the maps are terrific!)
If you take the view, as I do, that the USA essentially started this war against Russia using Ukraine (and latterly Europe) as proxies, then what we really have here is the two main protagonists negotiating with each other. The limited involvement or total exclusion of Ukraine and European leaders tends to support this thesis.
Trump may well want to do a deal, but IMHO his focus is domestic and he cannot afford a debacle Kapbul style. I think he should have simply walked day 1 and blamed it on Biden. Well no matter what, Ukraine will be defeated by Russia, and with it the USA and Europe (whatever that means these days). And Trump will get the blame. Whenever this occurs. I don't think there is a "deal" here for Trump to do. Russia has inflicted [or soon will do] a devastating military defeat on the USA led Collective West.
So I suppose I agree in the round with the author in that - in this case - the sword will prove mightier than the pen. And will define the endgame. However Russia is not going to do a temporary deal with a POTUS with less than 4 years left and beset by domestic enemies. It may allow the impression of a deal, but this is "c*ck on the block" time as they used to say. Put up or shut up. Over to you Mr T.
"weak, stupid and easily manipulated" - yet somehow he managed to be elected president of the US twice while spending a fraction of the money as his opponents as they mobilized the power of propaganda and government to try to put him in jail.
I get why people call him stupid, but one groups "stupid" is another groups "most entertaining presidential speaker of many decades".
Serges article made a brief mention of Trumps similarity to FDR that struck a cord with me as I am reading "The Forgotten Man" a narrative history of the depression and new deal. It's striking how similar FDR and Trump are.
Being popular is hardl;y a sign of intellect, any more than album sales are a barometer of musical ability. Anyway, Trump's own appointees, who know him better than I do, have specifically used the word "moron".
Keep in mind that Trump's opponents were singularly weak as candidates themlseves.
That said, the average frustrated deplorable can be said to have made an entirely rational decision in voting for weak, stupid, easily manipulated Trump. When the system is rigged, and not in your favor, when everyone outside the ruling class is being picked clean and left to rot, the choices on offer being Team R Tweedledee and Team D Tweedledum, one response is to Burn It All Down.
First time I ever heard Trump compared with FDR, I'll say.
It has always been strange how easily these accusations against Trump persist, are repeated against logic, against basic common sense. The facts are clear, Trump won two very difficult political battles, against serious political adversaries, starting as a complete outsider. First time not even a Republican, second time a persecuted villain, yet he won both battles, creating generation level political changes both in Republican party, and in mainstream media...
Results are formidable, in both presidential elections.
Against the enormous force of media manipulation, against a significant vocal group of opponents who dislike, detest, hate Trump, up to the level of a real TDS, it is the perceived lack of intellectual foundation that is making these people distrust Trump. Trump is walking like a king on a foundation that does not exist, and it is easier to dismiss Trump as stupid, ....etc that face the feeling that there is no foundation in American society.
No foundation. Everything they used to stand on is wobbly uncertain insecure failing. Signs of a great change. An enormous number of people feeling basic insecurity, and part of them being afraid to have to rely on such a strange human being in so great a trouble.
But Trump is just a symptom of the larger disease of American society, a skilled operator in a time of post truth, where nothing is solid any more except for a Trump victory.
America as a country, as a society does not need intellectuals, never needed intellectuals in the public sphere. What makes America strong is business, common sense and patriotism, nothing that intellectuals bring to the table.
And there is no intellectualism in Trump, no intellectuals around Trump, no intellectuals in US willing to explain what is the man doing and why.
Strange decreasing strength of the intellectual voices in America, unable to face the phenomenon of Trump.
I’m surprised that you would refer to an addled and senile Biden as a serious political adversary (or the wine mom Harris who can barely string a coherent sentence together). The reality is that Trump found himself in a uniquely fortuitous moment in US politics where the opponent was simply unelectable.
Trump is, in all his humanity, an agreeable man, he tosses statements about, that make people wonder, he bites directly those that would bite him, but...
he is not critisizing his opponents in a way that people have been used too, he is antiintellectual, anti theory, simply a very pragmatic operator
Lets investigate some of the basic Trumps postulates instead of speaking about deplorables
No1.
If liberal worldview is so great, and as Francis Fukuyama opines (idiot, and writing and repeating idiocies) has won the final battle as the best system of human organization and we finally see the end of times....
how come
- US is trillions dollars in debt
- majority of citizens have not improved in their well being for at least two generations
- US is fighting and losing wars all over the world
Liberal worldview, with all intellectuals that support it, however intelligent they may seem, actually are or pretend to be, is an empty shell, a lie , a mirage
It is not Trump who created post Truth, he is the man who recognizes postTruth world and knows how to navigate in it.
Depends what you mean by elected, doesn't it. Trump actually obtained less than 35% of the 'popular' vote,so you could argue thst he's a minority prez.
you need, we all need, something like this so's we can wave it in front of govt. etc. and show clearly and without chance of dispute where we are at, what we are thinking, what we want. and we could, should give this to ourselves. now.
The US was created as a republic. The ideal of the founders was to create such a government that generally people would not have to concern themselves with it. There was no desire to create a "democracy" in the sense of a dictatorship of the majority. There was no sense of "the broader the franchise the better". There was a clear appreciation of the danger that a democracy would lead to people voting themselves benefits that someone else pays for.
As it's evolved, the system has become more binary - pick A or B. Unlike what we see in European "democracy" where the electorate divides up in many small factions. Interestingly it seems to generally have been that way in the US from the beginning.
Things began going off the rails with the Civil War which saw the blossoming of the Federal government. The turning point probably came when the constitution was amended to have Senators elected by popular vote and of course with the rise of the "progressives" and the introduction of the Income Tax, WW1 and the New Deal.
But I'd say, by accident or God's blessing, the foolish workings of politics in the US is still capable of delivering change, even revolutionary change - for good or ill. What makes people unhappy is that it can take decades to work out - even lifetimes. But the thing that makes explosives so deadly is that the energy is released all at once rather than spread out in time. Dissatisfying to those wo want the explosion.
The US does not need more "democracy". No matter how much tweaking we might do it will never be "democratic" enough for those out of power who want into power. We need to reduce the spoils available to the parasite class we call politicians.
A smaller federal government, withdrawl from foreign entanglements. Return to local control. Perhaps impossible now
Grr, you can always be counted on to say the same thing over and over again. I hadn't heard from you in a while and was beginning to worry that I had gotten off the productive path somehow. But I am relieved to get your signal back.
How does population that is being controled by "others" via destruction on that pupulations cohesion fight back? Will feminised, demoralisied, controled, manipulated men fight? For whom? How?
And one shouldn't forget FDR won 4 presidential elections - no small feat. After his Dem successor Truman won 1948, the emasculated GOP gave up its fight with DeepState and accepted RINO Eisenhower as its new presidential candidate for 1952.
Certainly, in 1941, in the early 30's Hitler, Fascism, Communism were all the rage in progressive circles. It was new and modern. They didn't enjoy the historical perspective of the late 30's and 40's which proved more of an embarrassment to them than persuasion that they were mistaken.
As to "MAGAman enabling" fascism - I suppose if you simply redefine fascism to mean: "anything I'm opposed to", you would be correct.
Fascism is not leaving office peacefully and pardoning the criminals that attempted a half assed coup in his behalf. No need to dial up the way back machine to the 30s just run (if you can ) the year 2020….🐘😴
Excellent article -- one of your best imo. This article could be a complete 'case study' in a military academy on salients and lines of communication in the era from WW1 to today. You don't often see complex and important concepts (and historical events) discussed with such clarity and insight and writing skill.
With regard to whether this article is 'too detailed' (which you seem to ask your reader), I want to say that I found your discussion of the military specifics happening across the multiple 'fronts' as enlightening (great detail, great insights, great supporting evidence and maps, etc.).. I particularly got value from your discussion of what is happening in the Siversk area (the other areas you mentioned -- e.g. south Donesk -- are great as well but they were more familiar (at least to me). So thank you for the detail and for covering a part of the front somewhat neglected elsewhere.
Furthermore, I want to thank you and call you out (in a good way) for your commentary tone in today's article. Your coverage of the military and diplomatic issues in todays article is insightful, entertaining to read, and yet detached (which I like). There have been a couple of articles of yours in the past where I've criticized you for 'too little detachment' -- however, this article of yours today is 'perfect' in that dimension.
As for what is going on with peace talks, I think your broader point -- that Russia can and, regardless of what Trump or Putins desires, likely will have to push on further towards a primarily military (not diplomatic solution) --- is correct. This assessment may change depending on unexpected events (e.g. regime change or the outbreak of actual or virtual in-fighting in Kiev), but further Russian military advances to 'force the issue' are likely because, as you point out, Kiev (and Europe) are not 'ready' for peace. Trump's intentions on all this are highly uncertain -- and many in the comments section and elsewhere will have a wide range of opinions on what exactly he is doing -- but you are correct that the current trajectory of this conflict depends less on what Trump wants, or Putin wants (diplomatically in an ideal state), than on what 'force of arms' is likely to accomplish. There may come a 'break point' (politically and then diplomatically) before there is a 'break point' militarily -- but the odds of that happening (at this moment), remain low.
I'm no military expert, but it seems to me Russia would've had this wrapped up a while ago if they used the appropriate level of force necessary to completely destroy and subdue the Ukulele threat, from the top down..
Correct, Russia did not mobilize sufficient forces at the outset of the war and tried to fight a budget operation. 2023 was the year they had to make up for this by playing for time while they mobilized, and then 2024 saw Russian advances begin to accelerate as the mobilization came into play. Russia is winning, but their failure to generate enough force in 2022 was a serious error that made the war much longer.
The idea was to bring Ukraine to the negotiation table and create a minsk 3 agreement. You don’t need a huge army for that as we have seen. Hadn’t it been for BoJo and JoBi, the SMO would have ended in mei 2022 and we wouldn’t be talking here.
The common one that the SMO was just about panicking Kiev enough to agree a deal, and that it almost worked but for some suicidal idiocy by Bojo and Zelensky that cost a million men.
I prefer the Donbas Civilian explanation that says 8 years of Nato building concrete firing positions for Nazis to shell Donbas civilians was the (only) rational for Kiev and Nato to believe an attack on Donbas to regain the 2 oblasts was feasible. [Something must have made them think it was achievable, I can't imagine what else] Russian intervention would have simply lead to either the slaughter of Donbas civilians or the embarrasing removal of civilians from Donbas (as good as a win for Ukraine/nato).
I take Kiev's intention to grab Donbas as a known fact. They announced it repeatedly, the CIA warning of a Russian invasion was clearly setting the scene for a false flag trigger for it (after all despite the CIA warnings Ukraine was quite unprepared for the SMO having lined up outside its internal Donbas border.
So the SMO was really about putting enough artillery between Donbas and Ukraine positions to defend Donbas - hence SMO was always a distraction event, not a serious invasion. Goal achieved and it withdrew rapidly.
So I don't see it as an error - the goal was to defend Donbas not to invade Kiev. But I agree the Change of approach in August / Sept 2022 was the real start of a real invasion. The Goals were much higher from then on.
In essence, you are making the point that what was done (historically in 2022) was insufficient and therefore something else should have been tried. There are two problems with that line of argument.
The first problem is that, at the time a decision had to be made, the decision makers didn't have the benefit of hindsight. Trying a 'higher risk, lower cost' approach is sometimes the right thing to do -- only in hindsight can you 'know' that that particular approach would not work. That's particularly true if the 'higher risk, lower cost' approach doesn't permanently 'destroy' your team's positions or chance of winning (and Russians 'failed' attempts in 2022 did not serious undermine its long term success in this war). Throwing an 'incomplete pass on 1st down' is unfortunate in US Football, but not catastrophic to your ultimate winning of the game. Russia's 'failed' efforts in 2022 were the same -- its effort had a reasonable chance of success and nearly succeeded. It might even be true that if you 'ran that same play 10,000 times' (in a Monte Carlo simulation kind of way), you might actually 'win' 60-70% of the time by pursuing their chosen strategy -- which makes 'trying the riskier but lower cost' play an even more reasonable opening move.
The second issue with your line of argument is regarding the 'costs' of your preferred approach (SEAD campaign, etc or whatever). The question remains whether this was a) actually possible at the time and b) better than the historical path (based on war-gaming out what the West / Ukraine might have done with the corresponding delay on the ground or how it would affect world or Russian opinion, economy, mobilization, etc.). The first part of this question (what could the Russian's realistically been able to mount in February 2022 and how successful would it be) is not publicly available to us -- so we won't be able to actually evaluate whether a SEAD (or other) approach was likely (at the time) to be feasible or effective. There is at least a decent chance that it would not have been effective (e.g. the Russian airframe and missile supplies were not optimally configured for that eventuality in terms of weapons mix, doctrine, or readiness) plus the Ukrainian air defense was at its height at that time in the conflict. The second part of the question depends on Western / Ukrainian countermoves and Russian opportunity costs. It was not unreasonable for Russia to keep assets (forces and missiles) in reserve in case of escalations in the Baltic or elsewhere for example nor was it unreasonable to hope to not have to mobilize reserves (financial, industrial, personnel) immediately for a 'stronger first blow' or guaranteed 'longer multi-year campaign'. It also depends on what Russia's optimal 'end state' was for the territory of Ukraine. Dropping the Dneiper bridges or electrical grid may or may not have been feasible in 2022, and even if destroying them was feasible, it may not have been preferable (perhaps because your political end goal is a functional Ukrainian state, or perhaps because you may end up 'owning' that land and needing those electrical grids or bridges or because you foresee having to cross that Dneiper at some point or whatever). Point is, it is not obvious that destroying infrastructure really supports your political goal, so some hesitation may be in order.
Once again, in hindsight, your approach might have been better overall for Russia than their historical path (although my point is that is not clear that this is so). I just don't see the point in being dogmatic about it. Being the 'man in the arena' (reference to the Kipling poem) is tough -- yelling at the quarterback on the field from the comfort of your sofa watching the game on TV for throwing an incomplete pass (that almost worked) is another. No personal insult intended.
That said, NATO certainly thought that Russia was capable of a "shock and awe" campaign in 2022, and Russia only had, what, eight years to prepare, more or less?
I actually don't think that NATO actually believed that (or if they did believe that Russia was capable of 'shock and awe', then they believed it for the wrong reasons -- i.e. they believed it because SEAD was totally consistent with NATO doctrine, weapon systems, readiness, and war plans and did not understand how SEAD would be inconsistent with how the Russian forces were actually configured). This happens (a lot) in military planning -- you 'play' the opponent's 'side' in the 'game' from 'your perspective' (your capabilities, doctrine, etc) and not from 'theirs'. Or, if you an 'expert' on Russia's capabilities and doctrines, 'you' get it (but your 'bosses' don't). Same is often true in business (and life in general).
There was / is also a big disconnect between what military commanders (and associated outside experts) 'say' in public and what might be 'true'. The best example of that phenomenon is Gen. Miley testimony to Congress that Russian wanted to take Kiev in 'three days' (although that is not technically what he said, that was certainly the gist of what he implied and how it was reported). That 'claim' of what the Russians 'intended' is rank speculation (how would he or anyone really 'know' what their intent was unless they were literal listening into the Russian decision-making conferences. You might reasonable 'infer' but you will never 'know' and even your 'inferences' are subject to error as noted above). However, that claim made pubicly in Congress certainly helped to portray the Ukrainian situation in March 2022 in a positive light -- 'look the Russians were repelled from capturing Kiev'!. This sounds good publicly (it's a victory) when meanwhile the Russians make massive inroads in Kherson and Zaporitze and create the critical land bridge to Crimea (which was arguably the most military significant aspect of 2022).
Furthermore, the aspect of having eight years to prepare also is a misunderstanding in some ways. If Russia had eight years to prepare for shock and awe, that begs two questions. Did Russia prepare (and if so, how)? And was shock and awe ever really part of the Russian plan? My argument above is that Shock and Awe has historically been part of NATO doctrine, weapon systems, plans, combat history but not really part of Russia's (or the Soviet Unions, unless you consider their plans for preemptive nuclear and chemical assaults under certain Soviet war plans). The other part of the argument is that Russia did prepare -- a lot -- in those eight years (turning from a very sanctions vulnerable economy to a near-sanctions proof one, expanding ammunition and missile construction capacities multi-fold, continuing the roll-out the expansion of professional contract troops and new weapons systems, etc.). Russia actually accomplished a tremendous amount of things in eight years -- and yet it was still very under-prepared for the conflict in 2022 (in part because it was starting from such a low base level of readiness in 2014). Anyway, just my two cents.
What really mattered in Feb 2022 was avoiding a retreat from Donbas or the slaughter of the residents. The SMO achieved that and gave Russia the option to go for a bigger adventure.
If "weak Putin allowed milions of Russians to be killed by nazis" then he would lose power to.. maybe someone like Prigozin? Some other nationalist that could be manipulated to destroy Russia.
If "evil Putin invaded democratic Ukraine" then sanctions would destroy economy and some democratic person would come to power in color revolution.. maybe someone like Navaly? Someone that would bring back situation that was in 1990. End goal being balkanisation to 43 "independent countries".
The question that arises though is if Russia would have been able to mobilize so many men before Feb 2022. I am saying this because the way the war evolved and the way the Western politicians reacted to the SMO, everyone was able to see the hidden Western agenda, crushing Russia and its economy and regime change, which was communicated openly at that time. That must have been an eye opening moment for every Russian and the Russian army had no issue finding enough recruits.
Russia certainly needed more boots on the ground, but they also should have started with a relentless SEAD campaign, then destroyed transport and infrastructure.
Western arms and munitions do no good if you cannot move them to the front, and you cannot move them to the front if all the bridges are wrecked.
What do you think would have happened if Russia had adopted western techniques and paid less attention to civilian casualties? That is, if they had begun the war with decapitation strikes at Kiev and other large cities of Ukrainian power.
So it seems to me, but I think Putin has had to keep in mind the possibility of boots on the ground intervention by NATO and also larger plans for BRICS. Maybe conquest of Ukraine would have been fast enough to represent a fait accompli by the time anybody thought about it? But I guess Putin, wielding the actual power in the situation, may have exerted greater judgment than I might have done from my couch. I also think he was surprised that the sanctions have helped more than they hurt and had to be prepared for a different outcome economically.
That NATO intervention is a lot closer now, as a result of Russian dithering and indecision. Contrast with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. NATO dared not lift a finger, out of fear of the Soviet Union.
This is most instructive. The rulers of America and their european catamites will do nothing out of the goodness of their hearts, for in sociopaths there is none to be found. They will do a great deal out of reward or fear.
The problem is that the Russian leadership does not want to admit to themselves that nobody cares how cultured they are, how many symphonies or novels Russia produces. They never will be admitted to The Club.
I do agree, regarding sanctions. The Russian Central Bank did and does yeoman's work.
I don't think it is, although one can never underestimate the effect of arrogance and desperation. But if NATO had intervened three years ago, they had some weapons with which to do so. Most probably thought the western wonder weapons would perform, and almost everybody believed the sanctions would hurt Russia. Putin had to consider those risks. Perhaps he's made mistakes, but I think on the whole his thinking has been sound.
Regarding culture, do you think Russian leadership continues to hope for admission to the club? I agree the Europeans will never let it happen, but it has always struck me as the craziest part of the whole thing.
No many more civilians would have died (1m Ukrainian to 20k civiians is the most civilian friendly war ever) though it would have been over before many middle aged men had been forcibly conscripted and died in uniform.
And many many more Russian speakers of the kind Russia sought to protect would have died.
Those 1MM didn't exactly volunteer, tho - but yes, all told it's remarkably restrained, numbers-wise in proportion to civ population. The contrast vs Gaza Lebanon etc is insane. That conflict is conducted with the stronger power making a point of inflicting mass casualties on civs.
The longer the Russians have allowed them to stay alive, the more opportunity they have given them to cause asymmetrical mischief: Nordstream (obviously done by the US), the Crimea bridge, Kursk, drone/artillery strikes on nuclear power plants, Moscow and Russian energy infrastructure, etc. Not sure how a non-military expert like myself can see this but the Russian high command can’t (or won’t). It’s not rocket science!
I think several things led to the Russian failure to mobilize more troops. Russia hasn't fought a war on this scale since WWII. I think their war games had become unrealistic and didn't reflect changes. Second, I think they underestimated both the scale of the NATO response and the lethality of Western weapons.
Everything is much simpler - Russians don't want to kill and unnecessary deaths. If they had wanted to, Putin would have solved the issue without getting up from his desk. It is simply difficult for you in the West to understand what is happening in Russia because of the constant lies about Russia.
I will say more - this situation is gradually changing, although with difficulty.
I've worked and traveled in Russia and enjoyed Russia and Russians while I was there. I believe almost nothing from our main stream news outlets.
I still believe what I said about the start of the war. I also believe you're absolutely right about how the Russians are fighting now. I think you're right about them not wanting a lot of unnecessary deaths but I think it's also to lessen the chance for NATO (read US) intervention.
"Zelensky is the President of Ukraine, and within the parameters of Ukraine’s laws, conditions of martial law do allow him to stay in office."
They don't, actually. Martial law doesn't provide for extension of Presidential term. Also, martial law only forbids Rada elections, not Presidential elections.
As far as I understand, Ukrainian constitution explicitly states that Rada remains in power until elections could be held, but doesn't state the same about president.
Who cares? The only thing that matters is whether his orders are obeyed.
One could make a legally sound argument that Viktor Yanukovich is the lawful president of Ukraine, that Zelenskii and Poroshenko are usurpers. However, since nobody in Ukraine pbeys Yanukovich, it doesn't matter.
The problem is not that Zelensky's orders are obeyed or not. Putin's argument is that Ukrainians could later say that peace agreements have been signed by illegitimate president and thus could be thrown away.
At this point if you pay attention Trump is maneuvering to dump the Ukrainian defeat onto the Europeans. Zelenskyy continues to attack the energy infrastructure that’s supposed to be part of a ceasefire. Russia has turned the other cheek so far. This both embarrasses Trump and gives Trump a politically acceptable way to cut off the Ukraine. Europe on the other hand is rushing into the trap and will get to own the eventual humiliating defeat of the Ukraine. I can’t think of a more stupid collection of clowns than the current European elite. They’re the equivalent of an ankle biter purse dog barking at a 100lb pit bull. I’m not the historian that Big Serge is so maybe he knows of a bigger collection of clowns leading Europe in history. Prior to WWI I don’t believe they were stipid. I believe they were naive about the dangers of their alliances. Believing alliances made them stronger and more likely to keep war away instead of the opposite.
Consider running a couple of different (i.e. competing) mental models in your head at the same time. One model would be that there is a 'division of labor' (the US really has no intention of normalizing relations with Russia and has already 'assigned' Europe its role as 'attack dog' to continue the war against Russia as it pivots to move against Iran and or China. Run another model that actually posits that the US and Europe actually hate each other and are on divergent paths --- but can not disentangle easily or fast enough and have to 'keep things nice for the cameras'. In that model, Europe's defiance is just that -- and actually working at cross purposes to the current US administration. Same with Europe's rearmament plan. One model is that the 'order has been given' and that the people of Europe will basically have no choice but to go into debt, expand defense, get drafted and go to war. Now try out another model that says the elite in Europe wants that outcome, but that the populace refuses to comply. Now run a third model that says that the elite really don't want to actually rearm -- they want to centralize more funding at the EU level, create giant debt-based slush funds, and fritter those funds away (like they already have for green initiatives and migration and COVID). None of those models may be 'right' in their entirety, but all may yield helpful insights into what is going on / what may happen. Models of things are just that, models, and not the 'thing' itself. There is actually little actual value in 'holding tightly' to one model (because all have their limitations in terms of explanatory value and relevance over time). Just a thought.
Now.. Propaganda in Europe has shifted, while people are all against it. That's why "Ursula has gone crazy with wanting EU army", everybody will be against it, but somehow it will happen. Like, somehow sanctions against Russia happened. And how somehow nobody knows who blew up Nordstream and so on. Theater for the masses. Those european clones of neocons will do what was commanded. Like Zelensky does..
Before the SMO and in the early weeks, I often saw expressed the (pro-Russian) opinion that a long slow war would result in multiple favourable outcomes for Russia, such as a more complete devastation of the Ukrainian military (better demilitarization), depletion of Western military equipment, etc., gaining all the benefits of attritional warfare for the side with the higher capacity, more invaluable wartime experience for the Russian military and bureaucracy, fragmentation of the Western political landscape, humiliation of the Western political class, a more complete rupture of relations with the West (seen as a good thing by these folks), giving time for the multipolar reality to set in among all classes, .., and the big reason, avoiding triggering the West (boiling frog) into doing something rash.
Western political class does not care if milions of "their people" die. I think Putin knows that and that Ukraine is just the latest war. More will be created.
Thanks, Big Serge, for a sobering but clear minded overview!
There is only one small thing I want to add, rearding the end of WW1: the German general staff - effectively, Ludendorff - did not have in mind to save its soldiers when the tide of fortune was turning against the Germans in the trenches (the first American troops entering the battle zone, the first signs of mutiny among the German soldiers). What they did want to save instead was their own poltical after-lives. So they engineered the exit from WW1 in a way that left the army - and the general staff - seemingly without fault: with the army still nominally fighting, they entered into talks with the (odious, for the generals) socialist left parties and told them, effectively, to take on them the whole state affairs from now on. And, besides, to enter into negotiations of truce. What the socialist parties - until now banned from active poltics - did. And they proclaimed a republic. Ah, and the kaiser was simply send into exil. And they signed the Versailles capitulation treaty.
Problem was: most of the people in the hinterland had been fed propaganda for the whole 4 years, of German trops advancing or at least holding off the allies. Now the whole state had crashed, the army was beaten and in tatters and retreating, the state run by socialists, the economic situation catastrophic (also) because of the reparations, etc.
At this point the generals (again, effectively Ludendorff) turned around and proclaimed that the army had not been beaten in battle but that the socalist politicians were to fault. They had signed the armistice, not the army!
(It was a lie, the Ludendorff had pledged the socialists to take over before the whole thing collapsed, but few knew this ...)
So the legend of the "stab in the back" was born: the socialist government was tainted as traitor, the army saved as "in the field unbeaten".
The socialist government, as was expected, did not fair well and a series of putsches began. One of the last was supported by Ludendorff himself, but he was outdone by that other revanchist guy who started the next war.
Well put. The difference between 1918 Germany and 2025 Ukraine is that the rulers of Ukraine long ago set up their boltholes, their exit plans, their Italian villas and British estates, their Panama holding companies and Swiss bank accounts.
So they have no concern for their political afterlives. They'll leave the patsies at home holding the bag while they enjoy The Good Life.
Good article and fair synopsis of the situation. One thing not articulated in the article is that Trump is in a hurry giving his administration just 100 days to solve this. Unfortunately, as the author points out, the situation is more complicated and reality on the battlefield matters more than Trump's wants.
At some level Trump knows that supporting Ukraine is debilitating to the US in terms of materiality and political capital. Support for Ukraine is diverting away from his ability to 'reform' the American domestic system to his liking, in which he wants a legacy of follow-on MAGA candidates achieving power like perhaps J.D. Vance, and for a build-up against China. To achieve these goals he only has four years and he sees the current Ukraine War as standing in the way.
Trump is notoriusly impatient and should he not make much headway in the peace talks; what is the possibility that he might walk away leaving Ukraine, and any Coalition of the Willing, to their own devices? US relations with Europe are already strained, with a looming trade war almost on the front door step, as well as Trump's divergent attitude to the war itself. It might be a possiblity that should there be an impasse to peace - either by the Russians, Ukrainians or Europeans - or all three, then Trump might walk away in order to achieve what he really sees as important to his Presidency leaving War to be the final arbiter to this situation.
You may be right, but I would challenge you on Trump being 'impatient' or whether he really seeks military conflict with China and is therefore in a 'hurry'. Many in Washington would fit that pattern -- and Trump might -- but I suspect not. I think the '100 days' or 'Day One' statements were more rhetorical flourishes to emphasize that "this is important to me and will be done' rather than a real time constraint on himself (it may be a constrain on any 'minion' he gives the task to but that is a personnel management tool and not a constraint on himself). I, of course, may be wrong, but my perception of Trump is that his 'public' persona is an 'act' and not necessarily the 'true' or 'only' measure the of the man. (that said, if something can be done in 100 days I am sure he would take it -- it's just what he says publicly isn't necessarily the whole and complete truth -- or even close to it. Instead, I always see him as an on-stage magician -- comical at times, flamboyant, always dangling bright objects here and there (while he moves his unobserved hand unseen beneath the table to bring about his next big 'surprise').
You might possibly be right in your assessment and these are based only on my observation and anicdotal evidence which we must take with a grain of salt. Just two points of clarification:
1. When I say a build up against China I am not talking about actually going to war with China but as a means to build pressure, incombination with other measures, to achieve his aims in humbling a peer competitor. Actual war is probably not Trump's intention - although I do class any hostile act against another state, such as trade wars for example, as a form of warfare. There are ways to use military force against an opponent short of war and having a concentration of presence is one of these.
2. On the impatient comment, he definitely does not see the Ukraine War as part of his agenda but as an impediment to it. As you say, he has certain deliberative aims - although I challange his reasoning, but he has a very limited time in which to do them (not being allowed, at this stage, to extend his tenure beyond 2028). Impatience may or maynot be part of his character - but we can only go off what he says and his actions. But there is probably an acknowledgement by him of this limited time to preseve his legacy. More time dealing with the Ukraine situation limits his time and political capital bandwidth, therefore, he wants to get shot of it as soon as possible. If no deal can be found in an acceptable timeframe for him then Trump has the option of washing his hands of the affair.
Thank you for the fabulous maps and brilliant analysis of the battlefield.
As for the "peace negotiations", my personal analysis differs slightly.
The US/Trump administration has a single objective in these "peace negotiations": they want to freeze the conflict in one way or another, before the Kiev regime collapses. Everything else (like the fake "minerals deal", or the fake "grains deal") is a distraction from this single real objective. And the reason they want to freeze the conflict is obvious: they'll restart it in 1 year, 5 years or 10 years, when the circumstances become more favorable for a complete destabilization of Russia (for example, after Putin exits the political scene).
The Kremlin knows this very well so they will drag on these negotiations essentially until - as you yourself have concluded - they achieve all the objectives of the SMO militarily. For Russia, this conflict is existential: they cannot and will not lose, whatever the cost.
The question on many people's mind is how and when will the conflict in Ukraine end? How it will end we know already: Russia will achieve all the objectives of the SMO militarily. The "denazification" of Ukraine means that the present Banderite government in Kiev will have to be replaced with one under the control of Russia, after the complete collapse of the Ukrainian armed forces. So how long will all that take? Despite signals from the Kremlin that the collapse of the Ukrainian armed forces will be achieved in 2025, I am more pessimistic about this. I think the US and Europe are both gearing to keep the Banderites in Kiev in power for as long as they can, and that means for a minimum of three years. To do so, at some critical moment the Ukrainian army will retreat entirely from the Donbass and setup strong defensive lines around Kiev and on the West bank of the Dnieper river. And that will be a very hard nut to crack.
Three comments on what you just wrote. I am not contradicting you but hoping to give you some things to think about with regard to your conclusions. The three comments are 1) what the West's goals are and whether they want renewal of the conflict, 2) whether they want Banderite's in power, and 3) whether Kiev will be able to 'hold' along the Dnieper.
The #1 point is often discussed by commentators (i.e that the West wants a Minsk 3 and wants to eventually return to war at a later date). I think that assessment was true with Blinken/Biden/Sullivan and remains true with Stamer/Macron/Merz and associated NeoCons and NeoLibs worldwide (e.g. Australia). However, I think that there is a reasonable chance that that viewpoint does not apply to Trump/Vance/Gabbard/Hegseth (and that may matter). Granted, this viewpoint that 'they are different' may be incorrect, but there are legitimate humanitarian, patriotic, political, economic and real-politic reasons why the belief 'they might be different' could be true. Of course, even if they are different, it is possible that events or political pressure etc forces them to 'comply' with the NeoCon / NeoLib view of the conflict - -but I think you have to allow for the possibility that things might be different now (and going forward). And depending on what 'going forward' means, it could be near impossible (if done correctly) for a future administration to 'restart' things, so something permanent might result. The relative 'bankrupcy' of the US government and the exhaustion of the vast majority of of American citizens towards 'forever war' (as well as the populist disgust and outrage over what they perceive to be European and Ukrainian entitlement) would be real impediments to a restart. Not a guarantee, but a factor for consideration.
The #2 point about Banderites is similar. The Banderites are 'dangerous' to US (and even correctly interpreted European) interests -- they are corrupt, ruthless, prone to violence and assassination inside and outside of Ukraine, explicitly racist, and involved (reportedly) in arms / human / biological weapon 'trafficking' --- and all of these things are likely to cause serious 'blow back' for the West in the near future. Some Banderites are also undoubtedly 'unstable' (e.g. depraved and/or addicted), etc etc. -- and having unstable leaders seeking nuclear or biological weapons (or having access to major civilian nuclear facilities) is very dangerous to the west. Furthermore, the Banderites were probably put in power in the past because of their alignment of interest with the Neo-Con/Neo-Lib West (the forever war with Russia and regime change agenda), because of their ruthlessness, and because of their reciprocal 'kompromat' blackmail that compromised key Western leaders and organizations (through bribery and or other means). Absent the common goal (forever war and regime change with Russia) and with different (presumably uncompromised) Western leaders, the Banderites become much more of a liability than an asset (and Western 'support' for last year's 'freedom fighters' can 'turn on a dime' to suppress this year's 'terrorist organization as has been demonstrated for decades across the globe). So, I think that the Banderite's 'sell by date' has already expired (at least in the USA).
Finally, #3, white it is entirely possible that Ukraine (with or even without Western aid) could hold together and defend the Dneiper -- that 'ability' depends on Ukraines national 'will' even more than on Western aid and weapons. If the mujadhadeen can do it, then yes, theoretically the Ukrainian can to do it as well. But whether the 'will' to do it and fight down to the actual 'last Ukrainian' exists is suspect I believe. This will is already heavily eroded (I believe) and will continue to suffer huge setbacks as further territory and losses mount, Western aid is withdrawn or further restricted, etc. Russia would be well advised (as you suggest) to plan for such a possibility just in case, but at some point, I think Ukraine will crack (perhaps militarily, perhaps politically internally, perhaps economically, etc) before that point.
These are all good points you make but they all stem from the assumption/belief that the US during the Trump administration 2.0 will change what has been its foreign policy for the last 80 years or so.
#1 The Trump administration 2.0 could have brought this conflict to an end in 10 minutes during the first day in office of DT (as he had promised): it would be as simple as turning off Starlink in Ukraine, disabling the 42,000+ Starlink terminals "gifted" to Ukraine by the US and used by every single Ukrainian military unit down to the platoon level as their sole means of communication. But the reality is that DT never intended to stop supporting the Kiev regime, so Starlink is still working, the flow of US weapons and ammunition into Ukraine continues unabated (including tens of thousands of kamikaze drones per month and of course, Kiev's favorite ammunition: cluster rounds), as well as money and ISR.
If you ignore the Kabuki theater dispensed in large doses by DT himself and all of his WH staff, including the VP, and focus on the actions of the US, you will conclude that the US does not want this war to stop and will pursue until the end of times its goal of destabilizing and ultimately destroying Russia, before they do the same to China.
#2 The Banderites are a means to an end and will receive US and European support for as long as they keep being useful, it's as simple as that. Plus they are relatively inexpensive.
#3 A cursory review of Ukraine demographics shows that there is a "pool" of around 1 million men that the Kiev regime can still force conscript and send to the frontlines. If the Ukrainian army retreats and organizes its defense around Kiev and on the West bank of the Dnieper river, they would reduce the attrition rate of their personnel to last for 3 years or more. Of course, a lot can happen in 3 years, but that goes both ways. A few days ago, the green goblin iin Kiev was hoping that Putin would die "soon, and then it [the war] will be over."
You might be right -- it's hard to know. Elsewhere on this overall thread I have a few comments on your point #1 (why Trump really can't do as you say on day 1) -- so I won't restate all that thinking here, but perhaps consider it. The Banderites might be kept as well (although there is a good reason for someone to want to eliminate them). At the end of the day, it depends on how 'unchangeable' you think national strategies might be. Something that has been in effect for 80 years might not change (ever) -- but I consider it is not only possible but actually likely -- but that's just me.
Martin, it's fine to hope that the Trump administration 2.0 will give up on "Project Ukraine" and the killing in Ukraine will come to an end. I actually hope the same. But hopes rarely translate into reality, and specially in this US hybrid war against Russia using Ukraine as a proxy, it seems Ukraine will indeed fight "to the last man" the Banderites in Kiev can grab off the street, punch senseless and ship to the frontlines.
All this gives Russia no choice but to fight to the bitter end.
I wonder if you've seen a recent Ukrainian poll that indicates just how strongly the nationalist/neo-Nazi element feels about ANY surrender terms..as I recall, a full 15% of the veteran respondents stated that they would participate in armed rebellion in event of any surrender of Ukrainian lands. A foregone conclusion, it seems, for at least a decade more of woe for Ukraine.
The one thing we see in any successful insurgency is a young population. The median age in Yemen is 19. The median age in Ukraine was over 40, and that from before the war.
I recall similar surveys taken in Afghanistan before the fall of the regime there, all suitably anonymized, which claimed to show that support for the Taliban was minimal. The subjects tell the pollster what he wants to hear.
Fair enough, but I think the fanaticism of Ukraine's neo-Nazis should not be underestimated, and the 18 year-old cohort remains fully intact. We shall see soon enough, because Ukraine is on it's knees.
I doubt Ukrainian Nazis are any more fanatic than jihadis. I have been in physical altercations with some, and they weren't all that, nor were they especially brave.
Like their SS forebears, quite the opposite.
Anyway, those of the 18-25 year old contingent who wanted to fight have already volunteered. As to their absolute numbers, that is a function of the post-1991 demographic collapse.
Ukrainian Nazis shot up the Maidan protests, and burned dozens of people alive in Odessa. They have made explicit death threats to Zelensky, they refused to withdraw from Donbass on his orders to try to implement Minsk accords, etc., etc. and so on. There is more than enough published information on this file since 2014, so no excuse to be unaware of it if you at all follow events in Ukraine 🤷♂️
Check out the prewar Ukraine population pyramid. Big dip in the teens. Made more so by refuge flows. Women and underage kids were allowed to leave until recently.
On the subject of "the deal" - it must be considered that the context is US attempting a pivot to Yemen and Iran.
That next war is required for the Trump administration in the context of "supporting Israel no matter what", and for them that's an immovable political priority. And the cost to the US of fighting that war depends greatly on Russia (and China too) refraining from becoming active proxy-sponsors. In particular, that Iran not receive help attacking the US Navy, which is at risk already with just the resources Yemen has at this stage of escalation.
This context drives Trump's US-Russia deal attempt. Trump must reduce intensity in UA to free up resources - but everyone knows he has to do this even if nothing is given to him. Thus he offers a little more, ie partial normalization, partial sanctions reduction, partial recognition of territory changes, etc. However, he must also "maintain leverage over Russia" to assure Russia doesn't help Iran in the future, so he can't offer everything. Therefore Trump's constraint on any deal, is that at best it is a halfway resolution of the Ukraine conflict.
And all this is currently mooted by Kiev's demonstrative refusal to implement even step 1 of the de-escalation sequence jointly proposed in the recent US-Russia meetings in Riyadh.
Pax -- good comments and re-statement of the current 'conventional wisdom', espoused by many public commentators on geo-politics. And it may, actually, be true. But maybe not. While there are many in the administration and DC and in the West (or Israel) that would advocate for that approach, I, at least, am 'cautiously optimistic' that Trump (like Putin in his own way and for his issues) is open to 'something else' if he can 'thread the needle'. In that vein, I genuinely believe (or perhaps hope) that Trump is not laser-locked on wars or conflict with China or Iran or in Yemen/Gaza or Ukraine (or Panama or Greenland for that matter). Does that mean he 'would never fight' in those regions - no, I think there are situations where 'conflict' (kinetic or otherwise) is occurring (Yemen right now) or would occur if 'push came to shove'. But being 'willing to do something if no better alternative exists' is different than 'wanting to' or even 'expecting to'. Threats, minor 'acts of aggression', dialog, cancelation of dialog, photo ops, tweets about 'rocket men' and / or new 'best friend' are all tools for some (I suspect) intentional (or perhaps instinctual) plan. So, the question is 'what is that plan'? Is it a pivot to be able to fight Iran (for the benefit of Israel and or Saudi Arabia or even China or Europe or for 'world-empire')? I suspect not for Trump, although almost certainly for John Bolton. I guess I am arguing for more skepticism for the 'conventional wisdom' -- it is often right (which is why it is both conventional and wise -- but in certain wild card situations or unusual characters -- it can be wrong. Even worse (or better from your perspective), it makes excellent camoflage to mask the moves of 'unconventional' operators. Just something to think about.
As far as previous talk about putting an end to stupid wars, it would be great if Trump or his cabinet had a plan to make that a reality.
I wouldn't hold my breath tho. They've been unwavering loyal to Netanyahu's expansionist agenda. If they didn't promise him to top Biden's already ridiculous (ie mass slaughter of civs) level of support, Trump wouldn't have got the political support he did from the Israel lobby. Given previous rhetoric, especially by JDV and Tulsi, It's something of a bait and switch, to be sure.
And in terms of policy style in general, the new administration has been direct / blunt all around. Looks like whereever they think they have leverage, they don't hesitate to push.
So in my view, that's a recipe for a deliberate escalation spiral with Yemen, which is already underway, and then Iran. What would cause them to back off is if they don't think they can win.
I certainly get where you are coming from. If Trump and team are against 'stupid wars' then, 'be against stupid wars then and stop fighting and provoking conflict!'. I get that sentiment. I can also understand how one can go to a) 'dishonesty' ('Trump was lying about stopping stupid wars') or b) 'cynicism' ('they are only against stupid wars that they cannot win'). I do think that there is a third alternative c) 'a certain number of wars are (in essence) unavoidable, and the key is to get out of the 'minefield' as quickly as possible and with as many finger / toes / limbs as possible.
I think the Yemen situation falls into that category. I think that there are multiple reasons why Yemen is attacking shipping in the Aden Red Sea straits -- one of those reasons is Israel / Gaza (but that is not the only reason). There is an Iran component. There is a jihad element. There is a criminal / piracy element. Similarly, there are reasons why the USA might might to take action to shut down Yemen's ability to act. Some of those reasons have to do with Israel -- but also Egypt (Egypt is unstable and always an economic basket case but its main source of revenue -- Suez Canal tolls has been dramatically impacted by the Yemen actions). Some of those reason have to do with trade routes to Europe and the Gulf States, and freedom of navigation, and not wanting to look weak, etc etc.
So all I am saying is that there are 1000 'hot spots' around the world (some of which aren't necessarily in the news like in the Congo right now, or Morocco, or Niger, or Bolivia, or Armenia, or Moldova, etc) and some times it might be necessary or advisable to act militarily (or threaten credibly to do so). Running a nation state with global interests is always going to fraught with actual and potential conflict. At worst, the leaders seek that conflict out or negligently engage with it when it occurs -- at best, they avoid the 'big ones' (and 'small ones too') but will inevitably trip some booby trap somewhere -- whether they want to or not (and admittedly, sometime they want to -- perhaps because they are evil or mistaken or perhaps because setting off a 'little one' helps to avoid the 'bigger one' over there, or so they think).
Not sure what will happen -- but that is my baseline hope. Not real total peace (since I don't believe that is realistic) - but as close to that as can be managed under the circumstances. I hope the stupid wars stop. I hope 'threats' are just that 'threats' to bring about a more peaceful outcome. But sometimes we don't get what we hope for and sometimes we try, but fail. I just want them to succeed in peace.
The Europeans are a big part of the problem, as well as Zelensky. Trump needs to withdraw all support from Ukraine, and then see how stubborn the war hungry Euros remain.
Support withdrawn means not only logistics from satellites, launch codes, and other intel, supplies of weapons and ammunition, but all the cost of supporting Ukraine as a state, such as pensions, police, ambulance, teacher salaries, etc... Trump needs to completely let go of the proxy if he wants to be taken seriously by Russia.
Europe won't go along with the sanctions relief needed for the ceasefire or grain deals, so let them handle Ukraine and keep the proxy running.
Will we lose European friends? Were they really ever friends, or just entitled dependents with a superiority complex, who want us to back them while they look down on us?
I understand where you are coming from -- and what you suggest would be the most emotionally satisfying resolution to what is going on -- 'just quit'. However, I don't think that Trump (or anyone, not just him) can really just 'do that'. Yes, it is possible that the US wants its 'cake and eat it too' (a geo-political role in Ukraine that continues and a resolution to this crisis) - and at some level I am sure this is 'true'. But, when you think about it, it also become clear that there are too many 'spider webs' tying the US to the Ukraine and Europe to 'just walk away' in one fell swoop. Therefore, it is possible, that what Trump is doing is exactly what you 'want' -- to walk away completely but that to do so, he has to move slowly, step by step, meticulously cutting away 'web after web'. Each move he makes (whether intentionally or not, although I suspect it's intentional) slowly moves the 'Overton Window' on what is discussable and allowable in public and in Congress. Cutting off aid Day 1 of his Presidency would have set off a firestorm (although large portions of his base would have been thrilled). Instead, we are only 90 some days into his office and already that has already happened (briefly) and has become 'discussable' going forward. If Europe or Ukraine 'derails' his 'fine' peace initiative, might such a 'withdrawal' happen (as you wish). I'd say 'probably'. And that's probably the point. Move the needle slowly -- too slowly if this were a 2 hour movie --- but not that slowly in the grand scheme of things (13 part mini-series, probably with multiple seasons!). He is a show-man after all. Just something to consider.
Give them just enough rope to hang themselves.
@HBI
(Quote)
"Give them just enough rope to hang themselves"
----------
As a tribute to both Trump and Stalin? Don't GIVE them any rope. Make them buy it themselves, charging full retail price.
Well, the objective is to alter the Overton Window, so giving rope out is a loss leader. ha.
Split the difference?
Offer high tensile strength 12.5mm hemp rope as part of a 30 day "free trial"? Return unused portion before end of month, pay only shipping & handling.
They could have used you working the Organization on the Trump Steaks project.
Not exactly their style
I am watching this progress and i'm convinced that is the plan. These people are by no means as dumb as they are portrayed to be.
I think that's true in politics. And also if they have really specific objectives, like for example appoint the judges X Y and Z to the Court of Appeals, or beat down anti-Israel-killing-Palestinians protesters.
With more open ended objectives tho, like trade agenda... I'm just not seeing it.
In foreign policy, the one that stands out to me is Trump's previous attempts to manipulate the relationship with China, during their first term. Backfired enormously, putting Chinese transition to tech independence which was happening at medium speed, on fast-forward. Because it basically forced Chinese domestic industrials - fiercely competitive and happy to lean hard on foreign tech to get ahead - to cooperate with each other and buy into domestic alternatives which were starting from scratch . All out of fear of the US. And that was when the Trump team didn't have a free hand to make sweeping changes like they do now. The Tariffs policy is shaping up to be an epic fiasco.
I think the 'jury is still out' on all of those topics. You can see the Trump 1.0 and China as a 'fail' (because China has redoubled its efforts at internal development, with some degree of success) -- or you could see it as something that was 'going to happen anyway and soon' (in which case the tariffs from 1.0 -- which are still in place even during the Biden era) as part of a longer term strategy to make the US less dependent on China (which some would argue was essential, regardless of the short term impact to the US or eventual benefit to China). The whole issue of whether China is 'strong' economically and financially or politically at the moment and going forward in the years ahead is also really an open question as well (there is evidence for and against that proposition) -- and how you answer that question plays a factor in assessing Trump 1.0 (and 2.0's) actions and motivations.
There is also a very large open issue with regard to the benefits of tariffs in general (and for the US specifically at this particular point of history). Conventional economic theory maintains that tariffs are pretty much always and everywhere a net negative (unless you are a developing nation with excellent long term leadership and a long term anti-tariff transition plan). However, conventional economics has (arguably) often (some would say always) been 'wrong'. As someone some what trained in several of the various schools of economics, I am no longer a 'believer' in the 'conventional consensus' (i.e. when you see 'how the sausage is made' and have to 'taste' whether the end result is 'fit for human consumption' you start to develop 'some doubts'). Furthermore, there are legitimate arguments for tariffs as a 'end state' (and not just a negotiating tool). These arguments may be wrong as well (or not) -- but they do exist (even if the mainstream economics and press do not honor them with conversation).
I'm with you. Trump should have walked when he tossed the green dwarf from the white House.
The sooner he does, the sooner the permanently outraged left will move on to other outrages and it will be forgotten.
European friends are not friends. They are vasals. Elites in Europe work for American empire. Superiorty complex is just a mask to hide that fact from people they are going to send to die in the near future.
You know, like Zelensky is doing that to ukrainians right now.
European friends? American Mexicana has occupied Germany for 80 years, forced the adoption of the Kalergi Plan as the template for the West in the U.N. overseen Germany's implementation of the Kalergi Plan throughout Western Europe, particularly through the E.U. which early on was dominated by American Mexicana controlled Germany.
American Mexicana has, for well over 150 years, actively worked to destroy Europe. The fact is that the greatest fear American Mexicana has is a united Europe.
I think you mean the British
American and British empires act in the same. Both were imnune from invasion, therefore they could "divide and rule" everybody else.
We are much farther away.
We don’t need Empire, further our organically Federated nature won’t allow Empire.
The Constitution simply works with our situation.
Every American wide scale arrangement from the Iroquois to the Internet and all arrangements in between has been a Federation .
American people don't need Empire.
What about their political elites?
Where is American Empire involved? USAID?
Inertia. We didn’t retract in 1991.
Idiotically we expanded.
That’s ending one way or another.
Sorry it’s not on our top 10 fears
"Were they really ever friends, or just entitled dependents with a superiority complex, who want us to back them while they look down on us?"
Worse than that, they are Manchurian Candidates that have sold out their own people for globalist banking, media, finance and corporations, taking their cut for taking orders. Unfortunately they are paid off by the lead globalist gang that operate in the US and it seems to me, are still emboldened by them. If Trumps' administration are attempting to do what they say they are, they are faced with their own deep state and those of the Europeans and UK. I agree with you but there are old, deeply layered poisons entrenched within European and even the US (security state) apparatus. Trumps' admin will need all the backing and support from ordinary people they can get. The US is the only Western state that can mount serious opposition to the globalists - the UK and European public and resistance is broken and demoralised.
Move to Russia bitch
Trump, I suspect, would happily walk away from Ukraine, but he has domestic political considerations to consider. Namely, a rather large faction of the Congressional GOP are deeply committed to the proxy war. Trump is a much savvier political operator than I think he gets credit for, and he knows this. That’s one reason the likes of Mike Waltz (a one-time aide to the arch-neocon Dick Cheney) is in his administration; he represents that faction’s interests and having him on board as reassurance is probably what allowed Trump to get Hegseth and Gabbard confirmed. That’s also why Waltz still has his job after the fiasco with the Signal chat - Trump can’t afford to alienate the faction Waltz represents (though he’s almost certainly on thin ice now).
I think the likely outcome of all this is that the US eventually gives up on forcing an immediate peace deal. I predict in that case a tightening of Russian sanctions, while at the same time material aid is quietly reduced and back channels with the Russians remain active waiting for the moment when Ukraine starts to concede to the inevitable (or in a less likely scenario, when Russia starts to reach its own limits, be they economic, political or military). We do have things the Russians want, some quite badly, and there will eventually be a time when they want those things as much or more than what they can get out of continuing on the battlefield (which cannot, after all, offer sanctions relief among other things).
I agree with the first paragraph. Tightening sanctions is virtue signaling. The Russians have more resources we want than products we can supply them due to 10 years of sanctions.
Seems to me that Trump uses chaos and BS to keep everyone guessing about his next move.
“We do have things the Russians want, some quite badly…”
Badly, like what?
Lots of things, honestly.
1) Sanctions relief.
2) Their frozen central bank funds.
3) Recognition as a Great Power (at least tacitly).
4) Security concessions such as removal of American troops and weapons from former Soviet Republics (the Baltics) and Warsaw Pact states (Poland and Romania in particular).
5) Barring that, at the very least obtaining commitments not to place nuclear capable missile launchers like Aegis Ashore installations or Typhon medium range missile batteries east of Germany.
6) Tacit recognition of a Russian sphere of influence (or at least interest) in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.
7) Curtailing efforts to destabilize Russia’s near abroad (in Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, etc.).
8) Normalization of relations in general.
In general, I think the Russians are fundamentally uninterested in conquering Europe; their primary concerns are security and securing their national interests in the Russian near abroad (including the rights of Russian speakers in nearby countries). Accordingly, I imagine that they view the current mutual hostility with the West as undesirable and would prefer a modus vivendi or detente in which each side’s interests are mutually recognized and respected. This is something we could offer them. The rub is that they don’t trust any rapprochement to last beyond the next four years (and with good reason). Still, it’s not like we have nothing they want. Eventually they’ll probably want some of these things more than continuing a bloody and costly fight in Ukraine (barring a total military collapse by Ukraine, anyway - which cannot be ruled out).
Russia has to win first, and than can start negotiating. There is absolutely no incentive to negotiate with Russia until Russia wins. And than there will not be much to negotiate.
Things the Russians want ... such as a more stable, peaceful, respectful, and economically beneficial mutual relationship longer term with the US (and maybe Europe).
Some will argue that the 'West' is purely predatory in 'nature' and cannot ever allow for that condition to exist. I would not agree with that position (although I would concede that the Neocon / Neoliberal factions in America and Europe and that the current leadership of the EU, UK, and Ukraine cannot allow that condition) -- but these 'Never Russia' factions are, in the end, factions that aren't 'guaranteed' to be in power in their governments forever (or at least that is my view of the world).
At some point, Russia -- even if it can (or actually does) 'conquer' all of the Ukraine (set your limit -- to the Dnieper, to Lvov, etc) will want to 'relax its limbic system' and have security (without maintaining such war time military expenditures and personnel losses). I am sure that Russia is prepared -- if forced to -- to fight a new 30 year Cold War (or semi-hot insurgency war in Western Ukraine), but I am sure that the 'calmer heads' in Russia don't seek this outcome as a first choice of action. Furthermore, Russia can isolate itself completely from the West and rely on BRICS if need be -- but it doesn't have to -- and Russia could find better geo-political-economic outcomes if it has some degree of engagement or raproachment with the West (define that degree or engagement as wide or as narrow as your wish -- something is better than nothing as long as Russia retains a vibrant and robust economic and technological degree of independence and autonomy). Governments in the West are not permanent (although national interests may be), and it may not be in the national interests long term of either North America or even of Europe to be in a permanent hot or Cold War with Russia (and visa versa).
Therefore the question, for Russia, is whether some sort of dialog, detente, raproachment, etc is feasible -- and with Trump, there may be an opportunity, so it is reasonable for Russia to explore that idea (and take it if it can be mutually agreed to and based on mutual benefit).
In essence, the 'thing being offered' is not territory in Ukraine (Russia can have pretty much whatever it wants, the only question is price to be paid for it in blood and treasure and future wariness and obligation). The 'thing being offered' is not economic benefits or technology or finance either -- it is a 'reset' (although, because of past failures and betrayals that concept is a dirty word). The onus to forge that new relationship (and make it 'real' and not just a 'sound bite' or 'photo op') is on the West -- and the US (via Trump) taking on that 'onus' is the 'offer'. Whether it 'works out' or not is to be determined -- but the 'chance' to escape 'mutual antagonism' is the 'lure' (for both parties -- at least in regard to the US and Russia).
Remarkably sensible summary of the situation.
I think Putin only wants the usa to become sane and reasonable. an enormous ask. impossible in fact. it would need the american public to wake up and begin to control their country. and even then it would be immensely difficult because their country of course is split into 50 states. they're divided before they start.
america doesn't exist therefore, the people being missing in action.
we just have the lunatic manipulators.
they will never willingly become sane and reasonable. they can't. they don't understand the concepts.
but they are going to have to. is the point. that putin and the rest of the world knows. time for those lunatics to sit down and be good boys. because they've been found out. and the machine they think they're running ain't the machine they think it is. it hasn't got the strength, the money, the structure, the power, the abilities they think it has.
it exists from sheer habit: the habit of satrapies to do as they're told.
the 'hereditary' instinctive belief everyone has in the 'might' of america.
its all a sham like the emperor's clothes.
it's not that the world wants something from america so much as they just want, need, america to get out of the way.
which means those lunatics, of course. i say again: there is no 'america'. 350 million people are totally discounted and might well be discounted, too, for they are dumb, disorganised, disinterested, unknowing, ineffectual.
so it means those lunatics. they need to get out of the way.
and the world grows more sophisticated.
soon if they don't get out of the way they will be pushed out of the way. it is going sooner or later to start getting up front close and personal for them.
i think the place will probably accelerate its own destruction any time soon. trump is murdering it.
but things the russians want? things the world wants? get out of the way. go back to your own little island and look after your own business after one hundred years of interfering in the business of the world and hampering the world in every possible way.
They apparently want farm equipment.
A comprehensive master-class complete with relevant historical references--coherent, systematic and well-written. I cannot thank you enough. Superb. (And the maps are terrific!)
If you take the view, as I do, that the USA essentially started this war against Russia using Ukraine (and latterly Europe) as proxies, then what we really have here is the two main protagonists negotiating with each other. The limited involvement or total exclusion of Ukraine and European leaders tends to support this thesis.
Trump may well want to do a deal, but IMHO his focus is domestic and he cannot afford a debacle Kapbul style. I think he should have simply walked day 1 and blamed it on Biden. Well no matter what, Ukraine will be defeated by Russia, and with it the USA and Europe (whatever that means these days). And Trump will get the blame. Whenever this occurs. I don't think there is a "deal" here for Trump to do. Russia has inflicted [or soon will do] a devastating military defeat on the USA led Collective West.
So I suppose I agree in the round with the author in that - in this case - the sword will prove mightier than the pen. And will define the endgame. However Russia is not going to do a temporary deal with a POTUS with less than 4 years left and beset by domestic enemies. It may allow the impression of a deal, but this is "c*ck on the block" time as they used to say. Put up or shut up. Over to you Mr T.
Trump is weak, stupid and easily manipulated. There will be no deal.
However, I suspect that this is far from over.
"weak, stupid and easily manipulated" - yet somehow he managed to be elected president of the US twice while spending a fraction of the money as his opponents as they mobilized the power of propaganda and government to try to put him in jail.
I get why people call him stupid, but one groups "stupid" is another groups "most entertaining presidential speaker of many decades".
Serges article made a brief mention of Trumps similarity to FDR that struck a cord with me as I am reading "The Forgotten Man" a narrative history of the depression and new deal. It's striking how similar FDR and Trump are.
Being popular is hardl;y a sign of intellect, any more than album sales are a barometer of musical ability. Anyway, Trump's own appointees, who know him better than I do, have specifically used the word "moron".
Keep in mind that Trump's opponents were singularly weak as candidates themlseves.
That said, the average frustrated deplorable can be said to have made an entirely rational decision in voting for weak, stupid, easily manipulated Trump. When the system is rigged, and not in your favor, when everyone outside the ruling class is being picked clean and left to rot, the choices on offer being Team R Tweedledee and Team D Tweedledum, one response is to Burn It All Down.
First time I ever heard Trump compared with FDR, I'll say.
It has always been strange how easily these accusations against Trump persist, are repeated against logic, against basic common sense. The facts are clear, Trump won two very difficult political battles, against serious political adversaries, starting as a complete outsider. First time not even a Republican, second time a persecuted villain, yet he won both battles, creating generation level political changes both in Republican party, and in mainstream media...
Results are formidable, in both presidential elections.
Against the enormous force of media manipulation, against a significant vocal group of opponents who dislike, detest, hate Trump, up to the level of a real TDS, it is the perceived lack of intellectual foundation that is making these people distrust Trump. Trump is walking like a king on a foundation that does not exist, and it is easier to dismiss Trump as stupid, ....etc that face the feeling that there is no foundation in American society.
No foundation. Everything they used to stand on is wobbly uncertain insecure failing. Signs of a great change. An enormous number of people feeling basic insecurity, and part of them being afraid to have to rely on such a strange human being in so great a trouble.
But Trump is just a symptom of the larger disease of American society, a skilled operator in a time of post truth, where nothing is solid any more except for a Trump victory.
America as a country, as a society does not need intellectuals, never needed intellectuals in the public sphere. What makes America strong is business, common sense and patriotism, nothing that intellectuals bring to the table.
And there is no intellectualism in Trump, no intellectuals around Trump, no intellectuals in US willing to explain what is the man doing and why.
Strange decreasing strength of the intellectual voices in America, unable to face the phenomenon of Trump.
Every time I hear someone calling Trump a moron I am asking what does this say about his opponents losing to such a moron.
I’m surprised that you would refer to an addled and senile Biden as a serious political adversary (or the wine mom Harris who can barely string a coherent sentence together). The reality is that Trump found himself in a uniquely fortuitous moment in US politics where the opponent was simply unelectable.
Not a fortuitious moment but more like
absolute collapse of liberal ideology
utter, definite end of liberalism
Trump is, in all his humanity, an agreeable man, he tosses statements about, that make people wonder, he bites directly those that would bite him, but...
he is not critisizing his opponents in a way that people have been used too, he is antiintellectual, anti theory, simply a very pragmatic operator
Lets investigate some of the basic Trumps postulates instead of speaking about deplorables
No1.
If liberal worldview is so great, and as Francis Fukuyama opines (idiot, and writing and repeating idiocies) has won the final battle as the best system of human organization and we finally see the end of times....
how come
- US is trillions dollars in debt
- majority of citizens have not improved in their well being for at least two generations
- US is fighting and losing wars all over the world
Liberal worldview, with all intellectuals that support it, however intelligent they may seem, actually are or pretend to be, is an empty shell, a lie , a mirage
It is not Trump who created post Truth, he is the man who recognizes postTruth world and knows how to navigate in it.
Depends what you mean by elected, doesn't it. Trump actually obtained less than 35% of the 'popular' vote,so you could argue thst he's a minority prez.
William, Trump received 49.9% of the popular vote, a plurality.
But not of those eligible to vote
you don't have a sensible voting system.
you need, we all need, something like this so's we can wave it in front of govt. etc. and show clearly and without chance of dispute where we are at, what we are thinking, what we want. and we could, should give this to ourselves. now.
https://abrogard.com/blog/2023/12/25/dont-write-to-congress/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-source_voting_system
https://abrogard.com/blog/2024/10/14/how-about-this-to-bring-truth-to-the-elections/
"you don't have a sensible voting system."
What is "sensible" ?
The US was created as a republic. The ideal of the founders was to create such a government that generally people would not have to concern themselves with it. There was no desire to create a "democracy" in the sense of a dictatorship of the majority. There was no sense of "the broader the franchise the better". There was a clear appreciation of the danger that a democracy would lead to people voting themselves benefits that someone else pays for.
As it's evolved, the system has become more binary - pick A or B. Unlike what we see in European "democracy" where the electorate divides up in many small factions. Interestingly it seems to generally have been that way in the US from the beginning.
Things began going off the rails with the Civil War which saw the blossoming of the Federal government. The turning point probably came when the constitution was amended to have Senators elected by popular vote and of course with the rise of the "progressives" and the introduction of the Income Tax, WW1 and the New Deal.
But I'd say, by accident or God's blessing, the foolish workings of politics in the US is still capable of delivering change, even revolutionary change - for good or ill. What makes people unhappy is that it can take decades to work out - even lifetimes. But the thing that makes explosives so deadly is that the energy is released all at once rather than spread out in time. Dissatisfying to those wo want the explosion.
The US does not need more "democracy". No matter how much tweaking we might do it will never be "democratic" enough for those out of power who want into power. We need to reduce the spoils available to the parasite class we call politicians.
A smaller federal government, withdrawl from foreign entanglements. Return to local control. Perhaps impossible now
I don't know that any place needs more democracy. But I do think they should try it.
Agreed
He wasn't elected, he was selected and installed by the genocidal ashkeNAZI sub-human animals that you adore.
No surprise to learn you are a Trumptard.
Grr, you can always be counted on to say the same thing over and over again. I hadn't heard from you in a while and was beginning to worry that I had gotten off the productive path somehow. But I am relieved to get your signal back.
Is USA zionist golem or is Israel USA proxy?
Good question. Col Laurence Wilkerson believes it’s the latter.
I tend to agree. But it seems to be a two way street; both carry out the dirty work for each other.
Both need destroying.
But what do you actually need to destroy?
How does population that is being controled by "others" via destruction on that pupulations cohesion fight back? Will feminised, demoralisied, controled, manipulated men fight? For whom? How?
Oh yes.. MAGA.. go fight China and Iran, right?
that would be the Amity Shlaes book. 2007.
Yes, exactly, thank you for citing the Author.
And one shouldn't forget FDR won 4 presidential elections - no small feat. After his Dem successor Truman won 1948, the emasculated GOP gave up its fight with DeepState and accepted RINO Eisenhower as its new presidential candidate for 1952.
Big diff chief, FDR fought fascism MAGAman is enabling it 😒
Certainly, in 1941, in the early 30's Hitler, Fascism, Communism were all the rage in progressive circles. It was new and modern. They didn't enjoy the historical perspective of the late 30's and 40's which proved more of an embarrassment to them than persuasion that they were mistaken.
As to "MAGAman enabling" fascism - I suppose if you simply redefine fascism to mean: "anything I'm opposed to", you would be correct.
Fascism is not leaving office peacefully and pardoning the criminals that attempted a half assed coup in his behalf. No need to dial up the way back machine to the 30s just run (if you can ) the year 2020….🐘😴
Give me a 007 license and I’ll have a go 😆
Big Serge with another great article.
Excellent article -- one of your best imo. This article could be a complete 'case study' in a military academy on salients and lines of communication in the era from WW1 to today. You don't often see complex and important concepts (and historical events) discussed with such clarity and insight and writing skill.
With regard to whether this article is 'too detailed' (which you seem to ask your reader), I want to say that I found your discussion of the military specifics happening across the multiple 'fronts' as enlightening (great detail, great insights, great supporting evidence and maps, etc.).. I particularly got value from your discussion of what is happening in the Siversk area (the other areas you mentioned -- e.g. south Donesk -- are great as well but they were more familiar (at least to me). So thank you for the detail and for covering a part of the front somewhat neglected elsewhere.
Furthermore, I want to thank you and call you out (in a good way) for your commentary tone in today's article. Your coverage of the military and diplomatic issues in todays article is insightful, entertaining to read, and yet detached (which I like). There have been a couple of articles of yours in the past where I've criticized you for 'too little detachment' -- however, this article of yours today is 'perfect' in that dimension.
As for what is going on with peace talks, I think your broader point -- that Russia can and, regardless of what Trump or Putins desires, likely will have to push on further towards a primarily military (not diplomatic solution) --- is correct. This assessment may change depending on unexpected events (e.g. regime change or the outbreak of actual or virtual in-fighting in Kiev), but further Russian military advances to 'force the issue' are likely because, as you point out, Kiev (and Europe) are not 'ready' for peace. Trump's intentions on all this are highly uncertain -- and many in the comments section and elsewhere will have a wide range of opinions on what exactly he is doing -- but you are correct that the current trajectory of this conflict depends less on what Trump wants, or Putin wants (diplomatically in an ideal state), than on what 'force of arms' is likely to accomplish. There may come a 'break point' (politically and then diplomatically) before there is a 'break point' militarily -- but the odds of that happening (at this moment), remain low.
Great work.
I'm no military expert, but it seems to me Russia would've had this wrapped up a while ago if they used the appropriate level of force necessary to completely destroy and subdue the Ukulele threat, from the top down..
Correct, Russia did not mobilize sufficient forces at the outset of the war and tried to fight a budget operation. 2023 was the year they had to make up for this by playing for time while they mobilized, and then 2024 saw Russian advances begin to accelerate as the mobilization came into play. Russia is winning, but their failure to generate enough force in 2022 was a serious error that made the war much longer.
The idea was to bring Ukraine to the negotiation table and create a minsk 3 agreement. You don’t need a huge army for that as we have seen. Hadn’t it been for BoJo and JoBi, the SMO would have ended in mei 2022 and we wouldn’t be talking here.
There seem to be 2 responses to that.
The common one that the SMO was just about panicking Kiev enough to agree a deal, and that it almost worked but for some suicidal idiocy by Bojo and Zelensky that cost a million men.
I prefer the Donbas Civilian explanation that says 8 years of Nato building concrete firing positions for Nazis to shell Donbas civilians was the (only) rational for Kiev and Nato to believe an attack on Donbas to regain the 2 oblasts was feasible. [Something must have made them think it was achievable, I can't imagine what else] Russian intervention would have simply lead to either the slaughter of Donbas civilians or the embarrasing removal of civilians from Donbas (as good as a win for Ukraine/nato).
I take Kiev's intention to grab Donbas as a known fact. They announced it repeatedly, the CIA warning of a Russian invasion was clearly setting the scene for a false flag trigger for it (after all despite the CIA warnings Ukraine was quite unprepared for the SMO having lined up outside its internal Donbas border.
So the SMO was really about putting enough artillery between Donbas and Ukraine positions to defend Donbas - hence SMO was always a distraction event, not a serious invasion. Goal achieved and it withdrew rapidly.
So I don't see it as an error - the goal was to defend Donbas not to invade Kiev. But I agree the Change of approach in August / Sept 2022 was the real start of a real invasion. The Goals were much higher from then on.
"Almost won" does not mean "won". What matters is winning, not moral victories.
In essence, you are making the point that what was done (historically in 2022) was insufficient and therefore something else should have been tried. There are two problems with that line of argument.
The first problem is that, at the time a decision had to be made, the decision makers didn't have the benefit of hindsight. Trying a 'higher risk, lower cost' approach is sometimes the right thing to do -- only in hindsight can you 'know' that that particular approach would not work. That's particularly true if the 'higher risk, lower cost' approach doesn't permanently 'destroy' your team's positions or chance of winning (and Russians 'failed' attempts in 2022 did not serious undermine its long term success in this war). Throwing an 'incomplete pass on 1st down' is unfortunate in US Football, but not catastrophic to your ultimate winning of the game. Russia's 'failed' efforts in 2022 were the same -- its effort had a reasonable chance of success and nearly succeeded. It might even be true that if you 'ran that same play 10,000 times' (in a Monte Carlo simulation kind of way), you might actually 'win' 60-70% of the time by pursuing their chosen strategy -- which makes 'trying the riskier but lower cost' play an even more reasonable opening move.
The second issue with your line of argument is regarding the 'costs' of your preferred approach (SEAD campaign, etc or whatever). The question remains whether this was a) actually possible at the time and b) better than the historical path (based on war-gaming out what the West / Ukraine might have done with the corresponding delay on the ground or how it would affect world or Russian opinion, economy, mobilization, etc.). The first part of this question (what could the Russian's realistically been able to mount in February 2022 and how successful would it be) is not publicly available to us -- so we won't be able to actually evaluate whether a SEAD (or other) approach was likely (at the time) to be feasible or effective. There is at least a decent chance that it would not have been effective (e.g. the Russian airframe and missile supplies were not optimally configured for that eventuality in terms of weapons mix, doctrine, or readiness) plus the Ukrainian air defense was at its height at that time in the conflict. The second part of the question depends on Western / Ukrainian countermoves and Russian opportunity costs. It was not unreasonable for Russia to keep assets (forces and missiles) in reserve in case of escalations in the Baltic or elsewhere for example nor was it unreasonable to hope to not have to mobilize reserves (financial, industrial, personnel) immediately for a 'stronger first blow' or guaranteed 'longer multi-year campaign'. It also depends on what Russia's optimal 'end state' was for the territory of Ukraine. Dropping the Dneiper bridges or electrical grid may or may not have been feasible in 2022, and even if destroying them was feasible, it may not have been preferable (perhaps because your political end goal is a functional Ukrainian state, or perhaps because you may end up 'owning' that land and needing those electrical grids or bridges or because you foresee having to cross that Dneiper at some point or whatever). Point is, it is not obvious that destroying infrastructure really supports your political goal, so some hesitation may be in order.
Once again, in hindsight, your approach might have been better overall for Russia than their historical path (although my point is that is not clear that this is so). I just don't see the point in being dogmatic about it. Being the 'man in the arena' (reference to the Kipling poem) is tough -- yelling at the quarterback on the field from the comfort of your sofa watching the game on TV for throwing an incomplete pass (that almost worked) is another. No personal insult intended.
Of course, hindsight is 20-20.
That said, NATO certainly thought that Russia was capable of a "shock and awe" campaign in 2022, and Russia only had, what, eight years to prepare, more or less?
I actually don't think that NATO actually believed that (or if they did believe that Russia was capable of 'shock and awe', then they believed it for the wrong reasons -- i.e. they believed it because SEAD was totally consistent with NATO doctrine, weapon systems, readiness, and war plans and did not understand how SEAD would be inconsistent with how the Russian forces were actually configured). This happens (a lot) in military planning -- you 'play' the opponent's 'side' in the 'game' from 'your perspective' (your capabilities, doctrine, etc) and not from 'theirs'. Or, if you an 'expert' on Russia's capabilities and doctrines, 'you' get it (but your 'bosses' don't). Same is often true in business (and life in general).
There was / is also a big disconnect between what military commanders (and associated outside experts) 'say' in public and what might be 'true'. The best example of that phenomenon is Gen. Miley testimony to Congress that Russian wanted to take Kiev in 'three days' (although that is not technically what he said, that was certainly the gist of what he implied and how it was reported). That 'claim' of what the Russians 'intended' is rank speculation (how would he or anyone really 'know' what their intent was unless they were literal listening into the Russian decision-making conferences. You might reasonable 'infer' but you will never 'know' and even your 'inferences' are subject to error as noted above). However, that claim made pubicly in Congress certainly helped to portray the Ukrainian situation in March 2022 in a positive light -- 'look the Russians were repelled from capturing Kiev'!. This sounds good publicly (it's a victory) when meanwhile the Russians make massive inroads in Kherson and Zaporitze and create the critical land bridge to Crimea (which was arguably the most military significant aspect of 2022).
Furthermore, the aspect of having eight years to prepare also is a misunderstanding in some ways. If Russia had eight years to prepare for shock and awe, that begs two questions. Did Russia prepare (and if so, how)? And was shock and awe ever really part of the Russian plan? My argument above is that Shock and Awe has historically been part of NATO doctrine, weapon systems, plans, combat history but not really part of Russia's (or the Soviet Unions, unless you consider their plans for preemptive nuclear and chemical assaults under certain Soviet war plans). The other part of the argument is that Russia did prepare -- a lot -- in those eight years (turning from a very sanctions vulnerable economy to a near-sanctions proof one, expanding ammunition and missile construction capacities multi-fold, continuing the roll-out the expansion of professional contract troops and new weapons systems, etc.). Russia actually accomplished a tremendous amount of things in eight years -- and yet it was still very under-prepared for the conflict in 2022 (in part because it was starting from such a low base level of readiness in 2014). Anyway, just my two cents.
What really mattered in Feb 2022 was avoiding a retreat from Donbas or the slaughter of the residents. The SMO achieved that and gave Russia the option to go for a bigger adventure.
If "weak Putin allowed milions of Russians to be killed by nazis" then he would lose power to.. maybe someone like Prigozin? Some other nationalist that could be manipulated to destroy Russia.
If "evil Putin invaded democratic Ukraine" then sanctions would destroy economy and some democratic person would come to power in color revolution.. maybe someone like Navaly? Someone that would bring back situation that was in 1990. End goal being balkanisation to 43 "independent countries".
Had Russia used adequate force from the outset, there would be no need to "go for a bigger adventure".
What is adequate force? 300k - I doubt that is enough.
500k - not available.
The initial goal was to protect donbas - and achieved.
The question that arises though is if Russia would have been able to mobilize so many men before Feb 2022. I am saying this because the way the war evolved and the way the Western politicians reacted to the SMO, everyone was able to see the hidden Western agenda, crushing Russia and its economy and regime change, which was communicated openly at that time. That must have been an eye opening moment for every Russian and the Russian army had no issue finding enough recruits.
Russia certainly needed more boots on the ground, but they also should have started with a relentless SEAD campaign, then destroyed transport and infrastructure.
Western arms and munitions do no good if you cannot move them to the front, and you cannot move them to the front if all the bridges are wrecked.
What do you think would have happened if Russia had adopted western techniques and paid less attention to civilian casualties? That is, if they had begun the war with decapitation strikes at Kiev and other large cities of Ukrainian power.
They would have won. A lot fewer people would get killed.
So it seems to me, but I think Putin has had to keep in mind the possibility of boots on the ground intervention by NATO and also larger plans for BRICS. Maybe conquest of Ukraine would have been fast enough to represent a fait accompli by the time anybody thought about it? But I guess Putin, wielding the actual power in the situation, may have exerted greater judgment than I might have done from my couch. I also think he was surprised that the sanctions have helped more than they hurt and had to be prepared for a different outcome economically.
That NATO intervention is a lot closer now, as a result of Russian dithering and indecision. Contrast with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. NATO dared not lift a finger, out of fear of the Soviet Union.
This is most instructive. The rulers of America and their european catamites will do nothing out of the goodness of their hearts, for in sociopaths there is none to be found. They will do a great deal out of reward or fear.
The problem is that the Russian leadership does not want to admit to themselves that nobody cares how cultured they are, how many symphonies or novels Russia produces. They never will be admitted to The Club.
I do agree, regarding sanctions. The Russian Central Bank did and does yeoman's work.
I don't think it is, although one can never underestimate the effect of arrogance and desperation. But if NATO had intervened three years ago, they had some weapons with which to do so. Most probably thought the western wonder weapons would perform, and almost everybody believed the sanctions would hurt Russia. Putin had to consider those risks. Perhaps he's made mistakes, but I think on the whole his thinking has been sound.
Regarding culture, do you think Russian leadership continues to hope for admission to the club? I agree the Europeans will never let it happen, but it has always struck me as the craziest part of the whole thing.
No many more civilians would have died (1m Ukrainian to 20k civiians is the most civilian friendly war ever) though it would have been over before many middle aged men had been forcibly conscripted and died in uniform.
And many many more Russian speakers of the kind Russia sought to protect would have died.
Those 1MM didn't exactly volunteer, tho - but yes, all told it's remarkably restrained, numbers-wise in proportion to civ population. The contrast vs Gaza Lebanon etc is insane. That conflict is conducted with the stronger power making a point of inflicting mass casualties on civs.
50:1 vs 1:50
insane contrast.
And yes in Gaza it is the Hamas military who are the collateral, civilians the target.
The longer the Russians have allowed them to stay alive, the more opportunity they have given them to cause asymmetrical mischief: Nordstream (obviously done by the US), the Crimea bridge, Kursk, drone/artillery strikes on nuclear power plants, Moscow and Russian energy infrastructure, etc. Not sure how a non-military expert like myself can see this but the Russian high command can’t (or won’t). It’s not rocket science!
I think several things led to the Russian failure to mobilize more troops. Russia hasn't fought a war on this scale since WWII. I think their war games had become unrealistic and didn't reflect changes. Second, I think they underestimated both the scale of the NATO response and the lethality of Western weapons.
Everything is much simpler - Russians don't want to kill and unnecessary deaths. If they had wanted to, Putin would have solved the issue without getting up from his desk. It is simply difficult for you in the West to understand what is happening in Russia because of the constant lies about Russia.
I will say more - this situation is gradually changing, although with difficulty.
I've worked and traveled in Russia and enjoyed Russia and Russians while I was there. I believe almost nothing from our main stream news outlets.
I still believe what I said about the start of the war. I also believe you're absolutely right about how the Russians are fighting now. I think you're right about them not wanting a lot of unnecessary deaths but I think it's also to lessen the chance for NATO (read US) intervention.
The biggest mistake Putin made was not physically eliminating the Kiev regime within the first few days.
That would turn Zelensky into martard. Bad move.
"Zelensky is the President of Ukraine, and within the parameters of Ukraine’s laws, conditions of martial law do allow him to stay in office."
They don't, actually. Martial law doesn't provide for extension of Presidential term. Also, martial law only forbids Rada elections, not Presidential elections.
As far as I understand, Ukrainian constitution explicitly states that Rada remains in power until elections could be held, but doesn't state the same about president.
Who cares? The only thing that matters is whether his orders are obeyed.
One could make a legally sound argument that Viktor Yanukovich is the lawful president of Ukraine, that Zelenskii and Poroshenko are usurpers. However, since nobody in Ukraine pbeys Yanukovich, it doesn't matter.
The problem is not that Zelensky's orders are obeyed or not. Putin's argument is that Ukrainians could later say that peace agreements have been signed by illegitimate president and thus could be thrown away.
They can do that regardless. Minsk and Minsk-2 come prominently to mind.
Sure they can. But it's not an excuse to provide them such an easy way out of an agreement...
They will do what they want to do. Legal fomalities won't change that in the least.
At this point if you pay attention Trump is maneuvering to dump the Ukrainian defeat onto the Europeans. Zelenskyy continues to attack the energy infrastructure that’s supposed to be part of a ceasefire. Russia has turned the other cheek so far. This both embarrasses Trump and gives Trump a politically acceptable way to cut off the Ukraine. Europe on the other hand is rushing into the trap and will get to own the eventual humiliating defeat of the Ukraine. I can’t think of a more stupid collection of clowns than the current European elite. They’re the equivalent of an ankle biter purse dog barking at a 100lb pit bull. I’m not the historian that Big Serge is so maybe he knows of a bigger collection of clowns leading Europe in history. Prior to WWI I don’t believe they were stipid. I believe they were naive about the dangers of their alliances. Believing alliances made them stronger and more likely to keep war away instead of the opposite.
It's a theater. European elites have their orders on "division of labor".
Everyting else is just to set up conditions to tell people there "WE have no choice. YOU must go to war and die.."
Consider running a couple of different (i.e. competing) mental models in your head at the same time. One model would be that there is a 'division of labor' (the US really has no intention of normalizing relations with Russia and has already 'assigned' Europe its role as 'attack dog' to continue the war against Russia as it pivots to move against Iran and or China. Run another model that actually posits that the US and Europe actually hate each other and are on divergent paths --- but can not disentangle easily or fast enough and have to 'keep things nice for the cameras'. In that model, Europe's defiance is just that -- and actually working at cross purposes to the current US administration. Same with Europe's rearmament plan. One model is that the 'order has been given' and that the people of Europe will basically have no choice but to go into debt, expand defense, get drafted and go to war. Now try out another model that says the elite in Europe wants that outcome, but that the populace refuses to comply. Now run a third model that says that the elite really don't want to actually rearm -- they want to centralize more funding at the EU level, create giant debt-based slush funds, and fritter those funds away (like they already have for green initiatives and migration and COVID). None of those models may be 'right' in their entirety, but all may yield helpful insights into what is going on / what may happen. Models of things are just that, models, and not the 'thing' itself. There is actually little actual value in 'holding tightly' to one model (because all have their limitations in terms of explanatory value and relevance over time). Just a thought.
https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/%204064113/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-at-ukraine-defense-contact/
Now.. Propaganda in Europe has shifted, while people are all against it. That's why "Ursula has gone crazy with wanting EU army", everybody will be against it, but somehow it will happen. Like, somehow sanctions against Russia happened. And how somehow nobody knows who blew up Nordstream and so on. Theater for the masses. Those european clones of neocons will do what was commanded. Like Zelensky does..
Before the SMO and in the early weeks, I often saw expressed the (pro-Russian) opinion that a long slow war would result in multiple favourable outcomes for Russia, such as a more complete devastation of the Ukrainian military (better demilitarization), depletion of Western military equipment, etc., gaining all the benefits of attritional warfare for the side with the higher capacity, more invaluable wartime experience for the Russian military and bureaucracy, fragmentation of the Western political landscape, humiliation of the Western political class, a more complete rupture of relations with the West (seen as a good thing by these folks), giving time for the multipolar reality to set in among all classes, .., and the big reason, avoiding triggering the West (boiling frog) into doing something rash.
Western political class does not care if milions of "their people" die. I think Putin knows that and that Ukraine is just the latest war. More will be created.
Thanks, Big Serge, for a sobering but clear minded overview!
There is only one small thing I want to add, rearding the end of WW1: the German general staff - effectively, Ludendorff - did not have in mind to save its soldiers when the tide of fortune was turning against the Germans in the trenches (the first American troops entering the battle zone, the first signs of mutiny among the German soldiers). What they did want to save instead was their own poltical after-lives. So they engineered the exit from WW1 in a way that left the army - and the general staff - seemingly without fault: with the army still nominally fighting, they entered into talks with the (odious, for the generals) socialist left parties and told them, effectively, to take on them the whole state affairs from now on. And, besides, to enter into negotiations of truce. What the socialist parties - until now banned from active poltics - did. And they proclaimed a republic. Ah, and the kaiser was simply send into exil. And they signed the Versailles capitulation treaty.
Problem was: most of the people in the hinterland had been fed propaganda for the whole 4 years, of German trops advancing or at least holding off the allies. Now the whole state had crashed, the army was beaten and in tatters and retreating, the state run by socialists, the economic situation catastrophic (also) because of the reparations, etc.
At this point the generals (again, effectively Ludendorff) turned around and proclaimed that the army had not been beaten in battle but that the socalist politicians were to fault. They had signed the armistice, not the army!
(It was a lie, the Ludendorff had pledged the socialists to take over before the whole thing collapsed, but few knew this ...)
So the legend of the "stab in the back" was born: the socialist government was tainted as traitor, the army saved as "in the field unbeaten".
The socialist government, as was expected, did not fair well and a series of putsches began. One of the last was supported by Ludendorff himself, but he was outdone by that other revanchist guy who started the next war.
Well put. The difference between 1918 Germany and 2025 Ukraine is that the rulers of Ukraine long ago set up their boltholes, their exit plans, their Italian villas and British estates, their Panama holding companies and Swiss bank accounts.
So they have no concern for their political afterlives. They'll leave the patsies at home holding the bag while they enjoy The Good Life.
Excellent article
Good article and fair synopsis of the situation. One thing not articulated in the article is that Trump is in a hurry giving his administration just 100 days to solve this. Unfortunately, as the author points out, the situation is more complicated and reality on the battlefield matters more than Trump's wants.
At some level Trump knows that supporting Ukraine is debilitating to the US in terms of materiality and political capital. Support for Ukraine is diverting away from his ability to 'reform' the American domestic system to his liking, in which he wants a legacy of follow-on MAGA candidates achieving power like perhaps J.D. Vance, and for a build-up against China. To achieve these goals he only has four years and he sees the current Ukraine War as standing in the way.
Trump is notoriusly impatient and should he not make much headway in the peace talks; what is the possibility that he might walk away leaving Ukraine, and any Coalition of the Willing, to their own devices? US relations with Europe are already strained, with a looming trade war almost on the front door step, as well as Trump's divergent attitude to the war itself. It might be a possiblity that should there be an impasse to peace - either by the Russians, Ukrainians or Europeans - or all three, then Trump might walk away in order to achieve what he really sees as important to his Presidency leaving War to be the final arbiter to this situation.
You may be right, but I would challenge you on Trump being 'impatient' or whether he really seeks military conflict with China and is therefore in a 'hurry'. Many in Washington would fit that pattern -- and Trump might -- but I suspect not. I think the '100 days' or 'Day One' statements were more rhetorical flourishes to emphasize that "this is important to me and will be done' rather than a real time constraint on himself (it may be a constrain on any 'minion' he gives the task to but that is a personnel management tool and not a constraint on himself). I, of course, may be wrong, but my perception of Trump is that his 'public' persona is an 'act' and not necessarily the 'true' or 'only' measure the of the man. (that said, if something can be done in 100 days I am sure he would take it -- it's just what he says publicly isn't necessarily the whole and complete truth -- or even close to it. Instead, I always see him as an on-stage magician -- comical at times, flamboyant, always dangling bright objects here and there (while he moves his unobserved hand unseen beneath the table to bring about his next big 'surprise').
You might possibly be right in your assessment and these are based only on my observation and anicdotal evidence which we must take with a grain of salt. Just two points of clarification:
1. When I say a build up against China I am not talking about actually going to war with China but as a means to build pressure, incombination with other measures, to achieve his aims in humbling a peer competitor. Actual war is probably not Trump's intention - although I do class any hostile act against another state, such as trade wars for example, as a form of warfare. There are ways to use military force against an opponent short of war and having a concentration of presence is one of these.
2. On the impatient comment, he definitely does not see the Ukraine War as part of his agenda but as an impediment to it. As you say, he has certain deliberative aims - although I challange his reasoning, but he has a very limited time in which to do them (not being allowed, at this stage, to extend his tenure beyond 2028). Impatience may or maynot be part of his character - but we can only go off what he says and his actions. But there is probably an acknowledgement by him of this limited time to preseve his legacy. More time dealing with the Ukraine situation limits his time and political capital bandwidth, therefore, he wants to get shot of it as soon as possible. If no deal can be found in an acceptable timeframe for him then Trump has the option of washing his hands of the affair.
Thank you for the fabulous maps and brilliant analysis of the battlefield.
As for the "peace negotiations", my personal analysis differs slightly.
The US/Trump administration has a single objective in these "peace negotiations": they want to freeze the conflict in one way or another, before the Kiev regime collapses. Everything else (like the fake "minerals deal", or the fake "grains deal") is a distraction from this single real objective. And the reason they want to freeze the conflict is obvious: they'll restart it in 1 year, 5 years or 10 years, when the circumstances become more favorable for a complete destabilization of Russia (for example, after Putin exits the political scene).
The Kremlin knows this very well so they will drag on these negotiations essentially until - as you yourself have concluded - they achieve all the objectives of the SMO militarily. For Russia, this conflict is existential: they cannot and will not lose, whatever the cost.
The question on many people's mind is how and when will the conflict in Ukraine end? How it will end we know already: Russia will achieve all the objectives of the SMO militarily. The "denazification" of Ukraine means that the present Banderite government in Kiev will have to be replaced with one under the control of Russia, after the complete collapse of the Ukrainian armed forces. So how long will all that take? Despite signals from the Kremlin that the collapse of the Ukrainian armed forces will be achieved in 2025, I am more pessimistic about this. I think the US and Europe are both gearing to keep the Banderites in Kiev in power for as long as they can, and that means for a minimum of three years. To do so, at some critical moment the Ukrainian army will retreat entirely from the Donbass and setup strong defensive lines around Kiev and on the West bank of the Dnieper river. And that will be a very hard nut to crack.
Three comments on what you just wrote. I am not contradicting you but hoping to give you some things to think about with regard to your conclusions. The three comments are 1) what the West's goals are and whether they want renewal of the conflict, 2) whether they want Banderite's in power, and 3) whether Kiev will be able to 'hold' along the Dnieper.
The #1 point is often discussed by commentators (i.e that the West wants a Minsk 3 and wants to eventually return to war at a later date). I think that assessment was true with Blinken/Biden/Sullivan and remains true with Stamer/Macron/Merz and associated NeoCons and NeoLibs worldwide (e.g. Australia). However, I think that there is a reasonable chance that that viewpoint does not apply to Trump/Vance/Gabbard/Hegseth (and that may matter). Granted, this viewpoint that 'they are different' may be incorrect, but there are legitimate humanitarian, patriotic, political, economic and real-politic reasons why the belief 'they might be different' could be true. Of course, even if they are different, it is possible that events or political pressure etc forces them to 'comply' with the NeoCon / NeoLib view of the conflict - -but I think you have to allow for the possibility that things might be different now (and going forward). And depending on what 'going forward' means, it could be near impossible (if done correctly) for a future administration to 'restart' things, so something permanent might result. The relative 'bankrupcy' of the US government and the exhaustion of the vast majority of of American citizens towards 'forever war' (as well as the populist disgust and outrage over what they perceive to be European and Ukrainian entitlement) would be real impediments to a restart. Not a guarantee, but a factor for consideration.
The #2 point about Banderites is similar. The Banderites are 'dangerous' to US (and even correctly interpreted European) interests -- they are corrupt, ruthless, prone to violence and assassination inside and outside of Ukraine, explicitly racist, and involved (reportedly) in arms / human / biological weapon 'trafficking' --- and all of these things are likely to cause serious 'blow back' for the West in the near future. Some Banderites are also undoubtedly 'unstable' (e.g. depraved and/or addicted), etc etc. -- and having unstable leaders seeking nuclear or biological weapons (or having access to major civilian nuclear facilities) is very dangerous to the west. Furthermore, the Banderites were probably put in power in the past because of their alignment of interest with the Neo-Con/Neo-Lib West (the forever war with Russia and regime change agenda), because of their ruthlessness, and because of their reciprocal 'kompromat' blackmail that compromised key Western leaders and organizations (through bribery and or other means). Absent the common goal (forever war and regime change with Russia) and with different (presumably uncompromised) Western leaders, the Banderites become much more of a liability than an asset (and Western 'support' for last year's 'freedom fighters' can 'turn on a dime' to suppress this year's 'terrorist organization as has been demonstrated for decades across the globe). So, I think that the Banderite's 'sell by date' has already expired (at least in the USA).
Finally, #3, white it is entirely possible that Ukraine (with or even without Western aid) could hold together and defend the Dneiper -- that 'ability' depends on Ukraines national 'will' even more than on Western aid and weapons. If the mujadhadeen can do it, then yes, theoretically the Ukrainian can to do it as well. But whether the 'will' to do it and fight down to the actual 'last Ukrainian' exists is suspect I believe. This will is already heavily eroded (I believe) and will continue to suffer huge setbacks as further territory and losses mount, Western aid is withdrawn or further restricted, etc. Russia would be well advised (as you suggest) to plan for such a possibility just in case, but at some point, I think Ukraine will crack (perhaps militarily, perhaps politically internally, perhaps economically, etc) before that point.
These are all good points you make but they all stem from the assumption/belief that the US during the Trump administration 2.0 will change what has been its foreign policy for the last 80 years or so.
#1 The Trump administration 2.0 could have brought this conflict to an end in 10 minutes during the first day in office of DT (as he had promised): it would be as simple as turning off Starlink in Ukraine, disabling the 42,000+ Starlink terminals "gifted" to Ukraine by the US and used by every single Ukrainian military unit down to the platoon level as their sole means of communication. But the reality is that DT never intended to stop supporting the Kiev regime, so Starlink is still working, the flow of US weapons and ammunition into Ukraine continues unabated (including tens of thousands of kamikaze drones per month and of course, Kiev's favorite ammunition: cluster rounds), as well as money and ISR.
If you ignore the Kabuki theater dispensed in large doses by DT himself and all of his WH staff, including the VP, and focus on the actions of the US, you will conclude that the US does not want this war to stop and will pursue until the end of times its goal of destabilizing and ultimately destroying Russia, before they do the same to China.
#2 The Banderites are a means to an end and will receive US and European support for as long as they keep being useful, it's as simple as that. Plus they are relatively inexpensive.
#3 A cursory review of Ukraine demographics shows that there is a "pool" of around 1 million men that the Kiev regime can still force conscript and send to the frontlines. If the Ukrainian army retreats and organizes its defense around Kiev and on the West bank of the Dnieper river, they would reduce the attrition rate of their personnel to last for 3 years or more. Of course, a lot can happen in 3 years, but that goes both ways. A few days ago, the green goblin iin Kiev was hoping that Putin would die "soon, and then it [the war] will be over."
You might be right -- it's hard to know. Elsewhere on this overall thread I have a few comments on your point #1 (why Trump really can't do as you say on day 1) -- so I won't restate all that thinking here, but perhaps consider it. The Banderites might be kept as well (although there is a good reason for someone to want to eliminate them). At the end of the day, it depends on how 'unchangeable' you think national strategies might be. Something that has been in effect for 80 years might not change (ever) -- but I consider it is not only possible but actually likely -- but that's just me.
Martin, it's fine to hope that the Trump administration 2.0 will give up on "Project Ukraine" and the killing in Ukraine will come to an end. I actually hope the same. But hopes rarely translate into reality, and specially in this US hybrid war against Russia using Ukraine as a proxy, it seems Ukraine will indeed fight "to the last man" the Banderites in Kiev can grab off the street, punch senseless and ship to the frontlines.
All this gives Russia no choice but to fight to the bitter end.
Sad but quite possibly true
I wonder if you've seen a recent Ukrainian poll that indicates just how strongly the nationalist/neo-Nazi element feels about ANY surrender terms..as I recall, a full 15% of the veteran respondents stated that they would participate in armed rebellion in event of any surrender of Ukrainian lands. A foregone conclusion, it seems, for at least a decade more of woe for Ukraine.
*Yawn*.
The one thing we see in any successful insurgency is a young population. The median age in Yemen is 19. The median age in Ukraine was over 40, and that from before the war.
I recall similar surveys taken in Afghanistan before the fall of the regime there, all suitably anonymized, which claimed to show that support for the Taliban was minimal. The subjects tell the pollster what he wants to hear.
Fair enough, but I think the fanaticism of Ukraine's neo-Nazis should not be underestimated, and the 18 year-old cohort remains fully intact. We shall see soon enough, because Ukraine is on it's knees.
I doubt Ukrainian Nazis are any more fanatic than jihadis. I have been in physical altercations with some, and they weren't all that, nor were they especially brave.
Like their SS forebears, quite the opposite.
Anyway, those of the 18-25 year old contingent who wanted to fight have already volunteered. As to their absolute numbers, that is a function of the post-1991 demographic collapse.
Ukrainian Nazis shot up the Maidan protests, and burned dozens of people alive in Odessa. They have made explicit death threats to Zelensky, they refused to withdraw from Donbass on his orders to try to implement Minsk accords, etc., etc. and so on. There is more than enough published information on this file since 2014, so no excuse to be unaware of it if you at all follow events in Ukraine 🤷♂️
Nobody said they didn't.
Most people are trained to think reality is "just Russian propaganda"
Check out the prewar Ukraine population pyramid. Big dip in the teens. Made more so by refuge flows. Women and underage kids were allowed to leave until recently.
Thanks for the overview - and nice maps!
On the subject of "the deal" - it must be considered that the context is US attempting a pivot to Yemen and Iran.
That next war is required for the Trump administration in the context of "supporting Israel no matter what", and for them that's an immovable political priority. And the cost to the US of fighting that war depends greatly on Russia (and China too) refraining from becoming active proxy-sponsors. In particular, that Iran not receive help attacking the US Navy, which is at risk already with just the resources Yemen has at this stage of escalation.
This context drives Trump's US-Russia deal attempt. Trump must reduce intensity in UA to free up resources - but everyone knows he has to do this even if nothing is given to him. Thus he offers a little more, ie partial normalization, partial sanctions reduction, partial recognition of territory changes, etc. However, he must also "maintain leverage over Russia" to assure Russia doesn't help Iran in the future, so he can't offer everything. Therefore Trump's constraint on any deal, is that at best it is a halfway resolution of the Ukraine conflict.
And all this is currently mooted by Kiev's demonstrative refusal to implement even step 1 of the de-escalation sequence jointly proposed in the recent US-Russia meetings in Riyadh.
Pax -- good comments and re-statement of the current 'conventional wisdom', espoused by many public commentators on geo-politics. And it may, actually, be true. But maybe not. While there are many in the administration and DC and in the West (or Israel) that would advocate for that approach, I, at least, am 'cautiously optimistic' that Trump (like Putin in his own way and for his issues) is open to 'something else' if he can 'thread the needle'. In that vein, I genuinely believe (or perhaps hope) that Trump is not laser-locked on wars or conflict with China or Iran or in Yemen/Gaza or Ukraine (or Panama or Greenland for that matter). Does that mean he 'would never fight' in those regions - no, I think there are situations where 'conflict' (kinetic or otherwise) is occurring (Yemen right now) or would occur if 'push came to shove'. But being 'willing to do something if no better alternative exists' is different than 'wanting to' or even 'expecting to'. Threats, minor 'acts of aggression', dialog, cancelation of dialog, photo ops, tweets about 'rocket men' and / or new 'best friend' are all tools for some (I suspect) intentional (or perhaps instinctual) plan. So, the question is 'what is that plan'? Is it a pivot to be able to fight Iran (for the benefit of Israel and or Saudi Arabia or even China or Europe or for 'world-empire')? I suspect not for Trump, although almost certainly for John Bolton. I guess I am arguing for more skepticism for the 'conventional wisdom' -- it is often right (which is why it is both conventional and wise -- but in certain wild card situations or unusual characters -- it can be wrong. Even worse (or better from your perspective), it makes excellent camoflage to mask the moves of 'unconventional' operators. Just something to think about.
As far as previous talk about putting an end to stupid wars, it would be great if Trump or his cabinet had a plan to make that a reality.
I wouldn't hold my breath tho. They've been unwavering loyal to Netanyahu's expansionist agenda. If they didn't promise him to top Biden's already ridiculous (ie mass slaughter of civs) level of support, Trump wouldn't have got the political support he did from the Israel lobby. Given previous rhetoric, especially by JDV and Tulsi, It's something of a bait and switch, to be sure.
And in terms of policy style in general, the new administration has been direct / blunt all around. Looks like whereever they think they have leverage, they don't hesitate to push.
So in my view, that's a recipe for a deliberate escalation spiral with Yemen, which is already underway, and then Iran. What would cause them to back off is if they don't think they can win.
I certainly get where you are coming from. If Trump and team are against 'stupid wars' then, 'be against stupid wars then and stop fighting and provoking conflict!'. I get that sentiment. I can also understand how one can go to a) 'dishonesty' ('Trump was lying about stopping stupid wars') or b) 'cynicism' ('they are only against stupid wars that they cannot win'). I do think that there is a third alternative c) 'a certain number of wars are (in essence) unavoidable, and the key is to get out of the 'minefield' as quickly as possible and with as many finger / toes / limbs as possible.
I think the Yemen situation falls into that category. I think that there are multiple reasons why Yemen is attacking shipping in the Aden Red Sea straits -- one of those reasons is Israel / Gaza (but that is not the only reason). There is an Iran component. There is a jihad element. There is a criminal / piracy element. Similarly, there are reasons why the USA might might to take action to shut down Yemen's ability to act. Some of those reasons have to do with Israel -- but also Egypt (Egypt is unstable and always an economic basket case but its main source of revenue -- Suez Canal tolls has been dramatically impacted by the Yemen actions). Some of those reason have to do with trade routes to Europe and the Gulf States, and freedom of navigation, and not wanting to look weak, etc etc.
So all I am saying is that there are 1000 'hot spots' around the world (some of which aren't necessarily in the news like in the Congo right now, or Morocco, or Niger, or Bolivia, or Armenia, or Moldova, etc) and some times it might be necessary or advisable to act militarily (or threaten credibly to do so). Running a nation state with global interests is always going to fraught with actual and potential conflict. At worst, the leaders seek that conflict out or negligently engage with it when it occurs -- at best, they avoid the 'big ones' (and 'small ones too') but will inevitably trip some booby trap somewhere -- whether they want to or not (and admittedly, sometime they want to -- perhaps because they are evil or mistaken or perhaps because setting off a 'little one' helps to avoid the 'bigger one' over there, or so they think).
Not sure what will happen -- but that is my baseline hope. Not real total peace (since I don't believe that is realistic) - but as close to that as can be managed under the circumstances. I hope the stupid wars stop. I hope 'threats' are just that 'threats' to bring about a more peaceful outcome. But sometimes we don't get what we hope for and sometimes we try, but fail. I just want them to succeed in peace.