This was wildly entertaining. Thank you Serge. And, of course, if the Nazis hadn't been so murderously bloodthirsty to their Slavic neighbors but came as liberators from Soviet communism, how many would have welcomed them. But, like the scorpion such depravity was simply "in their nature."
Wondering if you saw the comedic piece in today's WSJ by Bernard-Henri Lévy who argues "Drone Attack Shows Why Ukraine Will Win This War." I found your sober analyses a worthy antidote to this sort of idiotic cheerleading of the legacy media and wonder at your response.
The plan in Ukraine was ever always only for NATO to intervene, and the US to jump ride to the rescue, rather than leave their european catamites hanging out to dry.
Basically betting that Russia does not have the stones to respond.
Russian dithering has made that outcome far more likely.
What don't you understand? Russia had made it clear since 2004 , from the Munich stage. As they had reminded , Ukraine should not become a member of NATO and this was a red line that would be adhered to without any second thought .It is very logical and makes sense that the dominant global power of our planet seeks to extend its colonial domination to the only and last sovereign, independent, state entities .They have a common denominator. Their regimes come from revolutions.
The October Revolution created the Soviet Union and it stood on the side of the revolutionary China, later Korea and finally Vietnam and Cuba. Even in the revolution in Iran, the Russians were found helping. In all these revolutions, the USA was defeated. .The only independent and sovereign state entities to this day remain these on the planet.
Ukraine has been in the shadow of the Russians for centuries. Khazaria is the most beautiful story of the historical events of the Middle Ages. The Dnieper is the bloodiest valley in Europe of all times. Unfortunately, the heart of Europe is there and has been bleeding for two hundred years. Where Eurasia communicated from Vladivostok to Paris and from Moscow to Baghdad, it did not stop bleeding.
Thanks Serge -- very well written, argued, and supported -- and a nice take (in a short document) on a very complex and controversial topic. Furthermore, I found your comments about the nature of the USSR's pre-invasion demands regarding Finland, Bulgaria, and the Turkish straits to be new information to me -- I had not heard those precise arguments before, so thank you for those tidbits as well.
Before, commenting on your thesis of your paper, let me recap your arguments (very briefly and in reverse order as you presented them):
1) Key operational mistakes were made during the battle of Smolensk (mainly by Guderian)
2) These mistakes were amplified by disagreements in the German high command, a culture of 'insubordination' amongst certain German generals in key positions of power at the time (e.g. the Moscow-focused group), and limits on Hitlers direct and timely 'control' or the eastern war effort (e.g. he was not as 'in control' operationally as Stalin was for the USSR)
3) These decision-making mistakes were amplified further by absolutely atrociously incorrect German intelligence assessments of Soviet actions, capabilities, and future potential (e.g. the 20 fold mischaracterization of Soviet force generation capabilities)
4) These intelligence shortfalls affected German government policies on mobilization, prioritization and logistics -- which dramatically reduced the effective force the German's could deploy in the east in 1941 and 1942
5) These policy decisions were driven by the political desire to minimize the cost to the German 'home front' and avoid any chance of discontent or future 'domestic collapse' from Germany as in WW1
6) These policies (and the resulting 'short preventive war' strategy) were conducted based on perceptions of current Soviet weakness, longer term Soviet threat, and current / future German economic vassalage to the USSR.
Overall, these are great points and well made (it's a pity that you don't have more time and space to elaborate more on these topics and add to them as well -- but perhaps you will in a book some day).
I would make two comments, however, that I hope help you (and your readers). The first is that, as you point out, even with changes at Smolensk and better force generation and logistics for the Germans in late 1941 to 1942, it is not clear that enough troops, supplies, logistics, would get to the right front lines 'to make a difference' in mid 1942. More material would likely get through to German lines (and attrition through combat would likely have been marginally better), as you point out, but 'more' is not necessarily the same as 'enough'. The logistic mess through the main railroad trunk lines from Germany to the east was terrible but getting those supplies out to the downstream feeder lines and then the last 20 miles to the troops in the front line positions may still have been even more difficult and maybe insurmountable in 1941. It is entirely possible that by cleaning up the bottleneck in one place of the supply chain the German's would have merely move the bottleneck to another part of the chain further down the line -- and that downstream part was even less amenable to fixing from the 'corporate center' on short notice than the railroads, depots, and logistic centers were. So, while it is possible that Germany in mid 1942 could have been better positioned in the war (if it made better choices in mid to late 1941) -- it's not clear that it actually would have been substantially better off than it was historically (it all comes down to what the real bottlenecks of supply were at the time in theatre). In other words, operationally, your contention that moving south to Ukraine (versus towards Moscow) is sound -- but if the logistics were really unfixable in 1941, it might not have made much of a difference what was undertaken operationally at that point.
The second comment is on your summary of Germany's pre-invasion economic vassalage to the USSR. Your points on that topic are very correct -- although you can (and probably should) take that point even further than you do. Germany in the 1930's (and hence in the 1940's) was always one step away from economic collapse -- and that economic collapse was repeatedly kept at bay by the next big desperate economic (or political or military) gamble. Looking more deeply into the economic antecedents of the political / military decisions of the German high command might further flesh out your thinking on this overall economic / military overlap.
For example, Germany's move to massive government spending in the time period of 1933-1937 was, in some sense, Keynesianism, which stimulated economic activity (autobahns, employment schemes, public work projects, social welfare spending, defense rearmament and mobilization) via debt (e.g. the MEFO bonds) and expenditure of its foreign exchange reserves. Whether the short term internal economic 'boom' of these policies was worth the 'economic cost' (in terms of debt and nationalization of the economy) is one issue -- but one thing for sure was that this debt and foreign exchange fulled binge allowed for was the importation of needed raw material (oil, rubber, minerals, food) necessary for the economic and military activity.
By 1937, Germany's growth (and given its debt, even its present economic statistics quo) was 'at the end of its rope' -- it had exhausted its foreign exchange reserves and future imports of raw material was about to stop (or the internal economy and military build-up would have to be drastically reversed). The annexation of Austria and the seizure of its gold reserves forestalled this problem. Similarly, the annexation of Czechoslavackia did the same in 1938 (and the seizing of Polish assets in 1939 did as well -- as did the capture of Norwegian, Danish, Dutch, French, Belgian assets, etc). Each military escalation by Germany in this pre-war and early war years was necessitated, in some ways, by its general economic 'vassalage' (just as you suggest was the case in 1941 between Germany and the USSR). It needed resources (and in the short term, foreign exchange assets) and it relied on those assets to continue its war effort without a full war economy (e.g. to support trade with Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, and the USSR). So, in that sense, the German preventive war rationale had precedent given its recent past.
Furthermore, this 'economic' element of the war also helps explain why it was essential (or at least thought to be essential) for the German high command to keep war mobilization as 'limited' as possible (e.g. not fully mobilizing the people and economy for war). The 'future Germany' that these leaders wanted in terms of economics 'needed' certain economic conditions (like limited manpower mobilization, some amount of a civilian consumer economy, adequate civilian food / medicine / fuel access, reasonable rates of inflation, etc.) to survive and prosper longer term. Therefore the German political command was trying to strike a 'balance' between war and future post-war economic survival: mobilize too far and too early and the 'peace' that would be won would be 'lost'. versus not mobilize enough or too late and risk losing the war and the peace. It was a difficult top-level war planning conundrum -- and one that they hesitated on too long (in hindsight). However, the game plan of 'risking economic ruin' and 'saving everything' with a 'successful roll of the brinkmanship or military dice' was totally consistent with how they had managed events in the previous decade (so it is no surprise that they tried that yet again in 1941).
Thanks for the article and the opportunity to comment.
German intelligence assessments of Soviet actions, capabilities, and future potential (e.g. the 20 fold mischaracterization of Soviet force generation capabilities)
I can give you a few 'answers' (or perhaps more accurately suggestions of an answer), but I think that ultimately you will have to look elsewhere for a more 'definitive' answer to the question of 'how did this happen?' -- but I will try:
I would attribute the German intelligence 'miss' to a couple of factors:
1) historical bias (based on the WW1 and pre-WW1 experience),
2) cultural and ideological bias,
3) lack of relevant language / cultural / technical skills in the intelligence organization,
4) bureaucratic bias / inertia (i.e. the 'bosses' already know the 'right answer' and don't want to hear anything adverse to that position), and finally,
5) the 'surprising' resilience of the Soviet government / Russian people (which surprised even the Soviets and the Russians themselves).
To Germans (and non Germans alike) the historical experience of Russia in WW1 (and prior to WW1) did not inspire confidence in the current 1940 Russia / Soviet situation (or future capabilities). Pre WW1 Russia was large -- but very under-industrialized and with very poor energy and transportation and communication networks. It could mobilize an enormous land army of infantry, cavalry, and artillery and sustain enormous losses -- but it could only move ponderously -- and its most lethal components (artillery) could only sustain intensive combat for a relatively short period of time (because of the its under-industrialization and poor transportation system and logistics). It could remain in place (and suffer enormous losses) --- and it could retreat into its interior (and sustain enormous losses due to retreats, encirclements, and a lack of supply) -- but it could be beaten (either after a period of years like in WW1 or with the expected 'shock' of 'Bewegungskrieg' (war of movement, which is often mistranslated as 'Blitzkrieg' in the West)). Therefore, the 'historical experience' of Russia suggested that the USSR could not adequately fight a 'modern' war well (e.g. 'modern' using tanks, planes, armored warfare doctrine, material production, etc). Finally, the end of WW1 in the East (and the rapid German advances deep into Belarus and Ukraine as the Russian armies melted away in 1917 and 1918) gave the German army a template for what might be possible once the main standing Russian armies on the Russian western front were destroyed (which was what France 1940 and Poland 1939 implied would happen to them once the war began in earnest). This was the basis for the 'kick the door in and the whole facade will come tumbling down' thinking in Germany (and in the West as a whole).
The cultural / ideological bias in the German military, intelligence, and government system further accentuated these assumptions / conclusions. National Socialism was 'statist' and 'centrally controlled' (much like the Soviet system) -- and Germany did recognize that the 'official' Soviet statistics on things like steel and coal production, mining, agriculture, railroads, etc. were significant in aggregate and rising - so the Germans had reason to believe that the USSR had 'some' reasonable industrial and force re-generation capability. However, these Germans also believed that the Leninist-Marxist - Stalinist version of 'socialism' and 'state control' was 'wrongly conceived' in theory and 'terribly executed' in practice. The purges, famines, collectivizations, rebellions, obvious lies, revisionist history, propaganda, etc of the post WW1 era USSR did not inspire confidence in how well the USSR was being run. The Germans had reason to believe the 'numbers' for Soviet output were 'being cooked' and that the 'quality' of the output was suspect (or that it couldn't reliably get from point A to point B). The Germans also put enormous faith in their own technical ability to 'do central planning the right way' and mobilize society and the armed forces and industry 'correctly' (i.e. the problem wasn't centralized planning per se, just Soviet centralized planning). So, there was a general tendency to 'dismiss' Soviet capabilities and their potential (even when the Germans had first hand experience of Soviet industry, technology, weapon systems, and doctrine gained during the German-Soviet pre-war cooperation era).
The third aspect had to do with deficiencies in the German intelligence services (in general). Culturally, linguistically, ideologically, and historically the Germans paid a lot more attention to things British and French (and Germany's direct neighbors) than things Russian (this limited their view into things happening in the USSR). A lot of what the Germans did know about the USSR came from emigres or defectors (which weren't necessarily the best or most current source of information). Plus there were competency and loyal issues within the German intelligence organizations themselves (e.g. there is some evidence to say that German intelligence was more concerned about internal threats and was penetrated to some extent by Western intelligence influence). So, part of the answer is 'how did the Germans miss this' comes from the fact that maybe the German intelligence organization just wasn't 'that good' at doing the job it was supposed to be doing.
The fourth aspect -- bureaucratic inertia and bias -- is common to all big organization -- but especially to ones under tight ideological control and suspicion. Thoughts contrary to the 'party line' or 'current thing' were not likely to be raised (by the rank and file) nor accepted by the layers of higher ups (or accepted by the highest of high command). So -- even if someone had 'good' information (which is questionable) -- that person wasn't going to get that information to the top (nor would that information likely change anyone's mind even if 'well-supported' -- it would likely just be 'waived away' with a few assumptions about the future - which is largely what happened historically).
Finally, the last piece -- the Soviet and Russia resilience -- was also a factor. Based on historical experience (the Crimean War, Russo-Japanese War, WW1, the Russian Civil War, the Russian-Polish war, etc), the USSR did 'much better' than might be expected. Yes, the USSR was hobbled by incompetence, suspicion, fake production and shoddy quality, purges, corruption, etc and it was still burdened with relatively weak transportation and communication networks limited fuel / food supplies, and yet it was still able to overcome and in fact transcend those weaknesses and fight on, despite enormous costs and losses. At the beginning of the war, the Russian people's 'love' for the Soviet system or Stalin was questionable -- but the war, and the sacrifices and victories it brought -- solidified the Soviet state and system in a way that would not necessarily been obvious in 1940. (As a counter example, the war in Asia between Japan and China helped the government of Chang Kai Shek and the concept of 'national unity' in China initially -- but as the war progressed, that sense of unity and support dissolved amidst the losses, corruption, mistakes, and disappointments, etc. Nationalist China, immediately after WW2, was not nearly as popular (in China) as the USSR was in Russia -- yes, there are probably many reasons for this beyond what I am suggesting but the point I am trying to make is that a relatively fractious Russia rallied to the USSR in a way that a fractious China did not rally to the Chinese Nationalists). This probably had something to do with the nature and history of the Russian people (defending their homeland) but it also had something to do with the relative 'competence' in the way that the Soviets managed the war (said another way, despite the massive amount of incompetence demonstrated by the USSR and Soviet system, it still 'rose above' its inherent constraints and 'earned' its victory).
As a result and in total, German 'got it wrong' because the Soviet USSR was not as 'incompetent' or 'impotent' as it seemed from Germany in 1941.
As a Russian interested in the history of WW2 as a hobby, I applaud this analysis, because it is quite comprehensive and is not biased in a way that is usually prevalent in the Western media
Fundamentally, Germany was sandwiched between two powers capable of autarky (the Anglos through control of the seas and trade, Russia through its vast land and natural resources).
If Germany wanted to be a fully sovereign state (be able to say no to the anglos and back it up if push came to shove) it needed to expand.
The real question then ought to be "was becoming a fully sovereign state in the interests of the German people". The alternative of course was to just accept anglo dominance and trade with them and get rich. That's were Germany ended up today.
There are I suppose several reasons this didn't happen. German elites wouldn't accept it in either world war. And fascism in particular just couldn't survive without autarky (it also kind of NEEDS to fight as part of its DNA, at least the Nazi variant).
If you accept that you aren't going to win Barbarossa, then giving up whatever you have to give up to Britain is the only correct play. I just don't think either the ideology or the economics (Nazi economics were terrible) would allow for that scenario to play out.
WWI Germany had a better shot because its economic system was more sustainable and they might have been able to set up successful puppet states in the east long term, and was less incompatible with the anglos.
Dhdh looks and sounds alot like duhhh. Your dopey statement contributes nothing to this conversation about military and strategic facts, because your low IQ prevents it.
"The Jew" is just a convenient justification for one's own evil desires, stupid mistakes and innate laziness and inability. I am sure you are a loser w/no real contribution to society.
When I see the head-slapping statement. "The Jew declared war in Germnay in 1933", I know I am dealing with someone who will twist facts and suppositions to fit into their Procrustean conspiracy-theory bed . There is, objectively, no such thing as "The Jew". What does this term mean? The Jews were spread out throughout the world after their ill-conceived revolt against the Romans. Do you suggest that German Jews, American Jews, Moroccan Jews, etc, all got together in a secret volcano base? Or did they use telepathy?
There is no such thing as "The Jew" anymore than there is such a thing as "The German". There are Jews, and there are Germans. The Jewish diaspora in particular would seem ill-suited for a unified conspiracy.
Even if you thought The Jews were politically unified, German Jews, ironically, were among the most highly assimilated in all the world. They were loyal citizens -- many of them fought for Germany in WW1 and received medals to prove it, yet they were sent to death camps anyway because of their ethnicity, because they were assumed to be "potentially" disloyal. This is the same pattern as we saw in the WW1 Ottoman Empire regarding the Armenians. Of course, in both cases, it was merely a pretext to steal the money, homes and belongings of their own productive citizens - citizens who they, in fact, had a duty to protect, as do all governments.
The Germans ended up being their own worst enemies - they chose a brutal government of thugs with a veneer of intellectualism. That government thought they could just finish WW1, with victory this time. They seriously overreached. Additionally, their race ideology caused them to underestimate their enemies and to treat conquered people with such brutality that cooperation was nil and armed resistance assured.
Ever heard of Weimar Germany where the Jew controlled Germans society and were over represented in all the elite professions. It was the sin merchants dream. Kind of like present USA. It just took a real WWI war hero with a small mustache to solve the problem.
lol. You must be a Jew or a shabos goy who just parrots their propaganda. AIPAC for example is a Jew organization. And yes the Jew is perfect descriptor of how the Jew operates as a parasite on goyim societies.
Britain was peripheral in June 1941. The only two big antagonist powers at that point were just USA and Soviet Russia. Both were in a defensive posture. By going after British and French interests in N Africa and Asia Germany would have an easier path, since USA didn't have the inner political coherence to be the first to declare war on Germany.
In 1941, the Afrika Korps was engaged in a strategically important struggle with the British army and by late 1941, the RAF was mass-bombing Berlin. Hardly peripheral to German war prospects.
In reality German war on Soviet Russia happened in June 1941, which drew 80% or more of German resources away. I was exploring the hypothetical of NO German-Soviet war in 1941.
My father was born in Petersburg in 1912 and attended the German-speaking Saint Peters School there. He was refused permission to go Germany for university (unlike his best friend Alfred, who ultimately became German consul in Leningrad after the war) and was assigned as a lathe operator instead. My grandfather was arrested and worked to death at Alma-Ata in 1930. My father was arrested and transported to the Far East in 1931, surviving the gulag and internal exile. In September 1941, my father (then working illegally as a surveyor on the Moscow-Volga canal) defected to the Germans somewhere between Vyazma and Smolensk, and served out the rest of the war in German army eastern intelligence. (His greatest intelligence coup was to point out that shiny German staples in fake documents was a "tell" as Russian staples are rusty.) He told me that at the time he thought the Germans' chance of "winning" was very remote, considering the comparative sizes of the US and USSR. Of course, as a line soldier his view of things was limited and his analysis simple. (Just before he died he published an account of his life in Russia and Germany: <https://www.abebooks.com/signed/Crossings-life-Russia-Germany-first-half/31437470819/bd>
btw, My mother was born in Berlin in 1921. Her father was an artillery commander killed in action near Wesenberg, Estonia. (In his last letters he wrote that his hair turned white in a week as enemy shelling gradually zeroed in on his emplacement.) My mother's younger brother perished at Stalingrad; he was 17 or 18 years old.
also btw, My father's younger sister was a medical resident at the Siege of Leningrad. Later, she recounted that there were not enough live people to clear the dead off the streets. After the war, she was exiled to Tashkent where she lived out her entire professional life as chief pathologist at the Karaganda City Hospital.
And while we are on the subject of luck and war...my girlfriend's Greek-American father (b. 1923, Steubenville, Ohio) was a B-17 bombardier in the Eighth Air Force during WWII. He flew 30 sorties over Europe (the chances of surviving this many sorties are about 0%, and in fact his flight team was shot down on a day he went for additional radar training; his CO sent him back into the air the next day.) He participated in the February fire storm bombings of Dresden. On the ground, my father had left Dresden the day before.
I also wonder what would have happened had Germany more effectively harnessed the hatred of the Soviet state by many Baltics, Ukrainians, and disaffected Russians. I know the Nazis thought of Slavs as subhuman but they could have at least pretended more effectively until the end of the war.
Additionally, the possibility of Japan joining the attack on the Soviets, had the Germans been more willing to share their plans in late 1940/early 1941. I recall reading a source (not sure where) that significant portions of the Japanese military leadership were very interested in doing this. But by the summer of 1941 the Japanese had committed to moving east instead of west.
The Japanese Empire lost their taste for invading the USSR in 1939 when they tried invading Mongolia and Georgy Zhukov handed them their asses in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. This caused the Imperial Army to lose face and the Imperial Navy took precedence with their sure fire plan to head EAST and conquer the Pacific colonial holdings of the decadent USA and the several soon to be irrelevant European powers. We all know how much better the IJN did at their endeavor.
My revisionist history is what if the Japanese civil government had (somehow!) reigned in BOTH the IJN and IJA BEFORE attacking the USSR, then gotten the Emperor to break tradition & visit the USA, meet with our oligarchy and suggest to those stalwart opponents of communism that the USA back their play at heading West while young Mr. Hitler made nice with the British (many of who's upper class twats were among his admirers, including the Duke of Windsor and his boy £u¢k!ng Hellfire Club wannabee coterie), promising not to make waves against their empire and keep Russia away from India forever if they remained neutral, then he headed East directly after the anschluss about the time the Japanese headed West with President Smedley Butler's blessings. I don't think Stalin could have managed THAT 2 front war.
The battle of Khalkhin Gol was a huge shock and embarrassment to the Japanese and it certainly dampened their enthusiasm for taking on the Soviets (but it did not eliminate that urge entirely -- in time, the Japanese Army rationalized away or improved its thinking so that it convinced itself that 'it could do better next time' and the potential of a Soviet two front war (with most of the Soviet resources deployed against Germany) certainly gave the Japanese Army faction 'hope' (in the end, it was the Japanese Navy faction, the oil embargo, and German diplomatic hesitation that directed the Japanese towards the Pacific and SE Asia instead).
As for FDR and anti-communism ... I think you are underestimating the amount of pro-Soviet / pro-socialist sentiment in parts of the FDR administration (particular the State Department). Many subsequent generations of Americans were quite unsettled by the amount of institutional bias in favor of socialism and the USSR (note the expansive pro Soviet press at the time from news outlets like the NYT etc.). Plus, regardless of what the 1940 US pro-Soviet deep state wanted at the time, the US public was not interested in war (not against Japan regarding China, not against Germany regarding Britain, not anywhere no how). So, I can't see how your revisionist history could really take hold in the US. (the part about a British government under Halifax instead of Churchill does seem somewhat plausible however).
MacArthur still amazes me -- I don't understand how people back then backed him as enthusiastically as they did (I just don't see what they possible saw in him). It boggles my mind (and I say that with respect for his WW1 military performance) -- but his personality, personal failures, his management of the Philippines and WW2, his lying, his blatant political machinations, and then Korea boggle my mind (although he was very well suited to running and making a success of post-war Japan). What an enigma.
The port of Vladivostok was crucial for Lend-Lease, the Japanese disabling that port would have been even more helpful to the German offensive than a large scale invasion into Siberia.
I was simply pointing out that it wasn't the first time the Japanese were beaten in the Russian Far East. I grew up on a military base near Vladivostok, and as kids, we're finding lots of the spent shells and broken revolvers in/around the river.
Was Vladivostok really that crucial? Hitler invaded the USSR in summer 1941 and Japan attacked the USA in December of that year (and effectively closed Vladivostok to shipping from the West). That's a very short window in which to receive Lend-Lease (plus the rail links West from Vladivostok weren't great). So, perhaps you are overestimating Vladivostok's importance.
To my knowledge, the Japanese did not attack American convoys to the Soviet Union in order to keep the Soviets neutral. As far as I know, the Lend-Lease reached Vladivostok unimpeded until the end of the war.
Well ... I am pretty sure that US or British convoys didn't make it across --- but Russian shipping carrying Western goods were probably allowed in as you describe. So, maybe we are both right -- the USSR did get meaningful supplies (but it had to be on Russian or neutral shipping). But given that the US, Britain, Dutch, and Japanese had the most shipping at the time in the world, I am not sure that purely Russian and neutral shipping would have been 'a lot' or 'enough' (as compared to the Arctic convoys) -- although anything getting in probably was valuable to the USSR
My point is that most of the Lend-Lease came to Russia (in US and British ships) via the Arctic convoys (not Vladivostok). So, the Soviets weren't the ones carrying most of the lend lease (they did do some in the Arctic). The point Mono seems to be making is that perhaps the Soviet shipping is what kept Vladivostok (on the Pacific) useful. So Soviet and neutral shipping to Vladivostok (because the Japanese let them through) and US / British / Soviet ships to Murmansk (via the Arctic convoys).
There was actually very little supplied by land-lease in 1941 and barely nothing in 1942, the crucial war years. The Soviets called SPAM cans "the second front."
Yes that makes sense -- the US Lend-Lease didn't really start until March 1941 (and then it was directed solely at the British Commonwealth -- at that time the USSR was still aligned with Germany). Plus since US Lend-Lease was initiated in 1941, the supplies and production authorized by that act took time to make it into production and then be collected, organized and shipped to overseas collection points and then organized into convoys to Russia -- so 1941 was not going to be a 'big year' for Lend-Lease except for perhaps for Britain on the home front or in the Western Desert). The same applies to 1942 -- which as you describe as the 'make or break' year for the USSR. In 1942, Lend Lease production and shipping was just getting started but then it was interrupted somewhat by the US entry into WW2 at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 as resources and production facilities were re-directed and re-prioritized to address the US crisis on its hands in the Pacific. As you say, if the USSR broke and lost the war it was likely to be in 1942 (the crucial year as you say) - and at that point Lend-Lease was just really starting to reach Soviet front lines (and a lot of the front line material that was sent was relatively second-rate at that point: Matilda and Grant tanks, Aerocobra and Hurricane fighters, etc.). Therefore, I think that US lend-lease aid in 1942 made a material and morale difference in 1942 and helped the USSR - but that that aid did not make THE difference to Soviet survival in that year. (so I think we agree)
Where I think US lend-lease made a substantial difference was in the rate of advance (and amount of success) the Soviets had in 1943-1945. I may be wrong on all that (and am willing to learn more), but I have some level of understanding how what was sent, in what quantities, how it was used etc and from that understanding my take on it was that the Soviets really used (and benefited from) the fuel, trucks, SPAM, radios, boots etc that were sent to the USSR and that enabled their advance. Offensives take enormous amounts of supplies to launch and sustain and the USSR was able to mount multiple near simultaneous offensives in those years and keep them going to the point that they yielded enormous breakthroughs and consolidated advances. My argument would be that those offensives would not have been as successful, or the breakthroughs as large, or as near simultaneous (and thus give the Germans better opportunities to regroup and dig in further back) if the USSR did not have those supplies. It's merely a semi-informed opinion of course so I can't claim absolute knowledge on the subject or argue that my viewpoint is right -- and it seems to me that both you and I are largely in agreement on all this -- just talking to each other on different parts of detail, etc. Thanks for the comment and reply.
Japanese needed oil asap, not some part of Vladivostok. That oil was originally coming from British colonies and the USA. Until Britain and FDR put a stop to it. So the Japanese had no alternative but attack South. They don't teach that in US schools anymore, do they?
What you say is correct (about oil) -- but there really was a strong advocacy group in Japan for fighting the Russias (instead of the Americans at Pearl Harbor) -- and it was a intensely fought battle over that decision in the Japanese High Command (as odd as that may seem to us).
There were several reasons for that line of reasoning: (1) ideological, 2) bureaucratic / clan and 3) geographic strategy.
The Japanese in the late 1930's were fiercely anti-communist. Japan had flirted with communist thinking and the early stages of a communist inspired revolution in the 20's, and the governments and military leadership that emerged from that experience had a visceral hatred of Communism (and they correctly inferred that any future communist threat to Japan would come from or be supported by the Soviets). So, they really really wanted to eliminate communist influence from the region (which would also weaken the Chinese communist threat as well).
Second, the Japanese society of that day (and of the earlier Meji era) was clan-based (at the top of the hierarchy) -- and the two biggest factions were represented -- one in the Army, the other in the Navy (and they literally hated each other -- and had hated each other for generations). The Navy used the most oil and looked southward towards the Pacific as a means for Japanese expansion. They saw the oil fields of the British and Dutch East Indies and the rice of Thailand and Vietnam and the minerals and rubber as targets for expansion. The Army saw China and Manchuria (and the Russia East Asia) for as Japan's natural 'empire' (with its coal, minerals, industry, fishing, etc.). Both elements of the Japanese high command wanted expansion and empire -- they just wanted to go in different directions (one north and west against the Soviet Union, the other east and south against the USA and Britain / the Netherlands / France).
The third rationale for going against the Soviets was that it eliminated one more great power from that part of the world. The Soviet (and before that Russian) influence in the Far East was tenuous -- maintained by a thin, relatively vulnerable rail line west to the heartland of Russia. Kicking the Russians out could make their removal 'permanent' and therefore permanently remove that threat to Japanese hegemony in the region. This would also permanently weaken their Chinese enemy as well (and in 1941 Japan's main enemy was China). From the Army's perspective, the US / Britain / Dutch could wait (and perhaps sanctions could be endured).
As you say, a key trigger for the decision to go towards the US / British / Dutch was ultimately the US oil embargo -- it was a relatively late addition to the list of US sanctions against Japan for its actions in China. Had it not occurred -- the decision to go against the Soviets might have been more likely. The oil embargo had a much bigger effect on the Japanese navy than the Army, but it did hurt the general economy and Army aviation assets as well. Perhaps just as important as the oil decision was German diplomatic noncommittal / incompetence. Had the German's been more insistent on gaining active Japanese support in their attack on the USSR, that might have made a difference (the Japanese were expecting to be asked to join in the war and many especially from the Army were hoping for that) -- but historically, the German's waffled diplomatically quite a bit and weren't too concerned about opening a two front war on the USSR, so that issue resulted in the Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact (which further shifted Japan's gaze toward the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions). However, it could have been otherwise.
The point is that FDR had a free hand to impose an oil embargo against Japan. Obviously, it was a VERY good move because it again shifted some pressure away from Soviet Russia in its war with the 3rd Reich. So kudos to FDR!
If Hitler were clever, he would have taken the same direction as Japan against the European Empires in N Africa, Asia and would have linked up with Japan in India. Soviet Russia wouldn't have done much in between, and Britain & USA would have struggled mightily. But hey, Hitler thought, Soviet Russia would be an easy mark, and it would be so much more glorious.
I think your suggested plan only works on a board-game like Risk (it doesn't take into account logistics, material supply, and the limitations and relative strengths / weaknesses of the rival powers in the military dimension) -- especially in the theaters of war critical for your plan to work (the Mediterranean, North Africa, and beyond). By saying that I don't mean to criticize you personally or 'talk down to you' -- just point out why what you are saying may not really make sense.
One problem with what you outline is that the European Axis powers (Germany and Italy) were grossly inferior to the British (and then made even more so when the Americans joined) in terms of naval assets (and air power) in those regions. This weakness was then made even more obscene by the Axis shortage of fuel by 1942 -- which made operating the Italian fleet (which was significant, at least on paper) infeasible and made long range air combat over the Mediterranean difficult versus the Anglo-American air and naval assets that could be deployed and supplied in the region in excessive amounts. Getting to France's or Britain's colonies in Africa, the Middle East, or India (Southern Asian) required a) winning the air / naval battle of the Mediterranean, b) having the ability to ship substantial amounts of supplies to Africa and then across Africa and the Middle East, then c) having the ability to win land battles against Allied and perhaps local opposition in those remote regions, and then d) having the ability to sustain those victorious Axis armies in that remote and inhospitable terrain for the long term. This just wasn't going to happen. The Germans may have had a very remote chance of closing the Suez Canal (and take advantage of Vichy French support in denying North Africa to the Allies) -- but unless Vichy France was 'fully in the war' (which they weren't) and unless Gibraltar was also taken (with Franco's Spain -- which France was smart enough not to do) then even taking the Suez Canal was pointless (there was no fuel or shipping to utilize the new Axis Mediterranean lake and the Allies could and would have moved to 'take back' those access points (the canal, Gibraltar, North Africa) relatively easily.
In short, the Axis did not have the ships / planes to win those battles in those regions, or the fuel to operate them, of the supplies to send there if they won, or the supply ships and road way trucks to get those Axis armies deep into the British and French colonies, etc.
Furthermore, it's not like the Japanese model (that you are referencing) worked out very well for the Japanese. The Japanese conquered French Indochina, British Malaya and Burma, the Dutch East Indies, and many islands across the Pacific. So, in that sense, it was wildly successful (and unexpectedly so). Doing this deprived the Allies of important assets (e.g. oil, tin, rubber, rice) -- but the depth of the Allied 'bench' more than made up for those losses with alternative sources of supply (e.g. Brazil for rubber, US for oil, food from the US/Canada/Argentina/Brazil, Belgian Congo for minerals, etc.) or with technology (e.g. synthetic rubber). Neither did the Japanese get much use out of those assets either (it basically stripped mined the local populations for food stuffs -- causing millions of civilian deaths due to starvation and it shipped as much oil and rubber and minerals as it could to Japan -- but the damage caused by their conquest, local opposition to Japanese rule, and an extremely successful US submarine and mining campaign reduced the actual supply of goods to Japan to a trickle as early as 1943). Plus it tied down Japanese air, land, and naval forces which were 'left on the vine' and bypassed by the US during their air-sea-land 'march' towards Japan (and victory). The end result of the Japanese 'victory' against the European colonies was post-war (those regions quickly moved toward independence -- but that had a lot to do with post-war Cold War politics and the bankruptcy and exhaustion of the WW2 colonial powers as well -- not jus the Japanese victories during the war). So, the Japanese example suggests that even a successful German foray into Africa or the Middle East or South Asia would not have been fruitful to either helping Germany/Italy or denying the Allies what they needed during the war.
So, my pushback to you is that if you look at more 'boring' aspects of WW2 (supply, material availability, actual military capabilities and areas of relative expertise and power) -- you can't march into Africa or across the Middle East if you are Germany (any more than you can land in Canada or Mexico and create a 'third front' against North America) -- the 'physics' of the real world just don't allow it.
A couple of final points:
Italy was utterly foolish to join WW2 (but that foolishness, given its government was utterly predictable).
Germany's decisions during the war, in many ways, were also both foolish and predictable. If Germany wanted to avoid economic (and then perhaps political) collapse in the later 1930's it had to start fights with its neighbors (like Poland or Czechoslovakia -- note I am not condoning Germany's actions, merely explaining that they were facing internal economic crises and that these actions appeared to give them a way out of that pending disaster -- plus they had other reasons for doing what they did, I am just suggesting that the economic reasons alone were sufficient). The invasions of the Nordics (and then later Belgium and the Netherlands) made strategic sense (and were relatively costless). The war with France and Britain was dreaded (by most Germans) and ultimately very hard to avoid -- but it turned out much better for Germany than expected (which helped create a sense of inevitability and confidence in Germany which helped set up the Russian war). The stalemate over British Isles and the Axis disadvantaged war in the Mediterranean and North Africa was also predictable (with Italy in the war) and only surprising in the sense that the Axis did much better than might have been expected. The war against the USSR was very predictable based on ideology and the economic vassalage (that Serge describes) - the only issue was when it would start and who would start it (Stalin or Hitler). My point with all this is that to say that Axis did much better (prior to 1941) than a reasonable person might expect --- but even with those advantages -- Germany was still very likely to end up at war with the USSR (and win or lose the entire war based on the outcome of that conflict) -- it had life or death material reasons to have that war (material supply and ideology) and it really didn't have the reach to go and make a difference anywhere else (e.g. North Africa or Turkey or the Middle East or the conquest of Britain).
A final comment on FDR. As an American, I have very mixed feeling about him (and many, though not all, Americans do). FDR's decision to put an oil embargo on Japan (and prior to that steel and other sanctions on Japan) were controversial in that era and very interventionist (i.e. example of America throwing its weight around rather than minding its own business in the world -- or at least you can make that argument). That was not a position that was consistent with the majority of the American public's opinion of what should be done at the time (so that's a bit of a problem for me) -- and it reflects a tendency in America (and American leaders) to intervene around the world to 'solve the world's problems' (e.g. a lot of people supportive of Russia or China today routinely decry such American attitudes and behaviors when it happens today) -- so, depending on your view of American interventionism, you may not want to 'praise FDR' too highly for that. Second, FDR's oil embargo (and his decision to re-position the American Pacific fleet from California to Hawaii) directly led to US involvement in the war with Japan (and then more generally across WW2). This was controversial (and not reflective of what the US public or Congress wanted at the time). Maybe, in the context of time and history, it was not FDR's intention to provoke Japan into an attack on the US -- or if it was his intention, perhaps it was still the 'right thing to do'. But it was costly and led to the US involvement in a world war -- which directly led to the Cold War and American overseas commitments and further interventionism and ultimately to things like Ukraine and Iraq. Was the US involvement in WW2 really a good thing for America? (many would reflexively say 'of course' because it helped 'save the world' or because it led to the American hegemony for decades -- but once again, was that really a good thing for America and Americans? Or even the world as a whole? I think that there is room for debate on all that (and that is not even getting into the things that FDR did domestically in the United State and whether that was long term good or bad for the US economy, government, or constitution). FDR is, for me, a very controversial and potentially very harmful US President.
It's all very interesting. However, in your reply you forgot that the reason Japanese had all these obstacles is that they had no support in their greater area of operations. Turkey was basically an undeclared German ally in the beginning of WW2, so if asked would have gladly provided Germany with its railway, that went down into Iraq and to Iranian border. Russia would have just benignly looked on.
Anyway, it is interesting that will all the alleged British/US air superiority over the Mediterranean, Germany had no problem moving troops into North Africa or moving them back. So no, British would have been in big trouble in North Africa without a German-Russian war. After all, after Turkey, Germany had to only cross Iran and it would have reached British India (which at that time included Pakistan).
The Germans had a lot of trouble moving troops back and forth to Africa -- the only time they had it relatively easy was when Rommel was in Tunisia (and if you look at the map you can see how close Tunisia is to Italy and even then they really made an all-out effort -- and suffered heavily for that effort). Even going from Italy to Libya (over and around Malta) was just too much for them. And no, I don't think the British would have been in trouble in North Africa absent a Soviet war (there is a good book regarding logistics in that war, I think it is called Feeding War that goes through all that chapter and verse). The ports and transportation networks of Libya and Western Egypt were absolutely primitive and limited in what they could handle in the best of times (and the British had the ability to interdict those shipments, destroy those ports, etc even if the Axis had the shipping and fuel to fuel those ships carrying supplies -- which they didn't).
Same problem with Turkey. Turkey was then (and until quite recently) extremely underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure, fuel availability, communication networks etc. Whatever it had in the 1940's was left over from the Ottomans (who had a single rail line railroad to Kirkuk - if I am recalling it correctly -- and it had to cross mountains, deserts, etc to get there). Plus it was highly vulnerable to hostile locals (like the Kurds) and to the British that had operational control and strike capabilities to shut it down (aside from more mundane things like sabotage). Iran was occupied by the Soviets (in the North) and the British in the South and it too totally devoid of infrastructure and railways (and was equally vulnerable and potentially hostile). It just wouldn't work.
That’s actually a interesting alternative timeline. The Wehrmacht aside, if the Japanese assaulted the Soviet unions Easter flank, it would have tied up significant resources and could have been the blow that broke the soviets. In theory the Japanese could have linked up with the Germans and received the oil that they direly needed. Germans shift to Africa and the Japanese to
The Japanese did tie up Soviet reserves in the far east; Stalin held about 20 divisions of Siberians in reserve out there with the fear of an impending Japanese attack after the commencement of Operation Barbarossa. By Dec ’41 Stalin had enough assurances from spy Richard Sorge that the Japanese weren’t coming; as a result those divisions were pulled out & flung @ Army Group Center outside Moscow Winter of ‘41.
Besides, the Japanese were going to attack USA. That was kind of in the cards. And unlike June 1941, this time Stalin chose correctly with this intelligence-aided foreknowledge.
The 'theory' part of that 'what-if' only works if you don't consider logistics -- the geography of traveling across Siberia with anything like a substantial force would have been prohibitive (fighting along the Trans-Siberian railroad line worked in the Russian civl war to some extent because the forces were relatively small and local and the fighting episodic and not all that intense relative to either world war but moving vast numbers of heavily armed soldiers and supplies is another matter). The Japanese resented Russian (USSR)'s presence in 'its' Far East and would have loved to kick the Russians out of the entire region, but moving Japanese troops west very far beyond the eastern edges of Mongolia would have been very very difficult for Japan logistically (and likely exposed their very vulnerable single supply line to partisans). Japan had a very real interest in the 'Russian' portion of 'Manchuria' not under Japanese control (i.e. the areas north of Japanese controlled Manchuria) and it would have liked to have control of Russian far east ports and resources (and the puppet state of Mongolia) -- and if Japan attacked, this would have been likely its objectives (and these objectives would likely have been within reach of them logistically). But traveling east beyond that looks good on a map (or simplified war game like Risk) but doesn't, in my opinion, have a chance (other than to tie-up Russian forces and perhaps 'win' the 'Russian' far east).
"I also wonder what would have happened had Germany more effectively harnessed the hatred of the Soviet state by many Baltics, Ukrainians, and disaffected Russians."
Have you forgotten how many SS divisions were formed from these populations?
I'm a dual citizen Canada/USA, it was horrendous to watch Canadian Parliament's standing ovation, clapping like trained seals to this old Nazi Waffen SS (SS! out of all things!), especially given that my Ukrainian grandfather, fought against Nazism. I wrote to Trudeau my thoughts on X.
They turned the Speaker into the scapegoat, fired him. Give me a break, Hunka was invited, Hunka even had a scholarship established @ Alberta's university for somebody to study some obscure Ukrainian bishop's legacy. From what I see, they test now and then how much push-back they get for peddling nazism, waiting for the real veterans to die. My grandpa died young, I never met him, but to see this old louse living to be nearly a century old, having the gall to show up in Canadian Parliament, standing up with the near nazi salute there - WTF?!
At the moment, they rolled back - fired the Speaker, Hunka on social media was saying that he "only wanted to live his last years in peace and now he has to move to Latin America to escape all the hatred." So, at the moment, world still remembers.
The Red army humiliated the Japanese army in the battles around Kolkin Gol. This made the Japanese high command loose faith in the Japanese army capabilities. So they started focusing on Japan's naval capabilities. This was an opportunistic move as Japan could use her navy to sieze the colonial territories of the defeated European powers to acquire resources and influence in the far east.
The problem with this alternative is that the ideology of "racial" supremacy and dismissal attitude towards many peoples of the USSR was the core tenet of Nazi Germany. If you want to picture a realists alternative scenario with much better management of occupied territories, you would have to change it core, and with this change the consequences would be much larger
I'm doubtful it would've made any impact on the final outcome of the war. Russians and Germans had a history of ethnic conflict. Whatever efforts the Germans tried to make in gaining the support of the local populations, Soviet propaganda about the threat the Germans posed to Slavs would override it, which is what happened in reality. Most of the negative statements about Slavs Germans made during the invasion were in private; in public they acted as if they were working together with the Russians and others to overthrow the USSR eg. Vlasov. Even if Hitler and other Nazi's had more positive views of Slavs it would have made very little practical difference in their propaganda.
The biggest opponents of the USSR regime were rural peasants who opposed collectivization. The Nazi's fundamentally couldn't work with these groups as they needed to maintain the collectivization system to extract food for the German population. This had little to do with their dislike of Russians and more with wanting to avoid the famine of WW1. Stalin's purges brutally got rid of a lot of dissidents within the Soviet system so I'm doubtful there was as much anti soviet energy to tap into as people think.
Moreover, it's unlikely even in such a scenario that the Slavic populations would stay loyal once the war stopped going Germany's way. Finland certainty didn't and the Russian liberation army ended up fighting the Germans at the end of the war.
"Russians and Germans had a history of ethnic conflict"
Can you please elaborate? My problem with this statement is that historically speaking, Russia was in large part governed by Germans, and a large chunk of elite consisted of Germans, the real animosity between Russians and Germans was the product of two World Wars
Catherine the Great was German and she was giving the Germans as much land as they can process, in the Southern Ukraine between Odessa and Nikolaev there were huge pockets of ethnic Germans, many were interned to Kazakhstan, etc., many collaborated with Germans when invaded. Did you mean that?
"The biggest opponents of the USSR regime were rural peasants who opposed collectivization."- ask yourself where did these peasants get the land from - they (including Ukrainian peasants) got free land from Lenin's "Land Decree" - they just didn't want to return this free-gotten land into the collective farm during famine and were gauging the prices of bread.
"ask yourself where did these peasants got the land from" I don't agree with what you're implying, but even if it is true the point's irrelevant. It's entirely possible peasants who may have gained land under early Soviet land reform later came to oppose Soviet collectivization policy. This is actually a pretty well established idea. When the German's first entered Ukraine, it was mainly groups from rural areas and Nationalist's in the west that welcomed them.
I don't "imply" anything - I telegraph my opinion :-) Sorry, but when you learn the USSR history well enough and would be able to show me the land registries of the lands granted under Lenin's Land Decree of 1917 vs. the lands confiscated in the 1930s, then we could have a reasonable dispute. I'm pretty sure that between the two of us, I was the one who was born in the USSR, am Ukrainian, and I studied the USSR history for years, and spoke with people, who lived through collectivization.
500,000 thousands Ukrainians served Hitler, but millions Ukrainians, including my own Ukrainian grandpa, fought against Hitler.
You claiming to have studied USSR history and spoken to people has no effect on whether your views are correct. There would be many people in the world who have studied USSR history and spoken to former soviet residents who would disagree with your views.
Slavs mostly fighting against the Nazi's rather than collaborating with them isn't a secret. It doesn't disprove that many Ukrainian's initially celebrated the Nazi invasion. To deny that is to be historically illiterate. I only brought up to illustrate that the Germans couldn't ally with the groups that they had shared interests in for both ideological and pragmatic reasons.
I understand what you are saying and your argument -- and yet I have a problem with what you wrote, and it comes down to what a person believes is the source of legitimacy and legal rights in civil society.
Under Soviet law, Lenin bestowed the land to the peasants and then when the law changed, they didn't want to comply (that's what I take to be your argument, as I understand it). Embedded in your comment is also the implications that some of those peasants weren't really Russian (they were of German origin at some point) -- and therefore had even less 'right' to claim such land. As I said, I can follow and understand that line of reasoning.
However ... one of the philosophical innovations of political philosophy (say since the mid 1700's) and from some aspects of sources earlier than that (e.g. English common law, the Bible, Roman law, etc.) was that the land and the rights to things like land (and rights to other things like free speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association) don't come from the government, they are inherent and reside in the people -- specifically all 'free people' regardless of their prior national origin). Now, I am talking conceptually here and it's not like this ideal was ever fully realized in practice (e.g. slavery, women's rights, etc). -- but it is an important concept and very much at odds with the implicit assumption behind your comment (e.g. 'Lenin bestowed .. ' if you allow me to paraphrase your comment as such).
With regard to Russia and the Soviet Union, this is even more problematic. Who owned the land during the Tsarist times? (and I don't mean who under the Tsarist system of laws had legal title to the land per legislation -- I mean that question more philosophically). Was it the landed noble? (in which case Lenin's seizure was illegal -- or at least unjust and uncompensated for). Was Tsarist land ownership shared in some sense with the serfs and then later emancipated peasants or independent farmers? (In some ways, I think the answer to that question is yes, as I understand Russian law and custom in that time period and for hundred of years earlier). What about the revolution -- first the one in 1917 then the ones in 1918. How did those political actions change things? Were those political changes legitimate and legal? In particular, why should Lenin's seizure of power and decrees and laws be considered legitimate (just because he was holding power, however obtained?). What about the legality of passing legislation that says one thing and then reversing that same legislation later (i.e. Did the governing body that made those decisions really have the legitimate power to make those decisions)? Even if they did, is it wrong for someone granted something of value to resist 'giving it back' because the state or society as a whole wants it? Does the Soviet state really require it (e.g. would collective farming really solve the problem or only make it worse and benefit some connected to power more than others)? The implication in all my questions and comments here is that perhaps legitimate rights reside inherently 'in the people' (not the state) and with the individual (not the collective) adn with the current status of that individual (not their distant heritage) and that usurpations of those legitimate rights are common, unfortunate, and to be resisted as much as humanly possible -- especially since even legitimate governments can be wrong or captured for wrongly desired reasons.
Sorry to burden you with all those thoughts and questions -- it just that your comment comes from such a different 'place' from the one I grew up in and embraced philosophically that I was floored (no insult intended -- it just knocked my socks off so to speak, as perhaps my response to you is doing to you). Anyway -- in the spirit of conversation and debate -- I just wanted to share that.
Land ownership vs German/no German was totally irrelevant. All got free land in 1917
The relevant issue was collectivization vs. private land ownership. You need to take a look at the dissolution of the serfdom in Russia - in the 1860s - the Crown purchased the land from the landowners and re-distributed land to both, nobility and peasants.
I met an old Ukrainian peasant who lived through collectivization. She told me that her parents were batraks (lowest form of peasants who work for other peasants no own land) and her parents got free land from Lenin in 1917, and when after a few sequential bad crops/famines n 1930s, Stalin's commissars came to confiscate this land into collective farm, they refused and starved to death. From their family of 8, only her 12 yo and her half-sister who was 14 were left alive. After her parents death, the land was confiscated anyway. The older sister began to work in kolkhoz for a plate of lentil soup/day, which she shared with her younger sister. When Germans came, my friend let herself to be taken - Germans were grabbing young people at the public places to send to Germany as work-force, some ended on farms, some at factories, some in brothels. My friend ended up a german gulag @airplant factory, met her Dutch husband there, they moved to Holland after the war.
My point was - most Ukrainian peasants did not paid for their land, they got it from free in 1917, but starved to death when the same land was being taken back.
Ever heard, "Give as freely as you have received?"
You missed my point I think. You above state that the Tsar purchased the land / or the 'serfdom' of the peasants and gave land to the nobles / peasants (throughout Russia). So, from my point of view, the land then belonged to those owners (because the government, using its legitimate authority -- which was pretty universally recognized as legitimate within Russia at the time - to change centuries old historical practice (serfdom) and establish something like Western property rights via law and compensation).
Then a revolutionary government seizes power and wins a violent power struggle (Lenin and the Soviets). I have a problem right there at that statement (that government is not, in my view, legitimate). That government then 'gives land' (that it does not legally own per the prior history) to some people (that may already own that land under the historical way of thinking) -- and it does so my taking that land from others without compensation (e.g. nobles and other peasants) and by force (that, in my opinion is not legitimate). It kills those who disagree with its actions (that's another problem). Later, it changes its mind and reverses its decisions (that's another problem) and forces (at the point of gulag, torture, starvation, and death) its will on its population (that's another problem). Whether it gave land (that it did not own or rightfully acquire) for free or not is immaterial.
My point on all this is that your original comment sounded to me that you were disappointed that some peasants refused to give up their land to the collectivization program (and that some of those peasants may have been of German origin -- hence your reference to Catherine the Great). Based on that understanding of your comment, I basically said "I agree with the peasants -- they were right" (even if they died for their beliefs and or still had to 'cave' in the end -- because their rights to own land that they had owned since emancipation, their rights to have a government that represents them and has their consent to govern, their rights to rebel or otherwise oppose unjust government action -- are their rights (as I see it). The government body trying to do these things by law and force is illegitimate -- which makes the government's actions illegitimate. Those actions may have the force of violence behind it (because it is tyranny) -- but that does not make obeying illegitimate authority legally or morally binding on those affected.
My view is totally colored by my experience and upbringing as an American (many people from other parts of the world and cultures might find my view alien -- and many of my compatriots of today might no longer share that kind of viewpoint, although it was once quite near universal among Americans -- it is part and parcel of the secular American creed instantiated in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and Bill of Rights, the Federalist Papers, and various laws and court ruling since the founding of the Republic. It's a kinda of a uniquely American viewpoint -- that is not limited to just America - it is truly an American quirk perhaps -- and therefore hearing sympathy for the collectivizers is strange to me. Even hearing that a duly elected, representative, and legitimate government wants to take private land for common good is hard for me to hear - and hearing that the government not only wants to take my land but compel my labor is really fighting words (you know Americans and their fascination with the 2nd amendment and the founding myth of rebellion to tyranny).
I am probably coming across to you like some kind of American stereotype or dinosaur -- but it's hard to relate to you how odd your comments sounded to my ears and understanding.
People have misinterpreted my comment and I didn't really write out my argument that well in the first place. I was merely talking about in the period prior to ww2, relations between ethnic Germans and Russians declined. Part of this was because of ww1 forcing the two groups to become more antagonistic towards each other but I think other factors were at play. The ethnic Germans (those who identified as German and not merely of German ancestry) represented an unassimilated and successful minority group which was a threat to Russia as a state since it was worried that group would feel more loyalty to the German state than Imperial Russia.
This wasn't exclusive to Imperial Russia. The USSR in the 30s started to implement some pretty brutal policies against ethnic Germans and once the war started, ethnically cleansed most Volga Germans. Considering the treatment ethnic Germans was getting under the USSR, I can't imagine Nazi Germany would then care to treat the various Slavic groups any better since even at the best of times most upper level Nazi's held very little regard for Russians and Ukrainians as a people.
On the German side, a general antagonism towards Russia was the norm among right wing and nationalist circles. Ideas of lebensraum and invading Russia predate Hitler and the Nazi's and was merely an idea they inherited from the German nationalist tradition.
I don't think that Sonny's comment about 'history of conflict' is accurate (except for the time period 1870-1990) -- and even within that time period, I think the real ethnic element of it was 1890-1950.
Before 1870, Germany (as a nation state) didn't exist (but of course, Germans did exist, just in various states or statelets). For the Germans of this time (or earlier back to the Middle Ages), the problem wasn't the Russians -- it was everyone else who lived around them (the French, the British, the Dutch, the Swedes, other Germans, various mercenary bands, etc). Usually, these local Germans were being 'walked over' by someone else's army -- e.g. the 30 years war, the various wars of the time of Louis XIV, Frederick the Great various wars, then Napoleon's wars, etc.). Rape, pillage, plunder, destruction was the norm (during war). Germany was, basically weak. During this time, individual German leaders (like Frederick the Great or the various Austrian Emperors) or specific kingdoms (like Prussia, Austria, or Saxony) had specific conflicts with the Russians (but they were often were aligned with Russia as well) -- so it wasn't a constant state of war with Russia and it was not ethnic in nature (it was dynastic or power-politic related or related over which king controlled which border vassal region like Polish Galicia or Bukhovina).
The exception was the Baltic regions -- these areas and East Prussia were conquered by Germanic crusader knights (Templars) during the late Middle Ages and had a large portion of the ruling classes / merchant classes tied to German culture (and Swedish culture as well). However, this did not prevent the upper classes of the Baltics aligning with the Tsars (in fact, a large percentage of the senior officers of the Tsar's army that fought against Napoleon were Baltic German heritage Russian officers). Plus, prior to Napoleon, a lot of German immigrants were recruited into Russia (by Peter and Catherine the Great) to help establish Novo-Russia and the emerging manufacturing and mining centers.
So, to say that there was historical tension or ethnic tension prior to 1870 really doesn't make sense (in my view). Prior to 1870, German-Russian relations were either allied or friendly (as in the wars against Napoleon and with German immigration to Russia) or episodically in conflict (e.g. with Frederick the Great).
After 1870, however, I think that line of argument about 'ethnic conflict' starts to gain credence -- in part because of German unification and even more so due to the prevailing cultural ideologies of that age.
Germany in 1870 was more focused to its west (against Britain and France) -- but the new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, removed Bismark from power ca 1890, and had a much more antagonistic approach against Russia (not merely based on his personal whim but also because his actions reflected the viewpoint of an increasingly a large part of German society that began to fear Russia as a rival power to its East). As you point out, the Romanov dynasty (at this point) was heavily Germanic influenced and there was ample economic and cultural exchange between Russia and Germany at this time, but after German unification (and consolidation and industrialization ca. 1890), there was a growing fear that Russia 'was a threat' (because of the size of its population, the amount of its resources, and its potential power if it were to ever industrialize and modernize like Germany had done).
The other important factor (aside from economic and military potential) that began to influence German thinking around this time (ca 1890) was philosophical (or ideological) in nature. In the West (generally) there was a growing belief in technocracy and rule of 'experts' via 'science' combined with a sense of social darwinism (i.e. that 'conflict' was inevitable amongst cultures and that 'conflict' was desirable for the stronger culture so that it can 'win out' and 'dominate' the future and 'inferior' peoples). Prior to 1890, technology and science made something like the conquering of Russia 'mad' (e.g. the examples of Napoleon and Charles XII from Sweden seemed to make that clear). After 1890, technologies like railroads and the telegraph and industrialization started to make invasion eastward at least conceptually feasible (this was false but it raised hopes) and the fact that certain countries like German had large advantages in industrial output, education, communications, transportation, and modern weaponry started to imply that perhaps German arms could defeat the more backward Russians (if it came down to a fight). This was a relatively short term phenomenon (an advantage of a few decades as it turned out, not an indefinite advantage), but this 'we can take Russia' viewpoint was seemingly backed up but the Russia performance in the Russo-Japanese war (1905) and in WW1. So, after 1890 (and especially after 1918) the belief that conflict with Russia 'could be successful' started to take hold.
The other element of culture / ideology that emerged around this time ca 1890 was a ethnic one (the antecedents of the National Socialist racial theories started to percolate through universities and various societies in both Russia and the West). This was a decisive break from the egalitarian elements of the Enlightenment and from the religious ideas of 'Christiandom' (although it borrowed from both of those frameworks). This racial or ethnic element then exploded into mass consciousness after the First World War (perhaps because of the trauma of that war, perhaps because of the loss of faith in the 'old' institutions of government, faith, ideology, and economics, perhaps because of bitterness or desperation). Whatever the cause of the ethnic component, by 1920 it was pronounced and acted upon (e.g. the German Freikorps volunteer militias fighting the Bolsheviks in the Baltics). This ethnic element became a full blown pandemic of ethnic violence in WW2.
So, in conclusion, I wouldn't say that the Russians and Germans had a history of ethnic conflict (outside of 1890 to the end of the Cold War time period -- and even the post 1945 part of that conflict was heavily influenced by other factors -- like defense and deterrence rather than ethnic hate). However, the intensity of the ethnic conflict that did occur (1918-1950) tainted what came after it (to this day) -- and this intensity is so deeply felt that it tends to color how we see history (prior 1890) as well (even if that coloring is anachronistic).
That's quite a comprehensive analysis, thanks for this
I would agree that there was no ethnic conflict between Russians and Germans before 1870 - though animosity of Russian nobility towards Germans first appeared after the death of Peter the Great. It was mostly the result of increasing influence of Germans (remember that Peter's successor was his wife Katherine, who was ethnic German). Katherine the Great for example did not speak Russian before she was married to Peter III.
But I don't think we can call this animosity of single digits of percent of the elite toward Germans an ethnic conflict. This Russian nobility had much less sympathy towards Russian peasants. Moreover, this situation is further complicated by the fact, that in Russian, German is a translation of the word "немцы" - and for the long time it referred to any foreigner.
I believe that real animosity towards Germans appeared only in the WW1 - the Russian authorities had to rename Saint-Petersburg into Petrograd.
Still, we should take into the account, that ~90% of population lived in rural villages and did not encounter any Germans regularly apart from their masters in the regions you described, so it would be a stretch to portray a picture of real ethnic conflict.
Thank you for the compliment and yes, I think the viewpoint of Russians towards the Germans was also primarily positive or neutral (except for the points you made with the elites) until WW1 (and beyond).
In that sense, I don't think the Russians necessarily had any problem with the Germans (prior to 1914) that they didn't also have with the French, Swedes, Poles, British, Turks or inhabitants of the Caucasus or the steppe lands north and east of Iran at different times as well (i.e. Germans weren't necessarily worse than any other type of foreigner and the title holder of 'most annoying or dangerous foreigner' varied depending on the time period and what was going on around Russia's borders at that time.
Furthermore I agree with you and think that the Russian aristocrat problem was a big deal during the reign of Peter the Great (and subsequent rulers) and had a lot to do with sorting out internal Russian aristocratic identity issues -- were they traditionalist Boyars (as in Ivan the Terrible's Day) -- or 'europeans' (that copied the language and customs of French or German elites). Perhaps I am generalizing here too freely, but that is my sense of what was going on there during those times.
The other underlying question (not really resolved in my mind) was how much of the WW1 (anti-German feeling) was really due to the war (clearly that was a factor), and how much was due to the changing nature of Russian society at that time. Russian society forty years earlier during the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877 (or Crimean War before that) was fundamentally different than Russian society in 1914 (Russia in 1914 was more urban, more literate, more industrialized, with a larger technical and service oriented middle elite, with a substantial popular more press, more labor unions and political parties and related organizations, etc). Maybe instant 'mass resentment' against a nation and its people as seen in 1914 needs these preconditions to really take hold.
For example, the German people eventually 'had enough' of the French and Napoleons influence by around 1812 -- but that was after nearly 20 years of large scale war, economic emasculation, and actual occupation (so, I'd say that at some point a German antipathy to France and things French was to be expected). But even early in that time period, you still had German cultural elites (like Beethoven and Goethe) writing symphonies and odes to the new order -- and had lots of German peasants rather happily going along with the 'new thing' --- there wasn't a sense of nationalism (at least not at first). Another example would be the the British and French who had, for hundreds of years, a sense of contempt for each other (that was common to both the elites and the masses) -- but once again, it had a lot to do with hundreds of years of near continuous conflict and war (and an embarrassing amount of shared culture between the two) that developed that sentiment (not like what happened in 1914 where resentment seemed to appear as soon as the war erupted and before even the first the casualties rolled in to hospitals away from the front).
The other issue I don't really understand is the hatred of the British upper classes and elites for Russia (it appears to stems to a time period just prior to the the Crimean War). I've heard the arguments from MacKinder about the control of the Eurasian land mass and the Iran - Afghanistan - India 'great game' etc etc - but I don't really buy it (the geography and the transportation and logistic obstacles of that day and even today make that all nonsense to a military or diplomatic or industrial professional). But there is no doubt that 'Russia bad .. Russia very bad' has been an overriding them in the UK for quite some time -- in a way that far exceeds what I've ever seen in the US at any of its time points (e.g. opposition to autocratic Tsarist rule, opposition to Bolshevik thinking and atrocities, opposition to the threat of the USSR during the Cold War never reached those depths or had such popular resonance). In the US, the 'nuke em now' viewpoint parodied in the wonderful film Dr. Strangelove was very much the extreme exception -- at least until say the last twenty years (where it has become more common). It's all curious to me.
The Japanese got a real bloody nose @ Khalkin Gol up in Manchuria in a border clash with the Soviets in May - Sept 1939. Many historians cite this for the Japanese reluctance to join in OB.
Possible idea for a future follow-up piece: what could the Soviets/Stalin had done more effectively in the opening phases of the invasion? Assuming certain things are realities on the ground: Germans are able to achieve surprise in the opening phase, Soviets are dealing with their depleted officer/leadership situation, etc.
I think John's points below are largely correct and useful -- but it's hard for me to envision a plan for the Soviets in 1941 that would work (and not create other sever problems for the Soviets and Russia as a whole). From my perspective, two factors come into play that make deploying a better strategy than the historical one a problem: a) the inexperience of the Soviet army in 1941 and the b) consequences of retreat.
In some ways, the Soviet army (regardless of the status of the Commander in Chief and purged generals) was going to have a hard time during the German invasion of 1941. The world was in the midst of rapid technology change (to radios, tanks, planes, etc.) -- so the 'old ways' weren't going to work the way they used to and the 'new' ways were still speculative and needing lots of refinement. Fighting in Spain showed some inklings of what was to come (but it was not a good template in many ways for what an industrialized European peer-on-peer war would be like) -- and things used during that war (planes, tanks, communications) changed rapidly since that point (or from Poland in 1939 as well). Finland showed all kinds of weakness in Soviet training and leadership and planning and supply -- but even if you eliminate those very real problems (because you assume away the purges etc) you still get a large Russian army fighting a 'new' type of war against a more experience German force (experienced in Poland, France and the Low Countries, Yugoslavia, etc.). The Germans were going into that war with a lot more useful knowledge and better honed operating procedures, war experience, etc. The peacetime Soviet army was just going to be going against a better prepared opponent (even if the numbers and equipment were a tie or Soviet advantage). It was going to difficult for them to do well under any operational scenario (short of German mistake and or incompetence).
The second problem comes from the effects of a retreat. If you knew in advance that the Germans would overwhelm your border forces and or your border forts, and that your counter-attacks wouldn't be effective (which is not something the Soviets could have known but assume for a moment that you know that for sure) ... then you would likely want your forces to retreat back to your Russian interior -- to trade time for space and bring you closer to your reserves and supplies (and draw the Germans farther away from theirs). The Germans had real problems supplying and supporting their forces the deeper they penetrated into Russia and Russia could have used that fact -- however, drawing inward and not fighting costly (but probably losing) battles was politically a problem for Stalin (as it was for Tsar Alexander during Napoleon's invasion in 1812). Could Stalin survive if so much real estate, people, industry, transportation nodes, supplies, etc were given up without a massive fight? What about when the stories of German atrocities emerged? In some ways, the best military response to the (short term) overwhelming German invasion conflicted with political common sense. The Soviets could very well have survived the German military invasion better than they did historically (by retreating) -- but who knows? Maybe that would have collapsed Russian support for the Soviet government or sparked all kinds of internal chaos (since the retreat might be perceived as betrayal of Russia).
Not sure that answered your question gt, but that's my attempt.
Instead of trying to conquer the USSR, he should have done what Germany did in WW1: knock it out of the war.
The USSR was a straw hut just waiting for someone to kick it over (or whatever AH said). The problem is that the USSR and the Russian people are anti-fragile. The more you press, the stronger they get. Even the most anti-Stalin general knew that to survive they needed Stalin to maintain the unity needed to fend off Germany.
So what AH should have done is to concentrate on blockading the Soviets. The first thing would have been to abandon the ridiculous idea of building battleships to be used as commerce raiders. Concentrate instead on subs and shore-based naval aviation, staged in Norway. On the land side push in as usual, but announce that if Stalin is executed and replaced by someone who renounces communism, becoming Russia once again, that Germany will declare peace and retreat to a defensive border. Depending on how far in they are, perhaps the Dnieper or Don to the Baltic.
Considering Stalin's quirks, at worst this would result in him executing even more generals than he did historically, with every general called back for consultation thinking some dangerous thoughts.
With the Soviets out of the way, the rest of war is much easier to win or negotiate a favorable peace.
If you treat Germany in WW2 like a single person strategy game (i.e. a game where you can determine the strategy and war decisions independent of history or ideology) -- then I can see why you might suggest this course of action. That said, I don't think that your approach would work if implemented (because of the economic strangulation Germany suffers long term being cut off from both Atlantic trade and from Soviet trade), but I understand your thinking.
The biggest problem, as I see it, however, with your suggestion is that there was a historical and ideological anchor that governed what Germany could have done in WW2 that you can assume away with your recommendation.
For example, I don't think that Germany without Hitler and National Socialism would have been able to wage the wars that it did wage (or win those wars if it did start them) against the various Western nations prior to 1941. Its Weimer coalition governments would not have gotten it to those points nor would a military dictatorship (led by the General Staff) or a restored Monarchist movement. Nor would a Communist or Socialist dictatorship have been able to make it work either. None of these pathways (aside from the National Socialist one) would have been stable enough or strong enough to fight against the slide into domestic civil war or overcome the various forms of civil and military opposition -- and none would have been fool-hardy enough to mortgage the economic future of Germany to the military present like the National Socialist were willing to do (i.e. when you look at what the German government actually did in the time period 1933-1938, it was literal economic suicide -- only a government totally 100% committed to 'faith' in its 'economic and military success' would basically sell the family home and bet everything at the roulette wheel like they did). So, the first point I am trying to make against your argument is probably only a National Socialist government with Hitler in charge gets you to 1941 like in the historical scenario. You need an insanely risk seeking individual (which doesn't imply that he was insane, merely supremely confident in his risk taking) and blindly loyal and fanatical party to take the leaps of faith needed to get to the historical German-Russia situation in 1941.
That sets up the second problem that I see with your argument -- it's basically impossible for Hitler and a National Socialist government and society to tolerate a Bolshevik, slavic Russia (in any form) for very long. The whole reason d'être of National Socialism was both elimination of inferior neighboring peoples (like the slavs and jews, and especially ethnically jewish slavs like many of the Bolsheviks) and the seizure of key land, resources, etc needed to make a sustainable long term empire. Germany (back then and still today) was technologically advanced but resource poor -- it could not feed itself, provide itself with sufficient coal or iron ore, it lacked most of the specialized minerals and raw materials needed for modern weaponry (e.g. tungsten, nickel, chromium, aluminum, titanium, uranium, oil, rubber, quinine, coffee) and it had insufficient amounts of other items (leather, wood, paper, copper, lead, tin, phosphorous, nitrates, tobacco, etc.). Taking Russian resources was really its only hope of being self-sufficient (given that it was blocked from importing outside of neutral nations in Western Europe / Turkey). It would be out-of-character to an extreme extent to be Germany in 1941 and not 'go for broke' against Russia (once a war starts). If Germany wins, then it may obtain 'what it needs to live'. If it fails, then Germany is crushed. If it doesn't try, it becomes an economic vassal of the hated Soviets or slowly withers away on the vine into inferiority and poverty. The best strategy for Germany in 1941 is to not be Germany in 1941 (or be the temporary economic vassal of the Soviets and hope for a reconciliation with the West before the Soviets turn on Germany) -- but once the war starts, Germany must either win bigly or die ugly. This became even more true once the Soviet war actually started and Germany treated the Russians the way it did (e.g. the civilians) -- at that point, there was no turning back or hope of a negotiated settlement in any realistic scenario with the Soviets.
Anyway, I can be wrong -- I just wanted to share with you my thoughts (even though they are critical of your points, I don't intend them to be critical of you personally).
Hence my requirement that the new leader renounce communism.
You make a lot of good points, and I agree with some of them. Note that with my plan Germany would still have acquired vast swathes of farmland in Eastern Europe. Of course once the war was over and Germany recovered, peace agreements can always be renegotiated...
I disagree about the nazis #1 goal being extermination of inferiors; their #1 goal was to 'Make Germany and Germans Great Again'. So unite German-speaking nations and improve the bloodline with eugenic programs (similar to what the US was doing at this time, but no one likes to talk about that.)
Neighboring inferiors didn't cause the nazis to slavver with insane hate and bloodthirst, that is (mostly) post-war propaganda to justify allied war crimes. Even before the war started, the nazis were working with zionist organizations to deport jews to Israel, rather than exterminate them. Nazi Germany wouldn't have had a problem putting off invading slavic neighbors until the time was right.
There are lots of quotes from politicians and generals saying the goal is extermination, but it must be remembered that politicians lie to generals and generals lie to soldiers.
The whole racial animosity of National Socialism is a pretty big point to take issue with (it seems pretty clearly established to me) -- but even if you take that aspect out of the equation, you still end up with a pretty unworkable situation for Germany since it requires the removal of Communism in Russia (which was really the core element of its the USSR's government, military, secret police, schools, science, arts, entertainment, propaganda, secular religion, etc.). It would be going too far to say that Communism was Russia (for pre-Communist Russian culture and religion was still there under the surface) -- but at that point in time, Communism (and all that went along with it) was what was holding the USSR together (the various regions etc) and the whole basis of its economic and social model. Giving up Communism would threaten the entire leadership cadre (at multiple levels of society) and be like the Vatican renouncing Christianity. The Soviet Union was led by a ego-driven dictator (that is true) -- but he was supported by a whole system of similar beings that largely believed in what he believed and would have acted in rather similar manners on most issues. It wasn't a situation where removing one leader would have made the difference (like it might have made a difference in Germany in WW2) -- there was too much Party infrastructure and layers and layers of replacement leaders ready to step forward (in that sense the Russian Communist Party was much deeper and more consistent internally than the German National Socialist Party could ever hope to be -- after all, it had 25+ more years in power to perfect its hold on society).
I could see how your compromise peace proposal could have worked in an alternate 1917 or with a White Russian post war government in 1918 / 1919 -- accept peace and don't be an enemy and we can coexist with new borders etc (because face it you lost the war). But I can't see how that works in 1941 or later (because Russia had not lost the war). The USSR couldn't be blockaded (even if Germany had the air and sea forces to do it, which they didn't) - it was too self sufficient. And it wasn't beaten militarily in the field -- and it was out to reclaim its borders, avenge its deaths, demonstrate the superiority of its culture and secular religion, etc. And time was on the USSR's side.
One last point -- more of a personal suggestion from me to you (because I am starting to be an old man and I perceive you to be a rather young man, regardless of whether that is the case, and I want to offer you some sincere and well-meaning advice -- so please take it in that vein). It might be a good idea to spend some time better understanding the writings and details of National Socialism, Italian Fascism, Soviet Marxist-Leninist-Trotskite-Stalinist thought, and modern Third Positionism. I'd recommend the YouTuber TIK for a starter (he has lots of clearly presented, objective, and well-supported videos on those topics). It might be helpful for you to get to know what the political, cultural, and ideological influences were on those ideologies and on what their leaders and thought-leaders said and wrote in detail about economics, morality, society, and the future. You might be surprised by how similar they are in some ways (and the ways in which they vary and why). Furthermore, you might benefit from that investigation because you come across to me as a 'open' to some of those National Socialist talking points (or explanations / excuses). Now of course you are free to believe whatever you truly want to believe (and not every negative story you hear about something is true), but (as an old man potentially talking to a younger one), you might want to really dig into those ideas before committing yourself too closely to them. When you do so, certain light bulbs might 'go off' for you that change the way you think about those topics. Those insights might be in the area of economics (because you really start. to understand how those various systems worked in theory and practice) -- or they might be in the area of morality (once you start to understand where those lines of thinking lead you with regards to discussions of what is right / what is wrong) -- or they might affect your views of on a religious level (hint: National Socialism is very deep into the occult -- whether you believe in the occult or not, it certainly does). Anyway, just a thought. There are a lot of bad ideas out there in life -- and oftentimes the bad ones get dusted off and recycled from time to time and defended and re-presented. Just be careful what you latch on to as you go forward (for sometimes those things latch back on to you!). Safe travels and healthy investigations to you, and all my best to you!
Yet NS was still able to agree to the Molotov-von Ribbentrop pact. I generally agree with Prof John Meersheimer who says you can predict a nations’ actions with ~75% accuracy simply by assuming they’ll act as complete sociopaths in pursuit of power and resources. If pretending to be a friend to an enemy is needed, then that is what you do.
Neither of those parties (in the specific case you mentioned and prior to that Pact) had many other good options and both had pressing needs (so they cooperated) -- and the case in question did not question their national survival and merely postponed the ultimate clash. What you suggest does affect their national survival (i.e. once the Soviet-German war starts in is difficult to end -- because a clear cut victory is hard to achieve for either side -- which means it goes on and become an existential struggle and because the ideology of each sides system requires the other to be destroyed (and that does not even take into account the passions and anger of the people that happen once war and death and destruction occur). The issue whether isn't whether nations act in a sociopathic ways (they often but not always do) -- the issue is that a negotiated solution short of outright victory is the rational solution (not sociopathic one). Bottomline, you can believe in the validity and efficacy of your proposed strategy (blockade and or negotiated settlement) -- it's a counter-factual hypothesis after all - I am just saying that there are many reasons why it would not be considerable (in that era) or work. I like the fact that you are trying to 'think out of the box' -- but this may not be the idea / situation to keep doing so.
The Nazis should have built subs instead of surface ships and set up a blockade in the north of Norway. Wow, that's amazing! Yeah why didn't they think of that.
Sincerely, Someone Who Never Read A Book About WWII
Please tell me what history book claims the nazis didn't build the Bismarck, the Tirpitz, etc. and instead poured those resources into shore-based naval planes and subs.
I hope you can't find any, because it would ruin one hell of a good movie.
He tried, Japan refused. Japan and Russia weren't at war until the very end, when Japan was almost done and Stalin saw an opportunity to take Manchuria with little risk.
I think it is more complicated than just saying Japan 'refused' -- my understanding was that the Japanese were indeed open to the idea of a joint attack on the Soviets, but that bringing that openness to action required certainty from the Germans (on whether they wanted active Japanese support) and a certain amount of diplomatic prep work on the part of the Germans (which was lacking).
Inside Japan, the Japanese Army faction of the government was supportive of a Soviet war (the Navy faction against the idea) -- but the Hitler/Stalin non-aggression pact took Japan by surprise and Germany's subsequent ambivalence about Japanese involvement in things diplomatic, military, and economic raised all kinds of doubts in Japan about how far it could trust its German 'ally' (this in turn then led to the Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact). Had Germany handled itself better diplomatically with the Japanese, I think there was at least a chance that Germany could have invaded Russia in 1941 with some kind of Japanese assistance (or at least active menacing) in the East. From the German perspective, this was an unforced error.
Accepting that seizing the Romanian oil fields was the only possible knockout blow (Moscow would have simply relocated across the Urals if seized), do you not think the allies would have sent fuel to Russia via Murmansk? Admittedly with an impact on their own operations, further delaying the invasions of Europe and North Africa perhaps. And cramping America in the Pacific.
The allies sent an enormous amount of fuel to Russia via the Arctic convoys (so what you propose actually happened in real life). Soviet fuel production capabilities (pumping and refining) were working at full capacity but were both damaged and interdicted a lot by the Germans during the war (and Siberian production was not yet a big deal). So a lot of the fuel the Soviets used in the war was actually American (America was over 50% of world oil production at the time and had surge capacity to drill, pump, refine, and ship it to both Britain / the Commonwealth and the Soviets). Without American gasoline and trucks, the Soviets armored counter-strokes would have been less effective and its advance in 1944-1945 a lot slower.
Romanian oil production for Germany was critical (there was a tiny bit of oil production in Poland and Hungary and a bit elsewhere as well) -- but Romania really accounted for something like only 10-20% of German needs (I am going off of memory here so I can't be exact at this moment). Germany was in a perpetual fuel deficit starting the moment the Germany Soviet war started (and probably before that as well). German rationing and synthetic fuel production helped but never ever had a chance of making up the needed shortfall. Even Germany's attempts to capture oil in the Caucasus had a bit of 'desperation' to it (i.e. even if successful, capturing those oil fields and refineries and shipping the output back to Germany would have been a challenge -- even if those facilities were captured intact, which they were unlikely to be). Same with German dreams of pushing into the Middle East. The oil-rich Middle East that we take for granted today produced relatively little oil in the 1940's (except for Basra, Kirkuk, and Iran which were firmly under British control). When you are starving, going for 'something' becomes your objective for sure -- but the chances of getting those oil supplies and then being able to 'bring it home' and 'eat it' was such a long shot to be almost impossible for Germany in that war. Germany had to win the war quickly (for so many reasons) or it had to have military or technological miracles -- because it was doomed to starve itself out of petroleum and then eventually food and coal and raw materials (if it didn't collapse first like it did historically).
What does my written statement mean to you? To me (who wrote it) it meant that there was in the 1940's no significant amount of Siberian oil or gas production in the Soviet Union (unlike say in the 1970's or today). Now, I have to admit that my knowledge of Soviet oil field statistics is superficial, and if you want to insist that the exact amount of Siberian production was precisely zero (instead of some nominal amount practically equivalent to zero), then you 'got me'. But does that really change my point?
Seriously, if you want to be helpful (because you have deeper knowledge on the topic) perhaps you can respond differently and say something like 'the USSR's first Siberian fields were not brought onto production until 19XX .. so like Martin wrote Siberian oil production could not contribute to the USSR's fuel needs during WW2'. Or you can do it your way. Whatever.
That's a good comment. I definitely think it was an issue of both quantity and quality -- and although Soviet produced fuel quantity was substantial in quantity, the USSR's needs for fuel and its usage of fuel went up tremendously (especially once it went on the offensive in late 1943 and beyond). So it's not that the Soviets lacked fuel like the German did in 1943 and beyond -- it was that the Soviets needed vast amounts of fuel to move westward with its massive armies over the destroyed infrastructure of Western Russia (which required substantial truck based logistics) and that Soviet oil production alone could not meet that need if the USSR wanted to move as massively and quickly as it wanted to (or did historically). The USSR could have kept up the fight and advanced without the Western fuel -- it just couldn't do it on as broad a front or as quickly if the Western fuel was not flowing in as it did.
The quality issue did affect aviation performance a lot (and the Soviets lacked the high octane blending capabilities that you reference) -- but aviation on the Russian-German front was different than on the other theaters of the war, so in that sense although aviation fuel mattered in the Soviet theatre, it probably didn't matter as much as it did elsewhere in WW2 (where fighter versus fighter combat for air supremacy mattered more).
By 1943, German aviation was under strain in France and Italy and at home (which diverted German air resources towards interceptors and home defense and away from its eastern front with the Soviets) -- which changed the type of aircraft they deployed to the Soviet front (and how they were used). By 1943, German tactical bombers were increasingly vulnerable and obsolete in the West and in Italy, and fighters needed in those areas instead. So, increasingly German air forces in Russia began to be run down (in types and numbers of aircraft) and reoriented towards bombing and interdiction efforts (and resupply). Meanwhile, the Soviets were churning out vast quantities of very serviceable domestic aircraft (and using whatever the Western powers gave them) -- so they became a real and increasing threat to German forces in Russia (even with inferior aviation fuel). This change in the air war balance became more profound over time.
The nature of the air war over the Soviet Union also affected the 'aviation fuel' problem a bit. The Russian front was huge, air early warning systems virtually non-existent, and it was difficult to to defend (on either side) from tactical bombing strikes from the other side party (these conditions did not apply so thoroughly in Western or Southern Europe or the Pacific). So, it became possible to have some amount of air support in the Soviet theatre (for either side) without having complete control of the air (via fighter dominance). It was the fighter versus fighter aspect of WW2 air combat where the fuel quality really mattered (for a fighter, every ounce of additional performance it could eke out over its opponent really mattered and therefore having appropriate fuel could make a huge difference). And while fighter versus fighter combat did occur on the Soviet-German theatre, the outcome of the air war in that space didn't depend on it like elsewhere. Hence, while the Soviets wanted and needed and prioritized high octane aviation fuel, my argument would be that not getting it from the West would have not been as 'hurtful to them' as not getting enough regular fuel (for the tanks and trucks moving westward).
At least that is my understanding of the fuel and air combat experience in that theatre and my understanding of how fuel affects WW2 engine performance.
It's not just a question of technology -- it's building and running and operating the plants at scale (during a war with tons of other things going on). You seem to be point out nits (and missing the bigger picture). The comment was that the Soviets were deficient in higher octane aviation gas. I said correct. It wasn't a question of technology but of installed industrial capacity able to meet military operational requirements. The Soviets needed help (and the US provided it).
Define 'won'. If Germany had maintained its economic partnership with the USSR, could Germany have retained control of Europe (outside of Britain) -- likely yes (especially if the USA does not actively join in WW2 in December 1941). Would Germany (with Soviet support) been able to conquer Britain or control the Mediterranean if Britain wanted to keep fighting (and received the historical support it was receiving from the US and the Commonwealth)? Probably not (the naval and air forces essential for these two aspects of the fight were not in its favor and Italy was a mixed blessing as an ally --- very unstable politically, militarily, and economically - and very vulnerable to British air/land/sea attack along its exposed coastline). An eventual collapse in Italy (absent the Soviet German war) was a very possible scenario (it would just happen differently than it did historically but it would likely happen at some point) -- which leaves Germany in control of Europe but militarily tied down everywhere, facing the threat of continued local rebellion / British intervention in many places, and very dependent on the USSR for most of the essential food, fuel, minerals, etc it needs to 'keep the lights on'. This is not a good long term scenario for Germany (i.e. perpetual hot war in its south and west on the sea and in the air versus an opponent backed by sheltered overseas partners capable of massively outproducing it in those dimensions). Germany would have to rely on the U-Boat fleet and 'special weapons' even more (and technologically, this was NOT a race it was guaranteed to win). So, under these considerations, 'holding what it had' was not a great outcome for Germany in 1941. The most likely outcome was continued war and the economic destruction of both Britain and Germany (which would let the USSR win).
If you assume that the German-USSR pact falls apart (because the Germans can't stand it ideologically or because they fear giving the Soviets too much power over them long term) -- then you get the historical outcome Serge talks about. Same if Stalin decides to 'take the Germans out' later on at a point of his choosing (because he doesn't trust the National Socialists or senses an opportunity).
The only alternative you left is a 'mind meld' of Soviets and National Socialists -- a complete 'happy' alliance where they can use their combined resources to 'take on the world'. This was so not likely to happen ideologically or practically. At that time period, Germany and the USSR were very ideologically governed places. They could compromise on practical matters (when they had no better alternatives and pressing needs), but they really really hated what the other stood for. Hitler in particular thought that the threat of Bolshevikism and 'the Asian' was 'the' existential threat to his vision of the future -- and the Soviets knew that their greatest enemies lie in the various philosophies, traditions, and national strategies of the 'West" -- and both nations (Germany and USSR) were inherently expansionist and absolutist ('all or nothing' 'to the end' because it 'was inevitable') -- so a sustainable alliance of the powers of the Eurasian land mass was not in the cards then (and is hard to imagine in most other historical periods as well).
Through my ongoing studies of the Russo-German War 1941-1945, the German plan was never to conquer all of the Soviet Union. The plan was to get to the so-called “AA Line”, an imaginary line drawn from the port of Archangel in the north to the city of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea in the south. The hope was that by getting to that point The Red Army would have been decisively destroyed.
Advance units of German troops actually did get into Astrakhan in Spring 1942 during Case Blau.
Have your ongoing studies found a case where an invader successfully conquered a part of another country without needing to respond to a whole country defensive response?
I can think of a couple of examples: the moorish conquest of Spain in the 700's (which left a northern remanent in Christian hands) and the Turkish conquest of the Byzantine Empire (which left progressively smaller Byzantine rump states behind for periods of time). Same with the Turkish conquest of southeastern Europe (e.g. Bulgaria, Serbia, parts of Hungary and Austria, etc). Eventually, the Spanish and Austrians (and other locals) pushed back the invaders (but it took something like 700 years and 350 years respectively to do so and the Byzantines never came back) -- so, I'd 'call' those victories for the invaders (at least in the relative time range of the actual invasions).
The larger point however is that a 'successful' German invasion of the Soviet Union would have aimed for a couple of objectives (that were not totally unrealistic or unachievable at least in theory):
-- capture of the main industrial centers, resource centers, and transportation hubs (like the main cities of European Russian, the rail lines, the oil fields, the mines) so that the Russians could not have the means of effective resistance going forward (outside of partisan activity)
-- the destruction of the support for or effectiveness of the Soviet governmental system (either by provoking civil war, economic collapse, political coups, rebellions, independence movements, etc). so that an organized Soviet response was not feasible or coordinated going forward
Neither of these two conditions were met by the Germans (obviously) -- but if they had been met, the fact that 70% of the Soviet land mass was not under German control might not have been an issue (those regions were going to be too disconnected from each other, under-developed and under populated, too remote, too potentially open to rebellion or independence, etc) that it wasn't an insane hypothesis for the German's to entertain. It wasn't a wise course of action for the Germans to embark on (given the German's limited chances of success) -- but it wasn't insanely unrealistic objective for holding on to its conquest if those conditions could be achieved.
A lot depends on how 'guaranteed' you think the Soviet victory was destined to be. I think that the chances of the Soviets system surviving the German assault were pretty good but not guaranteed. I do believe that there was a chance that the Soviet system might have come down (through military action or economic collapse or internal rebellion) -- but just because it didn't happen in history doesn't mean that it wasn't a close run thing (or that if you ran the same 'simulation' a thousand times you wouldn't get a different outcome).
As for Russian nationalism and the Russian's long term will to resist, I do believe that an intensely patriotic and determined people make a huge difference in what happens, eventually (just ask the Medieval Spanish) -- but it isn't necessarily successful (ask the Byzantines) or quick. So, I think that there was a chance that the Germans could have met their goals (just not a good chance of doing so).
I often ponder about alternate ww2 history. I am most curious about what would have been if the U.S. threw all of its material support behind the nazis at the onset of barbarosa. I don't think the soviets could've prevailed in that alternate universe. With the current proxy war in Ukraine where the entire western block is shamelessly supporting modern day nazis in the hope of them being able collapse the Russian state. I wonder if the decision makers in the US wish they could go back in time to support Hitler instead of Stalin. The odds that they could've collapsed Russia back then is orders of magnitudes higher than it is now using Ukraine and I bet the neo-cons are kicking themselves over the missed opportunity.
The US threw all of its financial and material support behind the Third Reich by finding Hitler's military buildup and having the Big 3 build automobile manufacturing plants in Germany to supply his automotive needs. They didn't want to support Soviet communism because it wasn't the form of Marxism that they subsequently installed in the US through the US Congress' adoption of all of the planks of the Communist Manifesto besides the abolition of private property, which BlackRock is facilitating by buying all of the housing and converting it to rental units.
You are misunderstanding the actions of individual companies (e.g. Ford in the 1920's) with the 'US' (government or national interest).
The 1920's was a boom time in some ways for the US and for the world as a whole. New technologies (aircraft, automobiles, oil products, radio, 'talking' movies, consumer products) were taking off and companies and entrepreneurs scrambled world wide 'to make it big'. Ford built plants in Germany and Britain and even in the USSR (so did Fiat in the USSR as well). This was a relatively non-ideological age (compared to today) -- and while there was anti-Soviet views at that time, there were also a lot of pro-Soviet ones as well.
During Hitler's rearmament and during WW2, the Germans nationalized the Ford (and other factories) and repurposed them for their war effort (and because of their ideology of state control of production). It wasn't the case of the 'US' supporting Germany over Russia but supply Ford products (in fact, for a variety of reasons, the US 'deep state' such as it was at that time period was actually more pro-Soviet than anti-Soviet).
Looking at that historical time period with the lenses of today (e.g. the current US deep state and Black Rock) is an anachronism -- like projecting the influence of the the internet on the attitudes and decisions of Napoleonic Europe (it doesn't really apply or work very well as an explanatory or analysis tool).
I don't think that your statement is accurate in any of the historical time periods we are discussing. The Big Three didn't support the US government's promotion of war in the 1920's and 1930's (because they as companies did not support war, the US population didn't support war, and the US government did not seek war). The Big Three were active in producing the weapons or war during WW2 (because their leaderships were supportive of that war, the American people were supportive of that war, and the government obviously were supportive of that war) -- but that was an actual war, not the next big war. The Big Three then scaled way back on 'war' support after WW2 (although they did some defense work in the 1950's and 1960's) but really it would be a mistake to say that they were promoting the next war (they were more focused on capturing profits in the domestic car business).
Overall, I think you are in danger of taking ideas and mindsets from today (e.g. 'that big business is supporting the next big war') and 'copying and pasting' that viewpoint to the past where it doesn't really apply.
Between the end of WW1 to WW2, virtually no US business made money off of 'war' (there really wasn't that much spending). During WW2 everyone participated in and profited from the war (although some portion of those profits evaporated do to rising costs). Post WW2-to the9/11, relatively few companies benefited from war or war spending (except during Korea and Vietnam). It's only after 9/11 that the general corporate appetite for war gets 'big' (and even then, it is concentrated in a a subset of tech and defense and advisory companies not general entities like the Big 3). The post 9/11 orgy for war has a lot to do with the policy changes made in the 1990's (the government's decision to seek regime change wars and to consolidate the post Cold War defense industries into giant, lobbying, behemoths capable of capturing Congress and administration spending priorities) -- as well as the propaganda and false flags that were used to goad the American people into supporting endless war.
Based on the search results, here are some examples of companies that support war efforts:
Based on the search results, several types of companies can be seen as supporting war efforts. These include major defense contractors and weapons manufacturers, companies that have continued operations in or provided support to Russia during the conflict in Ukraine, and companies in other sectors that may have indirect connections.
Defense Contractors and Weapons Manufacturers:
Examples include Lockheed Martin, the world's largest arms producer involved in aircraft, electronics, missiles, and space technologies, and the largest federal contractor in the U.S.. Other significant U.S. military contractors mentioned are Raytheon Technologies Corporation, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing. European defense contractors like the UK-based BAE Systems and French companies Alsetex and Cheddite are also listed. SWORD Defense Inc., a veteran-owned company manufacturing advanced weapon systems, is also noted.
Companies Operating in Russia and/or Supporting Russian War Efforts (according to NACP):
Several companies are identified by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) for their continued operations in Russia or perceived support of Russian war efforts. These include businesses from various sectors, such as retail (Auchan), food production (Barry Callebaut, Bacardi), construction (Buzzi Unicem, Knauf, Rockwool International), technology (Comnav Technology Ltd., SLB), manufacturing (Danieli, Vičiūnai Group), and consumer goods (Unilever). These companies' actions range from paying taxes to supplying goods or providing services that could be seen as supporting the Russian government or military.
Companies in Other Industries:
Companies in other industries can also be linked to supporting war efforts. For instance, Alibaba Group is mentioned through its AliExpress platform providing international goods in Russia, and the Houston Astros baseball team for broadcasting games in Russia.
Note: The information provided is based on the search results and is not exhaustive. The concept of "supporting war efforts" can be interpreted broadly, encompassing direct military supply to providing essential services to countries involved in conflict."
Look I was not arguing that 'companies don't support wars' -- I was responding to your comments regarding the Big 3 (which I know very well both presently and historically) and to the eras that this article is about (WW2 +/- 20 years). Certainly, some companies support war spending (because they profit from building the products) -- this is true even if the weapons just get built and go into inventory and never get used -- but there are a few people within those companies at different times that may go beyond that 'build it to be strong' attitude and go full-war-monger ('build it to use it then build and use some more etc.). This latter trend is more prevalent now (since 9/11) that in other times (although there is always some element of that going on in history).
The other issue I have with your comments is your use of general terms like the 'US', the 'US government' or 'companies'. These are collective nouns that don't have (or rarely have) opinions or plans. Certain people in important parts of the US government may want regime change - but that is not the same thing as the 'US wants' regime change (although for short hand reasons we might casually refer to things that way, it's literally a false statement because it reflects the attitude of a subset of the government and not necessarily the people as a whole). Same with using phrases like 'companies' want -- a certain CEO or executive might want a certain thing -- but do the rank and file workers and managers, the investors, the creditors, etc. want that as well? (or do they just want stable and increasing employment, profits, repayments, etc). It's a logical mistake to infer 'meaning' to one person in a causal chain (the defense company CEO) and then infer those same thoughts, feelings, and plans to the all the people, suppliers, investors, further down the chain (and that collectively make up 'the company').
Futhermore, I encourage you to avoid general statements like saying 'companies want war' (and meaning that in a literal sense). It's the kind of juvenile thing a student leftist might chant during a protest march ('all companies are war-mongers .. all cops are bad ...'). It may have an element of truth to it because some people controlling a particular company are war-mongers and because some particular cops or even certain localized police departments are bad -- but it's also wrong and misleading because it over-generalizes and makes specific, individual failures feature of the whole. No system -- capitalistic, socialistic, communistic whatever can survive that kind of over-simplification and condemnation. If you want call out Lockheed Martin (since 1995) -- I'll agree with you. But if you want to make all kinds of generalizations (that can't possibly be supported), I object.
Proving that the US has always played both sides of every war it has engineered its entry into, having eliminated the constitutional requirement that Congress declare them, with the active abdication of its military members, in ignorant treason.
You didn't explicitly saying but you were clearing implying American forces backed the Germans over the Soviets, which even ignoring lend lease is a silly argument.
There are some really important difference between the US (in the 1920's and early 1940's) and the post 9/11 world we live in today that affect your question.
The US population on the eve of WW2 was very very isolationist (even pacifistic). Aside from a belief in a 'strong two ocean navy' to guard the Atlantic and Pacific 'moats' and the 'former' colony of the Philippines (which the US was in the process of divesting itself from very very slowly), there was little support for a US military or military adventures outside of Latin America, which was perceived as a sphere of US influence -- i.e. in Latin America it was 'ok' to use a little bit of force from time to time to 'restore order' provided that the expedition was very short term and low cost -- e.g. the various US Marine excursions to Nicaragua, Haiti, etc. but even those efforts had little support outside of the the US Senate and corporate board rooms).
The population in the US after WW2 (and particularly after the Berlin Blockade, the Soviet atom bomb, the creation of the 'Iron Curtain', the 'overthrow' of the 1948 Czechoslovak government, and the Korean War) reluctantly (and then rather enthusiastically) embraced a standing military with worldwide defense obligations. This military was very navy and air centric (and heavily reliant on nuclear weapons), and its land army was not in and of itself much to write home about in terms of training and real capabilities during the 1950's to mid 1960's. The US defense production base was in place, many reserve and active duty units were part of the order of battle, but the US military pre-Vietnam was not all that ready for overseas wars or major conflict (in part because the belief that any major conflict would quickly move to a nuclear war and hence make the kind of army or tactical Air Force of 1945 pointless).
The mid 1960-s to mid 1970's Vietnam war totally screwed up this US military system (and called into question its willingness to fulfill its defense treaty obligations to foreign nations let alone undertake 'wars of choice'). As a result, US military in the late 1970's was run down, unpopular, and not very mission capable (e.g. the failed Iran-hostage rescue attempt in 1979/80) and the popular opposition to Reagan's efforts to support El Salvador and Nicaragua against Marxist guerrillas in the early 1980's.
Reagan (with an eye to Europe and countering the Soviets) rebuilt US convention and unconventional forces massively and had a huge impact on how the US population saw its armed forces -- but even after the Reagan era there was still little appetite to 'use' that force unless absolutely necessary. However, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait (and the successful US war effort repelling that invasion) massively boosted US support for and confidence in its military. The relative 'ease' of that victory then helped create the story that modern 'smart-bomb' centric war, at least for the US, was now 'costless' (at least in terms of US lives).
The mid to later 1990's was then a period of debate. The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact was finished -- should the US pull back and demobilize (to capture the 'peace dividend' like Europe opted for) -- or should it use this massive power (hyper-force) to drive the 'rules based international order' (i.e. regime change / globalization / 'democracy' / human rights). This was also a period of generational change in US politics. Leaders who had been around for (and fought in WW2) like Bush Sr and Reagan were replaced by baby boomers who came later (Clinton, Gore, Bush Jr, Cheney, Biden, etc.). These new leaders wanted to pursue interventionism and kept the military capabilities largely in place. They also started to use those forces often (e.g. Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Haiti), although it was not until 9/11 when the 'leash came off' and US forces began to be used massively throughout the world. It then took twenty years before the US public really began to understand the costs, lack of benefits, and senselessness of those wars to get to where we are now (swinging back towards non-interventionism or even out-right isolationism, at least at the grass roots level).
So, your question puts a question that the post 9/11 generation took for granted (i.e. the 'let's do regime change') and transposes that recent attitude back to a very different America in summer of 1941 (very isolationist, still relatively poor compared to today, very religious, very militarily unprepared, and burned by the senseless waste of WW1).
Based on those profound differences in time period and mindset, it would seem impossible to me that the US public (or Congress, which at that time period better reflected the sense of the US public than it does today) would support a National Socialist (or British or French) war against 'Communism' and the USSR. The overwhelming US response at that time would have been 'a pox on all of their houses'.
The other complicating factor in all that is that in the 1930's and 1940's, a lot of the State Department and intellectual elite of the US (the nascent 'deep state' of today) was openly or passively pro-communist in outlook (or at least sympathetic to it). The same was true in Britain and France as well. France had a somewhat strong fascist element to its society in 1940 (but less so Britain and a lot less so in the US). So, if there was a side the US would have taken (and as I mentioned above, the US would not have taken sides), it might have been on behalf of the Soviets (not the Germans) if the 'deep state' of 1940 could have its way.
Of course, if the US did support Germany (and not provide Lend-Lease to the USSR), then the outcome of the German war in Russia might well have been different -- but that scenario was just slightly more realistic than a Martian army landing in Munich and doing the same thing. It just wasn't going to happen in the America of the early 1940's.
If possible, could you point me to anything (articles etc) you might recommend about the pro-communist feeling amongst the bureaucracy in the US and UK/France? I'd read quite a bit of WW2 history and don't recall this being brought up much, so am quite intrigued to understand better. Cheers!
I can't think of any specific books regarding those two topics that I would recommend off hand, but I can make two alternative suggestions. The first, which I referenced somewhere earlier, is in TIK's WW2 Youtube channel -- he covers many topics (including some that are close to what you are asking) -- and he also shows a very extensive set of footnotes and references for his work (so you could work off of that).
The other alternative is actually a modern, on-line (or downloadable) war game called Hearts of Iron (IV). Now there are many things to hate about that particular game -- it promises so much (and if you are serious about history and play it) it really fails to deliver on those hopes and expectations. It may or may not be 'fun' to play (by yourself or with others) as a 'game' (I find it uninteresting and predictable after you figure out how it works) -- and as a military simulation it has aspects that are amazing (and others that totally destroy its utility as a 'what if' model of history). Every couple of years I start using it (perhaps because some new module or version comes out) .. get my hopes up or try to modify it to better suit my needs and expectations --- only then to run into some the same limitations that damned it the last time I looked at it. So, based on that you might be wondering why I recommend it -- well, it (and the cottage industry of history buffs and computer nerds that like it) have developed a whole lot of well-researched content / modules / add-ons for the base game that can really teach you history if you play it with that in mind. You have to be careful and selective in what you mods you play (and what information you take at face value) - but if you are interested in what was going on in Britain or France in the 1930's (pro-communist, pro-fascist, historical Tory, alternative Tory or Labor etc) there is a mod for that that will take you through historical events, give you decision trees to choose from etc that really help you understand that perspective. For example, for Germany, I wasn't (at that point in my life) terribly interested in German financial and economic policy during the Third Reicht -- and I certainly hadn't heard about MEFO bills. Playing a particular good 'mod' of the game, that went through all that, opened my eyes to the importance of all that (so that when other books and content came along referencing that topic I paid attention / sought better information out). I also learned a great deal about what was going on inside the Polish government of the 1930's (and the various factions and alternative parties and their interests / goals / constraints etc) by playing 'Poland' in a particular mod or mods. Same with Finland or France or Italy or whatever. Now, the quality of those mods varies greatly (and some that existed 10 years ago most certainly aren't around today) -- but it can really help. So, check it out if you are so inclined (it's not terribly expensive in terms of dollars but very time intensive with regard to learning curve -- just to master the basic game -- and then understanding and using mods is yet another hurdle -- but you may be so inclined). Remember that like all things crowd-sourced -- be wary and test what it tells you (it may be gold or it may be bull-shit, it depends). That game also can help a person understand logistics and the constraints of geography as well (it is simplified in relation to reality but way more automated and sophisticated than most table top games can simulate or books / videos alone can demonstrate).
The condensed version of what I learned regarding Communist influence in Britain in France is something as follows:
For both Britain and France, non-Marxist versions of socialism arose somewhat spontaneously in the mid 1800's (either from Christian-aligned sects or from enlightenment 'liberal' philosopher types hoping to offset the poverty, inequality, and misery of industrialization, enclosure, urbanization, etc.). These groups affected popular culture to some extent, but were often only local and self-limiting (and basically went no-where).
Marxist versions of Socialism started to emerge around 1850's and in the decades after it. Marx was in England at the time and Engels was the rich offspring of factory owners who financed Marx's writings (and debauched lifestyle -- but that is another story). Marxist thought in England was somewhat limited in its rate of expansion, but Marxist and similar thought (e.g. the Paris Communards) were pretty influential and politically active in France at this time. The French government (under Emperor Louis Napoleon) was conservative (as were its military and police and much of the countryside) so they kept that Communard element in check (although Napoleon's liberal opposition in Parliament flirted with it). That Communard element then revolted and seized control of Paris after Napoleon III's defeat at Sedan (the infamous Paris Commune of 1870). Eventually, the new liberal 'Republican' government (that replaced Louis Napoleon's Empire) suppressed that rebellion with force and restored order. That legacy of open communist revolt and government suppression left a firm legacy on French left, right, and center -- although the dominant thread of French politics up to the First World War was conservatism / Catholicism versus socialism / secularism (not Communism).
After the Paris Commune, the Communard element of communism faded and the socialist and Marxist versions of it became ascendant internationally in Europe not just in Britain and France. The people involved in these movements tended to be intellectuals and lawyers and philosophers -- so they tended to have endless debates about their beliefs, priorities, plans of action (as opposed to the more direct action Communards or shop level worker rights movements -- those kinds of movements existed in parallel although the leadership of the movements tended to be fractious and contentious intellectuals. The end result was the various groups that made up the various 'Internationale' movements of socialist and communist groups across Europe and UK and elsewhere. At various points and times, these movements tended to fragment and form 'heresies' (or new, more correct versions of the true communism) -- and some of the groups were more inclined to work with the reigning governments (like the Social Democratic Party in Germany or the emerging Labor Party in Britain) -- while others did not. The First World War was a huge disappointment for these parties -- they expected the workers of Europe to unite in their refusal to fight capitalist wars -- but towards the end of WW1 all of those left and communist parties took new hope with the emergence of Bolshevik Russia and Lenin in the USSR.
The dire economic conditions of post war Europe and the institutional hang-over of the WWI which destroyed many people's faith in governments, parties, religion, private enterprise, patriotism, empire, etc was fertile ground for home-grown (and Soviet sponsored) Marxist parties, propaganda, and political activism in 1918 and beyond. A significant number of WW1 veterans were socialist or Marxist going into that war -- and had put their Marxism or Socialism aside during the war -- but upon war's end, many of these pre-war Socialist became very politically active (Mussolini in Italy would be an example). More significantly was the rise of socialist and communist belief in the younger generation that did not fight in the war (because they were too young). I was reading something recently about how relatively few active veterans of the First World War in Britain 'thought badly' about the conflict -- where as their younger brothers / sons outright rejected everything to do with that war (and fully bought into the 'lions led by donkeys for the capitalist and imperialist' benefit' line of thinking).
The French Government in the 1920's and 1930's was one revolving door of politicians, elections, and parties (some lasting mere weeks or months) (as was Italy's) -- and the instability of the governments, their ineffectiveness with dealing with social and economic and financial impacts of the First War, and the rise of Soviet inspired and funded press, political parties, and activism totally eviscerated most of the French (and the British Liberal) parties by the early 1930's. The French Popular Front government of 1936 was famous or infamous (depending on your point of view) because it was the first time the unabashedly Communist left parties were in coalition with the more tradition Socialist and Left parties in French Society. The tensions of the Spanish Civil War (which pitted nationalists and traditionalists and out-right fascists against democrats and socialists and anarchists and communists) exacerbated the French government's (and French society's) fissures and nearly brought France to a civl war / coup.
The British Labor Party - which was trying hard to be 'respectable' and not radical, struggled to govern in an difficult situation two different times during this period (and had some success in enacting parts of its agenda when in power and when in out of power but it was not revolutionary in nature) -- but more radical elements of socialism, syndicalism, communism, anarchism, etc. spread readily across industry and college campuses. Given Labor's relative strength electorally (and the conservative nature of Britain as a whole and of its government institutions), Communism was unlikely to come to Britain electorally before WW2 (but institutions that had large numbers of upper and middle class British public school and Oxbridge graduates -- like the Foreign Office, Intelligence Services, etc) were very populated with Marxist or Marxist adjacent thinkers.
The other place to look for what you are looking for is in post WW2 'exposees' about Soviet spies high up in British government service (e.g. Ken Philby). After WW2, damning evidence began to be revealed about just how compromised certain Oxbridge graduates were in British service by the Soviet Union. The US had similar scandals (as I supposed did the French). Learning about those cases and investigating them will also show you how the process worked, why certain individuals were open to it, how deeply it had spread, etc. You can catch glimpses of that in the recent movie Oppenheimer and in the 1950's US Senate committee investigations on 'who lost China' and why "Hollywood was Red', etc. as well.
A great piece of analysis but I will throw in a few thoughts here – the topic being a long standing interest of mine – to the point where I have tried to model events via serious computer simulations. And this is much harder than you might think. 1% wrong on attrition/replacement rates per week has a serious impact after a year.
1 The original decision to invade was taken in July 1940 (ie before the Battle of Britain) and came from OKH in response in the clumsy Soviet invasion of Bessarabia (Rumania was a French ally at the time) which brought the Red army perilously close to Ploesti. See the Halder diaries. This occurred whilst the Wehrmacht was fully engaged in France in June 1940. This caused Germany to reformat its strategic war plan away from a Naval/Air confrontation with the British (and ultimately they thought the USA) towards building an army capable of defeating Russia. They did not have the resources to do both.
2 As Tooze points out, Nazi Germany was always going to attack the USSR as it needed to eliminate what it defined as the Bolshevik/Jewish threat, gain resources to fight a global war with the USA and create lebensraum. It could only achieve these things by defeating the USSR, and none of them without doing so. Tooze also describes how much of the industrial capacity that was used to build the weapons we see produced in volume later in the war was actually non-existent in 1940 and 1941 and was being created over this period.
3 OKH had a major intelligence failure and identified maybe 180 divisions and c 36 brigades in the Red army. Actual numbers were 303 with around a dozen brigades, plus up to 50 fortified regions – backed by hundreds of thousands of NKVD troops in hundreds of regiments along with several combat divisions. Mobilisation potential ran to hundreds more divisions, all of which were formed on pre-war plans. The starting point for any alternative history covering the defeat of the USSR is a more accurate intelligence assessment.
4 Stahel writes at length about this period in a series of books. His basic hypothesis though is that, based on this faulty assessment, the German Army was created to perhaps the economic limits at the time, to defeat it in its forward deployment west of the Dvina/Dnieper line. When this was broadly achieved in the first few weeks OKH/OKW thought they had won the war. They were surprised that the Red Army had such a depth of reserves east of this position. AGC really did not advance at all between July and October 1941 as it could not, and was subject to constant counter attacks (see Glantz).
5 Re Soviet plans to attack, I take the view based on deployments and the on-going mobilisation that the Red army was deploying into attack positions per the May 41 plan and were mobilising to fill out understrength units. The German attack caught them partially mobilised and moving into these positions. This is basically the Suvorov/Rezov hypothesis. Glantz does a good job in describing the weaknesses and deficiencies of the Red Army at this juncture in Stumbling Colossus but actually provides a wealth of evidence that backs up my views. This is not to say that Stalin would have ordered an attack, just that he was trying to put his forces in a position to do so. Given the well-known weaknesses of the Red Army, it is hard to claim that such an attack would have been successful, but surely the Red Army would have been in a better state than its rout under a surprise attack. Weeks in Stalin’s Other War provides a scholarly analysis of the competing theories here.
6 On the subject of a surprise attack, there is again much conjecture of what the Russians knew or suspected. The best analysis in my view is given by Murphy – What Stalin Knew. Perhaps summarising here, Stalin was largely fed information that fed his pre-existing views as to contradict the boss was lethal. Murphy provides an intriguing theory backed by some credible evidence that Stalin might have believed that the Wehrmacht was going to do a June 1941 Seelowe and so was putting the Red Army in position to take advantage of its redeployment. Sergei Beria (son of Lavrenty) wrote that everyone knew about the German attack plans (but did not necessarily inform Stalin) and the surprise was not the attack on 22 June but the fact the Red Army crumbled. Lots of conjecture here but fits the facts.
7 The author is correct in that it was probably not possible to defeat the USSR in one summer campaign and this would need two years along with an element of German force generation/conservation and logistical/industrial effort beyond the history. The official Russian position (Krivosheev) on Soviet losses is bad enough but recent works by Zetterling on Typhoon and Lopukhovsky et al on Soviet losses demonstrate that losses in this period were in fact much worse than admitted. In the first year of the war Red Army permanent losses were between 3 and 4 million higher than official Russian figures say. This matched my own accounting. The USSR came perilously close to defeat. In one month between mid-September and mid October 1941 between Kiev and Bryansk/Vyazma and elsewhere the RKKA lost around 2 million men KIA/MIA. No army in history has ever suffered such losses and survived, and it is no wonder that OKH pushed every last battalion to try to take Moscow and inflict a political and military defeat whilst it perceived there was an opportunity to do so. However it all comes back to the faulty intelligence assessment – Soviet mobilisation and industrial potential, along with what I will euphemistically call political stability – ensured its survival and ultimate victory. The USSR was underestimated by Hitler. It seems we in the West may have done the same with modern Russia.
Excellent rundown showing the complexity of massive military operations and the small margins that often make the difference. Did not realize the Soviets had performed so well in 1941. Having looked at German options, would be interesting to also review the Soviet performance and likewise ask how they could have turned the tide sooner.
A more fascinating analysis would be of what the Soviets could have done differently to avoid the disasters of 1941. As it were, everything pretty much went the Germans’ way, and yet things still ended in disaster. It is not too difficult to imagine a universe where Stalin takes heed of an impending German attacks, prepares defenses and puts his armies on alert. Or a universe where Soviet forces retreat in good order, preserving USSR’s most professional and best equipped forces to fight another day.
Like Germany in World War 2, the United States is "geostrategically cornered" in the US/Russo conflict. The core dynamics between the United States and Russia are the same today as they were in 1940 and are characterized by the abject dependence of the United States on Russian raw materials.
Russia holds vast reserves in natural resources -- in real coal, real natural gas, real crude oil, real minerals, and real rare earths -- in an "embarrassment of riches." These are all resources that United States has either exhausted or will shortly, or has completely run out of. This goes for Europe and all of the West.
Some have said how World War III began after World War II, when the United States (and the West) picked up where Nazi Germany left off in 1945 -- by treating Russia and the Russia people as sub-humans, undeserving of huge reserves of natural resources and geography.
Today, it has become pretty obvious that having encroached all it can on Russia's borders that Ukraine is being terraformed into the next front. NATO (the United States is NATO), will wait until the last Ukrainian is dead and then come to the aid of their fellow martyrs for their democracy.
The situation and the outcome of the current US/Russo conflict is unclear. I am just as terrified by the idea that the United States might actually win World War III as I was that Germany might have prevailed in World War II.
I think you are very mistaken on the US's imminent mineral poverty. The US does import certain raw materials from Russia today (mainly uranium, heavy-ish oil, titanium, and certain scarce minerals). However, it does so not because it lacks those resources or alternatives - but because it has been less expensive to buy Russian resource rather than go with the alternatives. For example, the US had more than enough uranium during the Cold War to develop its massive nuclear arsenal and substantial civilian nuclear power industry. After the Cold War, it shut down a lot of its uranium mining and refining assets (because they are environmentally nasty and expensive). Would it prefer to continue to buy Russian uranium -- yes -- but if it had to, it can go back to what it did before. As for Russian oil, the US imports Russian oil not because it lacks sufficient oil reserves (it has plenty) -- instead it imports Russian oil because its chemical composition makes it a better feedstock for making diesel fuel than the domestic 'sweet light crude' that the US produces in abundance (which is better for gasoline). If the US didn't import Russian crude, it could buy more Mexican, or Canadian, or Venezuelan heavy crudes (or change its refineries to better utilize the domestic oil production). The rare minerals would be the hardest to fix however the US could open its long closed US mining facilities or it could go back to its 'go-to' sources in the Congo and elsewhere for those resources. The point is that the US is not resource poor (Europe and Japan and to a large extent China are).
You can still believe that the US's worldwide goals are grasping and dominating and evil if you want (I think that is too much of an over-simplification but you do you) -- it's just that it isn't driven by resource poverty (there would have to be other reasons).
End of 7th paragraph: "While preemptive action is forced by a specified immediate threat, preemptive war is predicated on longer-term strength calculations and the fear that the other party will initiate war at an unspecified later date under more favorable conditions." The second 'preemptive ' should be 'preventive'.
This was wildly entertaining. Thank you Serge. And, of course, if the Nazis hadn't been so murderously bloodthirsty to their Slavic neighbors but came as liberators from Soviet communism, how many would have welcomed them. But, like the scorpion such depravity was simply "in their nature."
Wondering if you saw the comedic piece in today's WSJ by Bernard-Henri Lévy who argues "Drone Attack Shows Why Ukraine Will Win This War." I found your sober analyses a worthy antidote to this sort of idiotic cheerleading of the legacy media and wonder at your response.
The drone terrorism is more “bomb places you can’t get to”.
No better than US dropping more tonnage in SE Asia from 1963, than in all theaters of WWII.
The plan in Ukraine was ever always only for NATO to intervene, and the US to jump ride to the rescue, rather than leave their european catamites hanging out to dry.
Basically betting that Russia does not have the stones to respond.
Russian dithering has made that outcome far more likely.
What don't you understand? Russia had made it clear since 2004 , from the Munich stage. As they had reminded , Ukraine should not become a member of NATO and this was a red line that would be adhered to without any second thought .It is very logical and makes sense that the dominant global power of our planet seeks to extend its colonial domination to the only and last sovereign, independent, state entities .They have a common denominator. Their regimes come from revolutions.
The October Revolution created the Soviet Union and it stood on the side of the revolutionary China, later Korea and finally Vietnam and Cuba. Even in the revolution in Iran, the Russians were found helping. In all these revolutions, the USA was defeated. .The only independent and sovereign state entities to this day remain these on the planet.
Ukraine has been in the shadow of the Russians for centuries. Khazaria is the most beautiful story of the historical events of the Middle Ages. The Dnieper is the bloodiest valley in Europe of all times. Unfortunately, the heart of Europe is there and has been bleeding for two hundred years. Where Eurasia communicated from Vladivostok to Paris and from Moscow to Baghdad, it did not stop bleeding.
This was one of the best short pieces on Barb I've ever read.
https://open.substack.com/pub/bigserge/p/ukraine-counterattacks?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=2hw9av
Thanks Serge -- very well written, argued, and supported -- and a nice take (in a short document) on a very complex and controversial topic. Furthermore, I found your comments about the nature of the USSR's pre-invasion demands regarding Finland, Bulgaria, and the Turkish straits to be new information to me -- I had not heard those precise arguments before, so thank you for those tidbits as well.
Before, commenting on your thesis of your paper, let me recap your arguments (very briefly and in reverse order as you presented them):
1) Key operational mistakes were made during the battle of Smolensk (mainly by Guderian)
2) These mistakes were amplified by disagreements in the German high command, a culture of 'insubordination' amongst certain German generals in key positions of power at the time (e.g. the Moscow-focused group), and limits on Hitlers direct and timely 'control' or the eastern war effort (e.g. he was not as 'in control' operationally as Stalin was for the USSR)
3) These decision-making mistakes were amplified further by absolutely atrociously incorrect German intelligence assessments of Soviet actions, capabilities, and future potential (e.g. the 20 fold mischaracterization of Soviet force generation capabilities)
4) These intelligence shortfalls affected German government policies on mobilization, prioritization and logistics -- which dramatically reduced the effective force the German's could deploy in the east in 1941 and 1942
5) These policy decisions were driven by the political desire to minimize the cost to the German 'home front' and avoid any chance of discontent or future 'domestic collapse' from Germany as in WW1
6) These policies (and the resulting 'short preventive war' strategy) were conducted based on perceptions of current Soviet weakness, longer term Soviet threat, and current / future German economic vassalage to the USSR.
Overall, these are great points and well made (it's a pity that you don't have more time and space to elaborate more on these topics and add to them as well -- but perhaps you will in a book some day).
I would make two comments, however, that I hope help you (and your readers). The first is that, as you point out, even with changes at Smolensk and better force generation and logistics for the Germans in late 1941 to 1942, it is not clear that enough troops, supplies, logistics, would get to the right front lines 'to make a difference' in mid 1942. More material would likely get through to German lines (and attrition through combat would likely have been marginally better), as you point out, but 'more' is not necessarily the same as 'enough'. The logistic mess through the main railroad trunk lines from Germany to the east was terrible but getting those supplies out to the downstream feeder lines and then the last 20 miles to the troops in the front line positions may still have been even more difficult and maybe insurmountable in 1941. It is entirely possible that by cleaning up the bottleneck in one place of the supply chain the German's would have merely move the bottleneck to another part of the chain further down the line -- and that downstream part was even less amenable to fixing from the 'corporate center' on short notice than the railroads, depots, and logistic centers were. So, while it is possible that Germany in mid 1942 could have been better positioned in the war (if it made better choices in mid to late 1941) -- it's not clear that it actually would have been substantially better off than it was historically (it all comes down to what the real bottlenecks of supply were at the time in theatre). In other words, operationally, your contention that moving south to Ukraine (versus towards Moscow) is sound -- but if the logistics were really unfixable in 1941, it might not have made much of a difference what was undertaken operationally at that point.
The second comment is on your summary of Germany's pre-invasion economic vassalage to the USSR. Your points on that topic are very correct -- although you can (and probably should) take that point even further than you do. Germany in the 1930's (and hence in the 1940's) was always one step away from economic collapse -- and that economic collapse was repeatedly kept at bay by the next big desperate economic (or political or military) gamble. Looking more deeply into the economic antecedents of the political / military decisions of the German high command might further flesh out your thinking on this overall economic / military overlap.
For example, Germany's move to massive government spending in the time period of 1933-1937 was, in some sense, Keynesianism, which stimulated economic activity (autobahns, employment schemes, public work projects, social welfare spending, defense rearmament and mobilization) via debt (e.g. the MEFO bonds) and expenditure of its foreign exchange reserves. Whether the short term internal economic 'boom' of these policies was worth the 'economic cost' (in terms of debt and nationalization of the economy) is one issue -- but one thing for sure was that this debt and foreign exchange fulled binge allowed for was the importation of needed raw material (oil, rubber, minerals, food) necessary for the economic and military activity.
By 1937, Germany's growth (and given its debt, even its present economic statistics quo) was 'at the end of its rope' -- it had exhausted its foreign exchange reserves and future imports of raw material was about to stop (or the internal economy and military build-up would have to be drastically reversed). The annexation of Austria and the seizure of its gold reserves forestalled this problem. Similarly, the annexation of Czechoslavackia did the same in 1938 (and the seizing of Polish assets in 1939 did as well -- as did the capture of Norwegian, Danish, Dutch, French, Belgian assets, etc). Each military escalation by Germany in this pre-war and early war years was necessitated, in some ways, by its general economic 'vassalage' (just as you suggest was the case in 1941 between Germany and the USSR). It needed resources (and in the short term, foreign exchange assets) and it relied on those assets to continue its war effort without a full war economy (e.g. to support trade with Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, and the USSR). So, in that sense, the German preventive war rationale had precedent given its recent past.
Furthermore, this 'economic' element of the war also helps explain why it was essential (or at least thought to be essential) for the German high command to keep war mobilization as 'limited' as possible (e.g. not fully mobilizing the people and economy for war). The 'future Germany' that these leaders wanted in terms of economics 'needed' certain economic conditions (like limited manpower mobilization, some amount of a civilian consumer economy, adequate civilian food / medicine / fuel access, reasonable rates of inflation, etc.) to survive and prosper longer term. Therefore the German political command was trying to strike a 'balance' between war and future post-war economic survival: mobilize too far and too early and the 'peace' that would be won would be 'lost'. versus not mobilize enough or too late and risk losing the war and the peace. It was a difficult top-level war planning conundrum -- and one that they hesitated on too long (in hindsight). However, the game plan of 'risking economic ruin' and 'saving everything' with a 'successful roll of the brinkmanship or military dice' was totally consistent with how they had managed events in the previous decade (so it is no surprise that they tried that yet again in 1941).
Thanks for the article and the opportunity to comment.
how did this happen?:
German intelligence assessments of Soviet actions, capabilities, and future potential (e.g. the 20 fold mischaracterization of Soviet force generation capabilities)
I can give you a few 'answers' (or perhaps more accurately suggestions of an answer), but I think that ultimately you will have to look elsewhere for a more 'definitive' answer to the question of 'how did this happen?' -- but I will try:
I would attribute the German intelligence 'miss' to a couple of factors:
1) historical bias (based on the WW1 and pre-WW1 experience),
2) cultural and ideological bias,
3) lack of relevant language / cultural / technical skills in the intelligence organization,
4) bureaucratic bias / inertia (i.e. the 'bosses' already know the 'right answer' and don't want to hear anything adverse to that position), and finally,
5) the 'surprising' resilience of the Soviet government / Russian people (which surprised even the Soviets and the Russians themselves).
To Germans (and non Germans alike) the historical experience of Russia in WW1 (and prior to WW1) did not inspire confidence in the current 1940 Russia / Soviet situation (or future capabilities). Pre WW1 Russia was large -- but very under-industrialized and with very poor energy and transportation and communication networks. It could mobilize an enormous land army of infantry, cavalry, and artillery and sustain enormous losses -- but it could only move ponderously -- and its most lethal components (artillery) could only sustain intensive combat for a relatively short period of time (because of the its under-industrialization and poor transportation system and logistics). It could remain in place (and suffer enormous losses) --- and it could retreat into its interior (and sustain enormous losses due to retreats, encirclements, and a lack of supply) -- but it could be beaten (either after a period of years like in WW1 or with the expected 'shock' of 'Bewegungskrieg' (war of movement, which is often mistranslated as 'Blitzkrieg' in the West)). Therefore, the 'historical experience' of Russia suggested that the USSR could not adequately fight a 'modern' war well (e.g. 'modern' using tanks, planes, armored warfare doctrine, material production, etc). Finally, the end of WW1 in the East (and the rapid German advances deep into Belarus and Ukraine as the Russian armies melted away in 1917 and 1918) gave the German army a template for what might be possible once the main standing Russian armies on the Russian western front were destroyed (which was what France 1940 and Poland 1939 implied would happen to them once the war began in earnest). This was the basis for the 'kick the door in and the whole facade will come tumbling down' thinking in Germany (and in the West as a whole).
The cultural / ideological bias in the German military, intelligence, and government system further accentuated these assumptions / conclusions. National Socialism was 'statist' and 'centrally controlled' (much like the Soviet system) -- and Germany did recognize that the 'official' Soviet statistics on things like steel and coal production, mining, agriculture, railroads, etc. were significant in aggregate and rising - so the Germans had reason to believe that the USSR had 'some' reasonable industrial and force re-generation capability. However, these Germans also believed that the Leninist-Marxist - Stalinist version of 'socialism' and 'state control' was 'wrongly conceived' in theory and 'terribly executed' in practice. The purges, famines, collectivizations, rebellions, obvious lies, revisionist history, propaganda, etc of the post WW1 era USSR did not inspire confidence in how well the USSR was being run. The Germans had reason to believe the 'numbers' for Soviet output were 'being cooked' and that the 'quality' of the output was suspect (or that it couldn't reliably get from point A to point B). The Germans also put enormous faith in their own technical ability to 'do central planning the right way' and mobilize society and the armed forces and industry 'correctly' (i.e. the problem wasn't centralized planning per se, just Soviet centralized planning). So, there was a general tendency to 'dismiss' Soviet capabilities and their potential (even when the Germans had first hand experience of Soviet industry, technology, weapon systems, and doctrine gained during the German-Soviet pre-war cooperation era).
The third aspect had to do with deficiencies in the German intelligence services (in general). Culturally, linguistically, ideologically, and historically the Germans paid a lot more attention to things British and French (and Germany's direct neighbors) than things Russian (this limited their view into things happening in the USSR). A lot of what the Germans did know about the USSR came from emigres or defectors (which weren't necessarily the best or most current source of information). Plus there were competency and loyal issues within the German intelligence organizations themselves (e.g. there is some evidence to say that German intelligence was more concerned about internal threats and was penetrated to some extent by Western intelligence influence). So, part of the answer is 'how did the Germans miss this' comes from the fact that maybe the German intelligence organization just wasn't 'that good' at doing the job it was supposed to be doing.
The fourth aspect -- bureaucratic inertia and bias -- is common to all big organization -- but especially to ones under tight ideological control and suspicion. Thoughts contrary to the 'party line' or 'current thing' were not likely to be raised (by the rank and file) nor accepted by the layers of higher ups (or accepted by the highest of high command). So -- even if someone had 'good' information (which is questionable) -- that person wasn't going to get that information to the top (nor would that information likely change anyone's mind even if 'well-supported' -- it would likely just be 'waived away' with a few assumptions about the future - which is largely what happened historically).
Finally, the last piece -- the Soviet and Russia resilience -- was also a factor. Based on historical experience (the Crimean War, Russo-Japanese War, WW1, the Russian Civil War, the Russian-Polish war, etc), the USSR did 'much better' than might be expected. Yes, the USSR was hobbled by incompetence, suspicion, fake production and shoddy quality, purges, corruption, etc and it was still burdened with relatively weak transportation and communication networks limited fuel / food supplies, and yet it was still able to overcome and in fact transcend those weaknesses and fight on, despite enormous costs and losses. At the beginning of the war, the Russian people's 'love' for the Soviet system or Stalin was questionable -- but the war, and the sacrifices and victories it brought -- solidified the Soviet state and system in a way that would not necessarily been obvious in 1940. (As a counter example, the war in Asia between Japan and China helped the government of Chang Kai Shek and the concept of 'national unity' in China initially -- but as the war progressed, that sense of unity and support dissolved amidst the losses, corruption, mistakes, and disappointments, etc. Nationalist China, immediately after WW2, was not nearly as popular (in China) as the USSR was in Russia -- yes, there are probably many reasons for this beyond what I am suggesting but the point I am trying to make is that a relatively fractious Russia rallied to the USSR in a way that a fractious China did not rally to the Chinese Nationalists). This probably had something to do with the nature and history of the Russian people (defending their homeland) but it also had something to do with the relative 'competence' in the way that the Soviets managed the war (said another way, despite the massive amount of incompetence demonstrated by the USSR and Soviet system, it still 'rose above' its inherent constraints and 'earned' its victory).
As a result and in total, German 'got it wrong' because the Soviet USSR was not as 'incompetent' or 'impotent' as it seemed from Germany in 1941.
Hope that helps.
As a Russian interested in the history of WW2 as a hobby, I applaud this analysis, because it is quite comprehensive and is not biased in a way that is usually prevalent in the Western media
Fundamentally, Germany was sandwiched between two powers capable of autarky (the Anglos through control of the seas and trade, Russia through its vast land and natural resources).
If Germany wanted to be a fully sovereign state (be able to say no to the anglos and back it up if push came to shove) it needed to expand.
The real question then ought to be "was becoming a fully sovereign state in the interests of the German people". The alternative of course was to just accept anglo dominance and trade with them and get rich. That's were Germany ended up today.
There are I suppose several reasons this didn't happen. German elites wouldn't accept it in either world war. And fascism in particular just couldn't survive without autarky (it also kind of NEEDS to fight as part of its DNA, at least the Nazi variant).
If you accept that you aren't going to win Barbarossa, then giving up whatever you have to give up to Britain is the only correct play. I just don't think either the ideology or the economics (Nazi economics were terrible) would allow for that scenario to play out.
WWI Germany had a better shot because its economic system was more sustainable and they might have been able to set up successful puppet states in the east long term, and was less incompatible with the anglos.
The Jew declared war on Germany in 1933
Dhdh looks and sounds alot like duhhh. Your dopey statement contributes nothing to this conversation about military and strategic facts, because your low IQ prevents it.
"The Jew" is just a convenient justification for one's own evil desires, stupid mistakes and innate laziness and inability. I am sure you are a loser w/no real contribution to society.
Do you know nothing of history other than what you are spoon fed by the tv ?
When I see the head-slapping statement. "The Jew declared war in Germnay in 1933", I know I am dealing with someone who will twist facts and suppositions to fit into their Procrustean conspiracy-theory bed . There is, objectively, no such thing as "The Jew". What does this term mean? The Jews were spread out throughout the world after their ill-conceived revolt against the Romans. Do you suggest that German Jews, American Jews, Moroccan Jews, etc, all got together in a secret volcano base? Or did they use telepathy?
There is no such thing as "The Jew" anymore than there is such a thing as "The German". There are Jews, and there are Germans. The Jewish diaspora in particular would seem ill-suited for a unified conspiracy.
Even if you thought The Jews were politically unified, German Jews, ironically, were among the most highly assimilated in all the world. They were loyal citizens -- many of them fought for Germany in WW1 and received medals to prove it, yet they were sent to death camps anyway because of their ethnicity, because they were assumed to be "potentially" disloyal. This is the same pattern as we saw in the WW1 Ottoman Empire regarding the Armenians. Of course, in both cases, it was merely a pretext to steal the money, homes and belongings of their own productive citizens - citizens who they, in fact, had a duty to protect, as do all governments.
The Germans ended up being their own worst enemies - they chose a brutal government of thugs with a veneer of intellectualism. That government thought they could just finish WW1, with victory this time. They seriously overreached. Additionally, their race ideology caused them to underestimate their enemies and to treat conquered people with such brutality that cooperation was nil and armed resistance assured.
Ever heard of Weimar Germany where the Jew controlled Germans society and were over represented in all the elite professions. It was the sin merchants dream. Kind of like present USA. It just took a real WWI war hero with a small mustache to solve the problem.
lol. You must be a Jew or a shabos goy who just parrots their propaganda. AIPAC for example is a Jew organization. And yes the Jew is perfect descriptor of how the Jew operates as a parasite on goyim societies.
lol. Why do defend the Jew?
Da Joos made me do it.
Britain was peripheral in June 1941. The only two big antagonist powers at that point were just USA and Soviet Russia. Both were in a defensive posture. By going after British and French interests in N Africa and Asia Germany would have an easier path, since USA didn't have the inner political coherence to be the first to declare war on Germany.
In 1941, the Afrika Korps was engaged in a strategically important struggle with the British army and by late 1941, the RAF was mass-bombing Berlin. Hardly peripheral to German war prospects.
In reality German war on Soviet Russia happened in June 1941, which drew 80% or more of German resources away. I was exploring the hypothetical of NO German-Soviet war in 1941.
I very much agree with you.
Another armchair warrior worried about fantasy wizards spoiling his plans for greatness.
What’s with the Juvenile commentary and stupid Calvin avatar ?
You don't like Calvin and Hobbes?
Actually I do.
A very persuasive and well-argued account, Serge. Fascinating.
My father was born in Petersburg in 1912 and attended the German-speaking Saint Peters School there. He was refused permission to go Germany for university (unlike his best friend Alfred, who ultimately became German consul in Leningrad after the war) and was assigned as a lathe operator instead. My grandfather was arrested and worked to death at Alma-Ata in 1930. My father was arrested and transported to the Far East in 1931, surviving the gulag and internal exile. In September 1941, my father (then working illegally as a surveyor on the Moscow-Volga canal) defected to the Germans somewhere between Vyazma and Smolensk, and served out the rest of the war in German army eastern intelligence. (His greatest intelligence coup was to point out that shiny German staples in fake documents was a "tell" as Russian staples are rusty.) He told me that at the time he thought the Germans' chance of "winning" was very remote, considering the comparative sizes of the US and USSR. Of course, as a line soldier his view of things was limited and his analysis simple. (Just before he died he published an account of his life in Russia and Germany: <https://www.abebooks.com/signed/Crossings-life-Russia-Germany-first-half/31437470819/bd>
btw, My mother was born in Berlin in 1921. Her father was an artillery commander killed in action near Wesenberg, Estonia. (In his last letters he wrote that his hair turned white in a week as enemy shelling gradually zeroed in on his emplacement.) My mother's younger brother perished at Stalingrad; he was 17 or 18 years old.
also btw, My father's younger sister was a medical resident at the Siege of Leningrad. Later, she recounted that there were not enough live people to clear the dead off the streets. After the war, she was exiled to Tashkent where she lived out her entire professional life as chief pathologist at the Karaganda City Hospital.
C'est la guerre.
And while we are on the subject of luck and war...my girlfriend's Greek-American father (b. 1923, Steubenville, Ohio) was a B-17 bombardier in the Eighth Air Force during WWII. He flew 30 sorties over Europe (the chances of surviving this many sorties are about 0%, and in fact his flight team was shot down on a day he went for additional radar training; his CO sent him back into the air the next day.) He participated in the February fire storm bombings of Dresden. On the ground, my father had left Dresden the day before.
As improbable a history as that is, imagine predicting a romance that connects those threads
I also wonder what would have happened had Germany more effectively harnessed the hatred of the Soviet state by many Baltics, Ukrainians, and disaffected Russians. I know the Nazis thought of Slavs as subhuman but they could have at least pretended more effectively until the end of the war.
Additionally, the possibility of Japan joining the attack on the Soviets, had the Germans been more willing to share their plans in late 1940/early 1941. I recall reading a source (not sure where) that significant portions of the Japanese military leadership were very interested in doing this. But by the summer of 1941 the Japanese had committed to moving east instead of west.
@Steve E
The Japanese Empire lost their taste for invading the USSR in 1939 when they tried invading Mongolia and Georgy Zhukov handed them their asses in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. This caused the Imperial Army to lose face and the Imperial Navy took precedence with their sure fire plan to head EAST and conquer the Pacific colonial holdings of the decadent USA and the several soon to be irrelevant European powers. We all know how much better the IJN did at their endeavor.
My revisionist history is what if the Japanese civil government had (somehow!) reigned in BOTH the IJN and IJA BEFORE attacking the USSR, then gotten the Emperor to break tradition & visit the USA, meet with our oligarchy and suggest to those stalwart opponents of communism that the USA back their play at heading West while young Mr. Hitler made nice with the British (many of who's upper class twats were among his admirers, including the Duke of Windsor and his boy £u¢k!ng Hellfire Club wannabee coterie), promising not to make waves against their empire and keep Russia away from India forever if they remained neutral, then he headed East directly after the anschluss about the time the Japanese headed West with President Smedley Butler's blessings. I don't think Stalin could have managed THAT 2 front war.
The battle of Khalkhin Gol was a huge shock and embarrassment to the Japanese and it certainly dampened their enthusiasm for taking on the Soviets (but it did not eliminate that urge entirely -- in time, the Japanese Army rationalized away or improved its thinking so that it convinced itself that 'it could do better next time' and the potential of a Soviet two front war (with most of the Soviet resources deployed against Germany) certainly gave the Japanese Army faction 'hope' (in the end, it was the Japanese Navy faction, the oil embargo, and German diplomatic hesitation that directed the Japanese towards the Pacific and SE Asia instead).
As for FDR and anti-communism ... I think you are underestimating the amount of pro-Soviet / pro-socialist sentiment in parts of the FDR administration (particular the State Department). Many subsequent generations of Americans were quite unsettled by the amount of institutional bias in favor of socialism and the USSR (note the expansive pro Soviet press at the time from news outlets like the NYT etc.). Plus, regardless of what the 1940 US pro-Soviet deep state wanted at the time, the US public was not interested in war (not against Japan regarding China, not against Germany regarding Britain, not anywhere no how). So, I can't see how your revisionist history could really take hold in the US. (the part about a British government under Halifax instead of Churchill does seem somewhat plausible however).
@Martin
Note that I wrote "President Smedley Butler", not FDR?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_Plot
If the "Businessmen's Plot" had successfully replaced FDR with a retired USMC general, things might have been a bit different.
Oh thanks for pointing that out -- I missed that! Oh boy .. that would have been an interesting timeline!
I bet MacArthur would have been sacked A LOT EARLIER. And who knows if the world might have been the better for it?
MacArthur still amazes me -- I don't understand how people back then backed him as enthusiastically as they did (I just don't see what they possible saw in him). It boggles my mind (and I say that with respect for his WW1 military performance) -- but his personality, personal failures, his management of the Philippines and WW2, his lying, his blatant political machinations, and then Korea boggle my mind (although he was very well suited to running and making a success of post-war Japan). What an enigma.
There was also Japanese Siberian Intervention ( Shiberia Shuppei) in 1918–1922 and in the Russian Far East, the were defeated
The port of Vladivostok was crucial for Lend-Lease, the Japanese disabling that port would have been even more helpful to the German offensive than a large scale invasion into Siberia.
I was simply pointing out that it wasn't the first time the Japanese were beaten in the Russian Far East. I grew up on a military base near Vladivostok, and as kids, we're finding lots of the spent shells and broken revolvers in/around the river.
Was Vladivostok really that crucial? Hitler invaded the USSR in summer 1941 and Japan attacked the USA in December of that year (and effectively closed Vladivostok to shipping from the West). That's a very short window in which to receive Lend-Lease (plus the rail links West from Vladivostok weren't great). So, perhaps you are overestimating Vladivostok's importance.
To my knowledge, the Japanese did not attack American convoys to the Soviet Union in order to keep the Soviets neutral. As far as I know, the Lend-Lease reached Vladivostok unimpeded until the end of the war.
Well ... I am pretty sure that US or British convoys didn't make it across --- but Russian shipping carrying Western goods were probably allowed in as you describe. So, maybe we are both right -- the USSR did get meaningful supplies (but it had to be on Russian or neutral shipping). But given that the US, Britain, Dutch, and Japanese had the most shipping at the time in the world, I am not sure that purely Russian and neutral shipping would have been 'a lot' or 'enough' (as compared to the Arctic convoys) -- although anything getting in probably was valuable to the USSR
there was no way the Soviets would have had enough ships to move all of the Lend Lease goods... unless the US added some ships as part of Lend Lease.
thinking emoji
My point is that most of the Lend-Lease came to Russia (in US and British ships) via the Arctic convoys (not Vladivostok). So, the Soviets weren't the ones carrying most of the lend lease (they did do some in the Arctic). The point Mono seems to be making is that perhaps the Soviet shipping is what kept Vladivostok (on the Pacific) useful. So Soviet and neutral shipping to Vladivostok (because the Japanese let them through) and US / British / Soviet ships to Murmansk (via the Arctic convoys).
There was actually very little supplied by land-lease in 1941 and barely nothing in 1942, the crucial war years. The Soviets called SPAM cans "the second front."
Yes that makes sense -- the US Lend-Lease didn't really start until March 1941 (and then it was directed solely at the British Commonwealth -- at that time the USSR was still aligned with Germany). Plus since US Lend-Lease was initiated in 1941, the supplies and production authorized by that act took time to make it into production and then be collected, organized and shipped to overseas collection points and then organized into convoys to Russia -- so 1941 was not going to be a 'big year' for Lend-Lease except for perhaps for Britain on the home front or in the Western Desert). The same applies to 1942 -- which as you describe as the 'make or break' year for the USSR. In 1942, Lend Lease production and shipping was just getting started but then it was interrupted somewhat by the US entry into WW2 at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 as resources and production facilities were re-directed and re-prioritized to address the US crisis on its hands in the Pacific. As you say, if the USSR broke and lost the war it was likely to be in 1942 (the crucial year as you say) - and at that point Lend-Lease was just really starting to reach Soviet front lines (and a lot of the front line material that was sent was relatively second-rate at that point: Matilda and Grant tanks, Aerocobra and Hurricane fighters, etc.). Therefore, I think that US lend-lease aid in 1942 made a material and morale difference in 1942 and helped the USSR - but that that aid did not make THE difference to Soviet survival in that year. (so I think we agree)
Where I think US lend-lease made a substantial difference was in the rate of advance (and amount of success) the Soviets had in 1943-1945. I may be wrong on all that (and am willing to learn more), but I have some level of understanding how what was sent, in what quantities, how it was used etc and from that understanding my take on it was that the Soviets really used (and benefited from) the fuel, trucks, SPAM, radios, boots etc that were sent to the USSR and that enabled their advance. Offensives take enormous amounts of supplies to launch and sustain and the USSR was able to mount multiple near simultaneous offensives in those years and keep them going to the point that they yielded enormous breakthroughs and consolidated advances. My argument would be that those offensives would not have been as successful, or the breakthroughs as large, or as near simultaneous (and thus give the Germans better opportunities to regroup and dig in further back) if the USSR did not have those supplies. It's merely a semi-informed opinion of course so I can't claim absolute knowledge on the subject or argue that my viewpoint is right -- and it seems to me that both you and I are largely in agreement on all this -- just talking to each other on different parts of detail, etc. Thanks for the comment and reply.
Japanese needed oil asap, not some part of Vladivostok. That oil was originally coming from British colonies and the USA. Until Britain and FDR put a stop to it. So the Japanese had no alternative but attack South. They don't teach that in US schools anymore, do they?
What you say is correct (about oil) -- but there really was a strong advocacy group in Japan for fighting the Russias (instead of the Americans at Pearl Harbor) -- and it was a intensely fought battle over that decision in the Japanese High Command (as odd as that may seem to us).
There were several reasons for that line of reasoning: (1) ideological, 2) bureaucratic / clan and 3) geographic strategy.
The Japanese in the late 1930's were fiercely anti-communist. Japan had flirted with communist thinking and the early stages of a communist inspired revolution in the 20's, and the governments and military leadership that emerged from that experience had a visceral hatred of Communism (and they correctly inferred that any future communist threat to Japan would come from or be supported by the Soviets). So, they really really wanted to eliminate communist influence from the region (which would also weaken the Chinese communist threat as well).
Second, the Japanese society of that day (and of the earlier Meji era) was clan-based (at the top of the hierarchy) -- and the two biggest factions were represented -- one in the Army, the other in the Navy (and they literally hated each other -- and had hated each other for generations). The Navy used the most oil and looked southward towards the Pacific as a means for Japanese expansion. They saw the oil fields of the British and Dutch East Indies and the rice of Thailand and Vietnam and the minerals and rubber as targets for expansion. The Army saw China and Manchuria (and the Russia East Asia) for as Japan's natural 'empire' (with its coal, minerals, industry, fishing, etc.). Both elements of the Japanese high command wanted expansion and empire -- they just wanted to go in different directions (one north and west against the Soviet Union, the other east and south against the USA and Britain / the Netherlands / France).
The third rationale for going against the Soviets was that it eliminated one more great power from that part of the world. The Soviet (and before that Russian) influence in the Far East was tenuous -- maintained by a thin, relatively vulnerable rail line west to the heartland of Russia. Kicking the Russians out could make their removal 'permanent' and therefore permanently remove that threat to Japanese hegemony in the region. This would also permanently weaken their Chinese enemy as well (and in 1941 Japan's main enemy was China). From the Army's perspective, the US / Britain / Dutch could wait (and perhaps sanctions could be endured).
As you say, a key trigger for the decision to go towards the US / British / Dutch was ultimately the US oil embargo -- it was a relatively late addition to the list of US sanctions against Japan for its actions in China. Had it not occurred -- the decision to go against the Soviets might have been more likely. The oil embargo had a much bigger effect on the Japanese navy than the Army, but it did hurt the general economy and Army aviation assets as well. Perhaps just as important as the oil decision was German diplomatic noncommittal / incompetence. Had the German's been more insistent on gaining active Japanese support in their attack on the USSR, that might have made a difference (the Japanese were expecting to be asked to join in the war and many especially from the Army were hoping for that) -- but historically, the German's waffled diplomatically quite a bit and weren't too concerned about opening a two front war on the USSR, so that issue resulted in the Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact (which further shifted Japan's gaze toward the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions). However, it could have been otherwise.
The point is that FDR had a free hand to impose an oil embargo against Japan. Obviously, it was a VERY good move because it again shifted some pressure away from Soviet Russia in its war with the 3rd Reich. So kudos to FDR!
If Hitler were clever, he would have taken the same direction as Japan against the European Empires in N Africa, Asia and would have linked up with Japan in India. Soviet Russia wouldn't have done much in between, and Britain & USA would have struggled mightily. But hey, Hitler thought, Soviet Russia would be an easy mark, and it would be so much more glorious.
I think your suggested plan only works on a board-game like Risk (it doesn't take into account logistics, material supply, and the limitations and relative strengths / weaknesses of the rival powers in the military dimension) -- especially in the theaters of war critical for your plan to work (the Mediterranean, North Africa, and beyond). By saying that I don't mean to criticize you personally or 'talk down to you' -- just point out why what you are saying may not really make sense.
One problem with what you outline is that the European Axis powers (Germany and Italy) were grossly inferior to the British (and then made even more so when the Americans joined) in terms of naval assets (and air power) in those regions. This weakness was then made even more obscene by the Axis shortage of fuel by 1942 -- which made operating the Italian fleet (which was significant, at least on paper) infeasible and made long range air combat over the Mediterranean difficult versus the Anglo-American air and naval assets that could be deployed and supplied in the region in excessive amounts. Getting to France's or Britain's colonies in Africa, the Middle East, or India (Southern Asian) required a) winning the air / naval battle of the Mediterranean, b) having the ability to ship substantial amounts of supplies to Africa and then across Africa and the Middle East, then c) having the ability to win land battles against Allied and perhaps local opposition in those remote regions, and then d) having the ability to sustain those victorious Axis armies in that remote and inhospitable terrain for the long term. This just wasn't going to happen. The Germans may have had a very remote chance of closing the Suez Canal (and take advantage of Vichy French support in denying North Africa to the Allies) -- but unless Vichy France was 'fully in the war' (which they weren't) and unless Gibraltar was also taken (with Franco's Spain -- which France was smart enough not to do) then even taking the Suez Canal was pointless (there was no fuel or shipping to utilize the new Axis Mediterranean lake and the Allies could and would have moved to 'take back' those access points (the canal, Gibraltar, North Africa) relatively easily.
In short, the Axis did not have the ships / planes to win those battles in those regions, or the fuel to operate them, of the supplies to send there if they won, or the supply ships and road way trucks to get those Axis armies deep into the British and French colonies, etc.
Furthermore, it's not like the Japanese model (that you are referencing) worked out very well for the Japanese. The Japanese conquered French Indochina, British Malaya and Burma, the Dutch East Indies, and many islands across the Pacific. So, in that sense, it was wildly successful (and unexpectedly so). Doing this deprived the Allies of important assets (e.g. oil, tin, rubber, rice) -- but the depth of the Allied 'bench' more than made up for those losses with alternative sources of supply (e.g. Brazil for rubber, US for oil, food from the US/Canada/Argentina/Brazil, Belgian Congo for minerals, etc.) or with technology (e.g. synthetic rubber). Neither did the Japanese get much use out of those assets either (it basically stripped mined the local populations for food stuffs -- causing millions of civilian deaths due to starvation and it shipped as much oil and rubber and minerals as it could to Japan -- but the damage caused by their conquest, local opposition to Japanese rule, and an extremely successful US submarine and mining campaign reduced the actual supply of goods to Japan to a trickle as early as 1943). Plus it tied down Japanese air, land, and naval forces which were 'left on the vine' and bypassed by the US during their air-sea-land 'march' towards Japan (and victory). The end result of the Japanese 'victory' against the European colonies was post-war (those regions quickly moved toward independence -- but that had a lot to do with post-war Cold War politics and the bankruptcy and exhaustion of the WW2 colonial powers as well -- not jus the Japanese victories during the war). So, the Japanese example suggests that even a successful German foray into Africa or the Middle East or South Asia would not have been fruitful to either helping Germany/Italy or denying the Allies what they needed during the war.
So, my pushback to you is that if you look at more 'boring' aspects of WW2 (supply, material availability, actual military capabilities and areas of relative expertise and power) -- you can't march into Africa or across the Middle East if you are Germany (any more than you can land in Canada or Mexico and create a 'third front' against North America) -- the 'physics' of the real world just don't allow it.
A couple of final points:
Italy was utterly foolish to join WW2 (but that foolishness, given its government was utterly predictable).
Germany's decisions during the war, in many ways, were also both foolish and predictable. If Germany wanted to avoid economic (and then perhaps political) collapse in the later 1930's it had to start fights with its neighbors (like Poland or Czechoslovakia -- note I am not condoning Germany's actions, merely explaining that they were facing internal economic crises and that these actions appeared to give them a way out of that pending disaster -- plus they had other reasons for doing what they did, I am just suggesting that the economic reasons alone were sufficient). The invasions of the Nordics (and then later Belgium and the Netherlands) made strategic sense (and were relatively costless). The war with France and Britain was dreaded (by most Germans) and ultimately very hard to avoid -- but it turned out much better for Germany than expected (which helped create a sense of inevitability and confidence in Germany which helped set up the Russian war). The stalemate over British Isles and the Axis disadvantaged war in the Mediterranean and North Africa was also predictable (with Italy in the war) and only surprising in the sense that the Axis did much better than might have been expected. The war against the USSR was very predictable based on ideology and the economic vassalage (that Serge describes) - the only issue was when it would start and who would start it (Stalin or Hitler). My point with all this is that to say that Axis did much better (prior to 1941) than a reasonable person might expect --- but even with those advantages -- Germany was still very likely to end up at war with the USSR (and win or lose the entire war based on the outcome of that conflict) -- it had life or death material reasons to have that war (material supply and ideology) and it really didn't have the reach to go and make a difference anywhere else (e.g. North Africa or Turkey or the Middle East or the conquest of Britain).
A final comment on FDR. As an American, I have very mixed feeling about him (and many, though not all, Americans do). FDR's decision to put an oil embargo on Japan (and prior to that steel and other sanctions on Japan) were controversial in that era and very interventionist (i.e. example of America throwing its weight around rather than minding its own business in the world -- or at least you can make that argument). That was not a position that was consistent with the majority of the American public's opinion of what should be done at the time (so that's a bit of a problem for me) -- and it reflects a tendency in America (and American leaders) to intervene around the world to 'solve the world's problems' (e.g. a lot of people supportive of Russia or China today routinely decry such American attitudes and behaviors when it happens today) -- so, depending on your view of American interventionism, you may not want to 'praise FDR' too highly for that. Second, FDR's oil embargo (and his decision to re-position the American Pacific fleet from California to Hawaii) directly led to US involvement in the war with Japan (and then more generally across WW2). This was controversial (and not reflective of what the US public or Congress wanted at the time). Maybe, in the context of time and history, it was not FDR's intention to provoke Japan into an attack on the US -- or if it was his intention, perhaps it was still the 'right thing to do'. But it was costly and led to the US involvement in a world war -- which directly led to the Cold War and American overseas commitments and further interventionism and ultimately to things like Ukraine and Iraq. Was the US involvement in WW2 really a good thing for America? (many would reflexively say 'of course' because it helped 'save the world' or because it led to the American hegemony for decades -- but once again, was that really a good thing for America and Americans? Or even the world as a whole? I think that there is room for debate on all that (and that is not even getting into the things that FDR did domestically in the United State and whether that was long term good or bad for the US economy, government, or constitution). FDR is, for me, a very controversial and potentially very harmful US President.
It's all very interesting. However, in your reply you forgot that the reason Japanese had all these obstacles is that they had no support in their greater area of operations. Turkey was basically an undeclared German ally in the beginning of WW2, so if asked would have gladly provided Germany with its railway, that went down into Iraq and to Iranian border. Russia would have just benignly looked on.
Anyway, it is interesting that will all the alleged British/US air superiority over the Mediterranean, Germany had no problem moving troops into North Africa or moving them back. So no, British would have been in big trouble in North Africa without a German-Russian war. After all, after Turkey, Germany had to only cross Iran and it would have reached British India (which at that time included Pakistan).
The book is called Supplying War by Martin van Creveld
The Germans had a lot of trouble moving troops back and forth to Africa -- the only time they had it relatively easy was when Rommel was in Tunisia (and if you look at the map you can see how close Tunisia is to Italy and even then they really made an all-out effort -- and suffered heavily for that effort). Even going from Italy to Libya (over and around Malta) was just too much for them. And no, I don't think the British would have been in trouble in North Africa absent a Soviet war (there is a good book regarding logistics in that war, I think it is called Feeding War that goes through all that chapter and verse). The ports and transportation networks of Libya and Western Egypt were absolutely primitive and limited in what they could handle in the best of times (and the British had the ability to interdict those shipments, destroy those ports, etc even if the Axis had the shipping and fuel to fuel those ships carrying supplies -- which they didn't).
Same problem with Turkey. Turkey was then (and until quite recently) extremely underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure, fuel availability, communication networks etc. Whatever it had in the 1940's was left over from the Ottomans (who had a single rail line railroad to Kirkuk - if I am recalling it correctly -- and it had to cross mountains, deserts, etc to get there). Plus it was highly vulnerable to hostile locals (like the Kurds) and to the British that had operational control and strike capabilities to shut it down (aside from more mundane things like sabotage). Iran was occupied by the Soviets (in the North) and the British in the South and it too totally devoid of infrastructure and railways (and was equally vulnerable and potentially hostile). It just wouldn't work.
That’s actually a interesting alternative timeline. The Wehrmacht aside, if the Japanese assaulted the Soviet unions Easter flank, it would have tied up significant resources and could have been the blow that broke the soviets. In theory the Japanese could have linked up with the Germans and received the oil that they direly needed. Germans shift to Africa and the Japanese to
south east Asia. It’s one of those what ifs lol
The Japanese did tie up Soviet reserves in the far east; Stalin held about 20 divisions of Siberians in reserve out there with the fear of an impending Japanese attack after the commencement of Operation Barbarossa. By Dec ’41 Stalin had enough assurances from spy Richard Sorge that the Japanese weren’t coming; as a result those divisions were pulled out & flung @ Army Group Center outside Moscow Winter of ‘41.
Besides, the Japanese were going to attack USA. That was kind of in the cards. And unlike June 1941, this time Stalin chose correctly with this intelligence-aided foreknowledge.
The 'theory' part of that 'what-if' only works if you don't consider logistics -- the geography of traveling across Siberia with anything like a substantial force would have been prohibitive (fighting along the Trans-Siberian railroad line worked in the Russian civl war to some extent because the forces were relatively small and local and the fighting episodic and not all that intense relative to either world war but moving vast numbers of heavily armed soldiers and supplies is another matter). The Japanese resented Russian (USSR)'s presence in 'its' Far East and would have loved to kick the Russians out of the entire region, but moving Japanese troops west very far beyond the eastern edges of Mongolia would have been very very difficult for Japan logistically (and likely exposed their very vulnerable single supply line to partisans). Japan had a very real interest in the 'Russian' portion of 'Manchuria' not under Japanese control (i.e. the areas north of Japanese controlled Manchuria) and it would have liked to have control of Russian far east ports and resources (and the puppet state of Mongolia) -- and if Japan attacked, this would have been likely its objectives (and these objectives would likely have been within reach of them logistically). But traveling east beyond that looks good on a map (or simplified war game like Risk) but doesn't, in my opinion, have a chance (other than to tie-up Russian forces and perhaps 'win' the 'Russian' far east).
"I also wonder what would have happened had Germany more effectively harnessed the hatred of the Soviet state by many Baltics, Ukrainians, and disaffected Russians."
Have you forgotten how many SS divisions were formed from these populations?
According to Viktor Hansen, 500,000 Ukrainians served Hitler, some were killing the landing allied troops on D-Day.
Yes, and the Canadian Parliament gave a unanimous standing ovation to a man who had fought the western allies as an unrepentant member of the SS.
I'm a dual citizen Canada/USA, it was horrendous to watch Canadian Parliament's standing ovation, clapping like trained seals to this old Nazi Waffen SS (SS! out of all things!), especially given that my Ukrainian grandfather, fought against Nazism. I wrote to Trudeau my thoughts on X.
They turned the Speaker into the scapegoat, fired him. Give me a break, Hunka was invited, Hunka even had a scholarship established @ Alberta's university for somebody to study some obscure Ukrainian bishop's legacy. From what I see, they test now and then how much push-back they get for peddling nazism, waiting for the real veterans to die. My grandpa died young, I never met him, but to see this old louse living to be nearly a century old, having the gall to show up in Canadian Parliament, standing up with the near nazi salute there - WTF?!
The Canadian Parliament knew exactly what it was doing.
Agreed.
Good for them
So your idiot grandfather was a Jew puppet who fought for the bolsheviks that murdered I told numbers of nuns and priests ?
He should get such accolades. The entire SS should
Victor Hanson the low life court historian for the Jew.
Good for them
well you see how effective that was
At the moment, they rolled back - fired the Speaker, Hunka on social media was saying that he "only wanted to live his last years in peace and now he has to move to Latin America to escape all the hatred." So, at the moment, world still remembers.
He is a hero.
The Red army humiliated the Japanese army in the battles around Kolkin Gol. This made the Japanese high command loose faith in the Japanese army capabilities. So they started focusing on Japan's naval capabilities. This was an opportunistic move as Japan could use her navy to sieze the colonial territories of the defeated European powers to acquire resources and influence in the far east.
The problem with this alternative is that the ideology of "racial" supremacy and dismissal attitude towards many peoples of the USSR was the core tenet of Nazi Germany. If you want to picture a realists alternative scenario with much better management of occupied territories, you would have to change it core, and with this change the consequences would be much larger
I'm doubtful it would've made any impact on the final outcome of the war. Russians and Germans had a history of ethnic conflict. Whatever efforts the Germans tried to make in gaining the support of the local populations, Soviet propaganda about the threat the Germans posed to Slavs would override it, which is what happened in reality. Most of the negative statements about Slavs Germans made during the invasion were in private; in public they acted as if they were working together with the Russians and others to overthrow the USSR eg. Vlasov. Even if Hitler and other Nazi's had more positive views of Slavs it would have made very little practical difference in their propaganda.
The biggest opponents of the USSR regime were rural peasants who opposed collectivization. The Nazi's fundamentally couldn't work with these groups as they needed to maintain the collectivization system to extract food for the German population. This had little to do with their dislike of Russians and more with wanting to avoid the famine of WW1. Stalin's purges brutally got rid of a lot of dissidents within the Soviet system so I'm doubtful there was as much anti soviet energy to tap into as people think.
Moreover, it's unlikely even in such a scenario that the Slavic populations would stay loyal once the war stopped going Germany's way. Finland certainty didn't and the Russian liberation army ended up fighting the Germans at the end of the war.
"Russians and Germans had a history of ethnic conflict"
Can you please elaborate? My problem with this statement is that historically speaking, Russia was in large part governed by Germans, and a large chunk of elite consisted of Germans, the real animosity between Russians and Germans was the product of two World Wars
Catherine the Great was German and she was giving the Germans as much land as they can process, in the Southern Ukraine between Odessa and Nikolaev there were huge pockets of ethnic Germans, many were interned to Kazakhstan, etc., many collaborated with Germans when invaded. Did you mean that?
"The biggest opponents of the USSR regime were rural peasants who opposed collectivization."- ask yourself where did these peasants get the land from - they (including Ukrainian peasants) got free land from Lenin's "Land Decree" - they just didn't want to return this free-gotten land into the collective farm during famine and were gauging the prices of bread.
"ask yourself where did these peasants got the land from" I don't agree with what you're implying, but even if it is true the point's irrelevant. It's entirely possible peasants who may have gained land under early Soviet land reform later came to oppose Soviet collectivization policy. This is actually a pretty well established idea. When the German's first entered Ukraine, it was mainly groups from rural areas and Nationalist's in the west that welcomed them.
I don't "imply" anything - I telegraph my opinion :-) Sorry, but when you learn the USSR history well enough and would be able to show me the land registries of the lands granted under Lenin's Land Decree of 1917 vs. the lands confiscated in the 1930s, then we could have a reasonable dispute. I'm pretty sure that between the two of us, I was the one who was born in the USSR, am Ukrainian, and I studied the USSR history for years, and spoke with people, who lived through collectivization.
500,000 thousands Ukrainians served Hitler, but millions Ukrainians, including my own Ukrainian grandpa, fought against Hitler.
You claiming to have studied USSR history and spoken to people has no effect on whether your views are correct. There would be many people in the world who have studied USSR history and spoken to former soviet residents who would disagree with your views.
Slavs mostly fighting against the Nazi's rather than collaborating with them isn't a secret. It doesn't disprove that many Ukrainian's initially celebrated the Nazi invasion. To deny that is to be historically illiterate. I only brought up to illustrate that the Germans couldn't ally with the groups that they had shared interests in for both ideological and pragmatic reasons.
I understand what you are saying and your argument -- and yet I have a problem with what you wrote, and it comes down to what a person believes is the source of legitimacy and legal rights in civil society.
Under Soviet law, Lenin bestowed the land to the peasants and then when the law changed, they didn't want to comply (that's what I take to be your argument, as I understand it). Embedded in your comment is also the implications that some of those peasants weren't really Russian (they were of German origin at some point) -- and therefore had even less 'right' to claim such land. As I said, I can follow and understand that line of reasoning.
However ... one of the philosophical innovations of political philosophy (say since the mid 1700's) and from some aspects of sources earlier than that (e.g. English common law, the Bible, Roman law, etc.) was that the land and the rights to things like land (and rights to other things like free speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association) don't come from the government, they are inherent and reside in the people -- specifically all 'free people' regardless of their prior national origin). Now, I am talking conceptually here and it's not like this ideal was ever fully realized in practice (e.g. slavery, women's rights, etc). -- but it is an important concept and very much at odds with the implicit assumption behind your comment (e.g. 'Lenin bestowed .. ' if you allow me to paraphrase your comment as such).
With regard to Russia and the Soviet Union, this is even more problematic. Who owned the land during the Tsarist times? (and I don't mean who under the Tsarist system of laws had legal title to the land per legislation -- I mean that question more philosophically). Was it the landed noble? (in which case Lenin's seizure was illegal -- or at least unjust and uncompensated for). Was Tsarist land ownership shared in some sense with the serfs and then later emancipated peasants or independent farmers? (In some ways, I think the answer to that question is yes, as I understand Russian law and custom in that time period and for hundred of years earlier). What about the revolution -- first the one in 1917 then the ones in 1918. How did those political actions change things? Were those political changes legitimate and legal? In particular, why should Lenin's seizure of power and decrees and laws be considered legitimate (just because he was holding power, however obtained?). What about the legality of passing legislation that says one thing and then reversing that same legislation later (i.e. Did the governing body that made those decisions really have the legitimate power to make those decisions)? Even if they did, is it wrong for someone granted something of value to resist 'giving it back' because the state or society as a whole wants it? Does the Soviet state really require it (e.g. would collective farming really solve the problem or only make it worse and benefit some connected to power more than others)? The implication in all my questions and comments here is that perhaps legitimate rights reside inherently 'in the people' (not the state) and with the individual (not the collective) adn with the current status of that individual (not their distant heritage) and that usurpations of those legitimate rights are common, unfortunate, and to be resisted as much as humanly possible -- especially since even legitimate governments can be wrong or captured for wrongly desired reasons.
Sorry to burden you with all those thoughts and questions -- it just that your comment comes from such a different 'place' from the one I grew up in and embraced philosophically that I was floored (no insult intended -- it just knocked my socks off so to speak, as perhaps my response to you is doing to you). Anyway -- in the spirit of conversation and debate -- I just wanted to share that.
Land ownership vs German/no German was totally irrelevant. All got free land in 1917
The relevant issue was collectivization vs. private land ownership. You need to take a look at the dissolution of the serfdom in Russia - in the 1860s - the Crown purchased the land from the landowners and re-distributed land to both, nobility and peasants.
I met an old Ukrainian peasant who lived through collectivization. She told me that her parents were batraks (lowest form of peasants who work for other peasants no own land) and her parents got free land from Lenin in 1917, and when after a few sequential bad crops/famines n 1930s, Stalin's commissars came to confiscate this land into collective farm, they refused and starved to death. From their family of 8, only her 12 yo and her half-sister who was 14 were left alive. After her parents death, the land was confiscated anyway. The older sister began to work in kolkhoz for a plate of lentil soup/day, which she shared with her younger sister. When Germans came, my friend let herself to be taken - Germans were grabbing young people at the public places to send to Germany as work-force, some ended on farms, some at factories, some in brothels. My friend ended up a german gulag @airplant factory, met her Dutch husband there, they moved to Holland after the war.
My point was - most Ukrainian peasants did not paid for their land, they got it from free in 1917, but starved to death when the same land was being taken back.
Ever heard, "Give as freely as you have received?"
You missed my point I think. You above state that the Tsar purchased the land / or the 'serfdom' of the peasants and gave land to the nobles / peasants (throughout Russia). So, from my point of view, the land then belonged to those owners (because the government, using its legitimate authority -- which was pretty universally recognized as legitimate within Russia at the time - to change centuries old historical practice (serfdom) and establish something like Western property rights via law and compensation).
Then a revolutionary government seizes power and wins a violent power struggle (Lenin and the Soviets). I have a problem right there at that statement (that government is not, in my view, legitimate). That government then 'gives land' (that it does not legally own per the prior history) to some people (that may already own that land under the historical way of thinking) -- and it does so my taking that land from others without compensation (e.g. nobles and other peasants) and by force (that, in my opinion is not legitimate). It kills those who disagree with its actions (that's another problem). Later, it changes its mind and reverses its decisions (that's another problem) and forces (at the point of gulag, torture, starvation, and death) its will on its population (that's another problem). Whether it gave land (that it did not own or rightfully acquire) for free or not is immaterial.
My point on all this is that your original comment sounded to me that you were disappointed that some peasants refused to give up their land to the collectivization program (and that some of those peasants may have been of German origin -- hence your reference to Catherine the Great). Based on that understanding of your comment, I basically said "I agree with the peasants -- they were right" (even if they died for their beliefs and or still had to 'cave' in the end -- because their rights to own land that they had owned since emancipation, their rights to have a government that represents them and has their consent to govern, their rights to rebel or otherwise oppose unjust government action -- are their rights (as I see it). The government body trying to do these things by law and force is illegitimate -- which makes the government's actions illegitimate. Those actions may have the force of violence behind it (because it is tyranny) -- but that does not make obeying illegitimate authority legally or morally binding on those affected.
My view is totally colored by my experience and upbringing as an American (many people from other parts of the world and cultures might find my view alien -- and many of my compatriots of today might no longer share that kind of viewpoint, although it was once quite near universal among Americans -- it is part and parcel of the secular American creed instantiated in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and Bill of Rights, the Federalist Papers, and various laws and court ruling since the founding of the Republic. It's a kinda of a uniquely American viewpoint -- that is not limited to just America - it is truly an American quirk perhaps -- and therefore hearing sympathy for the collectivizers is strange to me. Even hearing that a duly elected, representative, and legitimate government wants to take private land for common good is hard for me to hear - and hearing that the government not only wants to take my land but compel my labor is really fighting words (you know Americans and their fascination with the 2nd amendment and the founding myth of rebellion to tyranny).
I am probably coming across to you like some kind of American stereotype or dinosaur -- but it's hard to relate to you how odd your comments sounded to my ears and understanding.
People have misinterpreted my comment and I didn't really write out my argument that well in the first place. I was merely talking about in the period prior to ww2, relations between ethnic Germans and Russians declined. Part of this was because of ww1 forcing the two groups to become more antagonistic towards each other but I think other factors were at play. The ethnic Germans (those who identified as German and not merely of German ancestry) represented an unassimilated and successful minority group which was a threat to Russia as a state since it was worried that group would feel more loyalty to the German state than Imperial Russia.
This wasn't exclusive to Imperial Russia. The USSR in the 30s started to implement some pretty brutal policies against ethnic Germans and once the war started, ethnically cleansed most Volga Germans. Considering the treatment ethnic Germans was getting under the USSR, I can't imagine Nazi Germany would then care to treat the various Slavic groups any better since even at the best of times most upper level Nazi's held very little regard for Russians and Ukrainians as a people.
On the German side, a general antagonism towards Russia was the norm among right wing and nationalist circles. Ideas of lebensraum and invading Russia predate Hitler and the Nazi's and was merely an idea they inherited from the German nationalist tradition.
I don't think that Sonny's comment about 'history of conflict' is accurate (except for the time period 1870-1990) -- and even within that time period, I think the real ethnic element of it was 1890-1950.
Before 1870, Germany (as a nation state) didn't exist (but of course, Germans did exist, just in various states or statelets). For the Germans of this time (or earlier back to the Middle Ages), the problem wasn't the Russians -- it was everyone else who lived around them (the French, the British, the Dutch, the Swedes, other Germans, various mercenary bands, etc). Usually, these local Germans were being 'walked over' by someone else's army -- e.g. the 30 years war, the various wars of the time of Louis XIV, Frederick the Great various wars, then Napoleon's wars, etc.). Rape, pillage, plunder, destruction was the norm (during war). Germany was, basically weak. During this time, individual German leaders (like Frederick the Great or the various Austrian Emperors) or specific kingdoms (like Prussia, Austria, or Saxony) had specific conflicts with the Russians (but they were often were aligned with Russia as well) -- so it wasn't a constant state of war with Russia and it was not ethnic in nature (it was dynastic or power-politic related or related over which king controlled which border vassal region like Polish Galicia or Bukhovina).
The exception was the Baltic regions -- these areas and East Prussia were conquered by Germanic crusader knights (Templars) during the late Middle Ages and had a large portion of the ruling classes / merchant classes tied to German culture (and Swedish culture as well). However, this did not prevent the upper classes of the Baltics aligning with the Tsars (in fact, a large percentage of the senior officers of the Tsar's army that fought against Napoleon were Baltic German heritage Russian officers). Plus, prior to Napoleon, a lot of German immigrants were recruited into Russia (by Peter and Catherine the Great) to help establish Novo-Russia and the emerging manufacturing and mining centers.
So, to say that there was historical tension or ethnic tension prior to 1870 really doesn't make sense (in my view). Prior to 1870, German-Russian relations were either allied or friendly (as in the wars against Napoleon and with German immigration to Russia) or episodically in conflict (e.g. with Frederick the Great).
After 1870, however, I think that line of argument about 'ethnic conflict' starts to gain credence -- in part because of German unification and even more so due to the prevailing cultural ideologies of that age.
Germany in 1870 was more focused to its west (against Britain and France) -- but the new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, removed Bismark from power ca 1890, and had a much more antagonistic approach against Russia (not merely based on his personal whim but also because his actions reflected the viewpoint of an increasingly a large part of German society that began to fear Russia as a rival power to its East). As you point out, the Romanov dynasty (at this point) was heavily Germanic influenced and there was ample economic and cultural exchange between Russia and Germany at this time, but after German unification (and consolidation and industrialization ca. 1890), there was a growing fear that Russia 'was a threat' (because of the size of its population, the amount of its resources, and its potential power if it were to ever industrialize and modernize like Germany had done).
The other important factor (aside from economic and military potential) that began to influence German thinking around this time (ca 1890) was philosophical (or ideological) in nature. In the West (generally) there was a growing belief in technocracy and rule of 'experts' via 'science' combined with a sense of social darwinism (i.e. that 'conflict' was inevitable amongst cultures and that 'conflict' was desirable for the stronger culture so that it can 'win out' and 'dominate' the future and 'inferior' peoples). Prior to 1890, technology and science made something like the conquering of Russia 'mad' (e.g. the examples of Napoleon and Charles XII from Sweden seemed to make that clear). After 1890, technologies like railroads and the telegraph and industrialization started to make invasion eastward at least conceptually feasible (this was false but it raised hopes) and the fact that certain countries like German had large advantages in industrial output, education, communications, transportation, and modern weaponry started to imply that perhaps German arms could defeat the more backward Russians (if it came down to a fight). This was a relatively short term phenomenon (an advantage of a few decades as it turned out, not an indefinite advantage), but this 'we can take Russia' viewpoint was seemingly backed up but the Russia performance in the Russo-Japanese war (1905) and in WW1. So, after 1890 (and especially after 1918) the belief that conflict with Russia 'could be successful' started to take hold.
The other element of culture / ideology that emerged around this time ca 1890 was a ethnic one (the antecedents of the National Socialist racial theories started to percolate through universities and various societies in both Russia and the West). This was a decisive break from the egalitarian elements of the Enlightenment and from the religious ideas of 'Christiandom' (although it borrowed from both of those frameworks). This racial or ethnic element then exploded into mass consciousness after the First World War (perhaps because of the trauma of that war, perhaps because of the loss of faith in the 'old' institutions of government, faith, ideology, and economics, perhaps because of bitterness or desperation). Whatever the cause of the ethnic component, by 1920 it was pronounced and acted upon (e.g. the German Freikorps volunteer militias fighting the Bolsheviks in the Baltics). This ethnic element became a full blown pandemic of ethnic violence in WW2.
So, in conclusion, I wouldn't say that the Russians and Germans had a history of ethnic conflict (outside of 1890 to the end of the Cold War time period -- and even the post 1945 part of that conflict was heavily influenced by other factors -- like defense and deterrence rather than ethnic hate). However, the intensity of the ethnic conflict that did occur (1918-1950) tainted what came after it (to this day) -- and this intensity is so deeply felt that it tends to color how we see history (prior 1890) as well (even if that coloring is anachronistic).
That's quite a comprehensive analysis, thanks for this
I would agree that there was no ethnic conflict between Russians and Germans before 1870 - though animosity of Russian nobility towards Germans first appeared after the death of Peter the Great. It was mostly the result of increasing influence of Germans (remember that Peter's successor was his wife Katherine, who was ethnic German). Katherine the Great for example did not speak Russian before she was married to Peter III.
But I don't think we can call this animosity of single digits of percent of the elite toward Germans an ethnic conflict. This Russian nobility had much less sympathy towards Russian peasants. Moreover, this situation is further complicated by the fact, that in Russian, German is a translation of the word "немцы" - and for the long time it referred to any foreigner.
I believe that real animosity towards Germans appeared only in the WW1 - the Russian authorities had to rename Saint-Petersburg into Petrograd.
Still, we should take into the account, that ~90% of population lived in rural villages and did not encounter any Germans regularly apart from their masters in the regions you described, so it would be a stretch to portray a picture of real ethnic conflict.
Thank you for the compliment and yes, I think the viewpoint of Russians towards the Germans was also primarily positive or neutral (except for the points you made with the elites) until WW1 (and beyond).
In that sense, I don't think the Russians necessarily had any problem with the Germans (prior to 1914) that they didn't also have with the French, Swedes, Poles, British, Turks or inhabitants of the Caucasus or the steppe lands north and east of Iran at different times as well (i.e. Germans weren't necessarily worse than any other type of foreigner and the title holder of 'most annoying or dangerous foreigner' varied depending on the time period and what was going on around Russia's borders at that time.
Furthermore I agree with you and think that the Russian aristocrat problem was a big deal during the reign of Peter the Great (and subsequent rulers) and had a lot to do with sorting out internal Russian aristocratic identity issues -- were they traditionalist Boyars (as in Ivan the Terrible's Day) -- or 'europeans' (that copied the language and customs of French or German elites). Perhaps I am generalizing here too freely, but that is my sense of what was going on there during those times.
The other underlying question (not really resolved in my mind) was how much of the WW1 (anti-German feeling) was really due to the war (clearly that was a factor), and how much was due to the changing nature of Russian society at that time. Russian society forty years earlier during the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877 (or Crimean War before that) was fundamentally different than Russian society in 1914 (Russia in 1914 was more urban, more literate, more industrialized, with a larger technical and service oriented middle elite, with a substantial popular more press, more labor unions and political parties and related organizations, etc). Maybe instant 'mass resentment' against a nation and its people as seen in 1914 needs these preconditions to really take hold.
For example, the German people eventually 'had enough' of the French and Napoleons influence by around 1812 -- but that was after nearly 20 years of large scale war, economic emasculation, and actual occupation (so, I'd say that at some point a German antipathy to France and things French was to be expected). But even early in that time period, you still had German cultural elites (like Beethoven and Goethe) writing symphonies and odes to the new order -- and had lots of German peasants rather happily going along with the 'new thing' --- there wasn't a sense of nationalism (at least not at first). Another example would be the the British and French who had, for hundreds of years, a sense of contempt for each other (that was common to both the elites and the masses) -- but once again, it had a lot to do with hundreds of years of near continuous conflict and war (and an embarrassing amount of shared culture between the two) that developed that sentiment (not like what happened in 1914 where resentment seemed to appear as soon as the war erupted and before even the first the casualties rolled in to hospitals away from the front).
The other issue I don't really understand is the hatred of the British upper classes and elites for Russia (it appears to stems to a time period just prior to the the Crimean War). I've heard the arguments from MacKinder about the control of the Eurasian land mass and the Iran - Afghanistan - India 'great game' etc etc - but I don't really buy it (the geography and the transportation and logistic obstacles of that day and even today make that all nonsense to a military or diplomatic or industrial professional). But there is no doubt that 'Russia bad .. Russia very bad' has been an overriding them in the UK for quite some time -- in a way that far exceeds what I've ever seen in the US at any of its time points (e.g. opposition to autocratic Tsarist rule, opposition to Bolshevik thinking and atrocities, opposition to the threat of the USSR during the Cold War never reached those depths or had such popular resonance). In the US, the 'nuke em now' viewpoint parodied in the wonderful film Dr. Strangelove was very much the extreme exception -- at least until say the last twenty years (where it has become more common). It's all curious to me.
The Japanese got a real bloody nose @ Khalkin Gol up in Manchuria in a border clash with the Soviets in May - Sept 1939. Many historians cite this for the Japanese reluctance to join in OB.
the "Nazis" NEVER thought of Slavs as subhuman - the ideal was Wehrmacht soldiers retiring to farms with pretty Ukrainian girls.
When Galician Waffen-SS retreated with the German troop, in the Germany proper they're not allowed to stay in German houses, but in barns, etc.
just delete your account
go away jew...
you are the ideal commenter for Big Serge. I’m sure he’s very happy to have you on the team.
why are you defending the jew?
which of your personalities wrote that comment
Possible idea for a future follow-up piece: what could the Soviets/Stalin had done more effectively in the opening phases of the invasion? Assuming certain things are realities on the ground: Germans are able to achieve surprise in the opening phase, Soviets are dealing with their depleted officer/leadership situation, etc.
I think John's points below are largely correct and useful -- but it's hard for me to envision a plan for the Soviets in 1941 that would work (and not create other sever problems for the Soviets and Russia as a whole). From my perspective, two factors come into play that make deploying a better strategy than the historical one a problem: a) the inexperience of the Soviet army in 1941 and the b) consequences of retreat.
In some ways, the Soviet army (regardless of the status of the Commander in Chief and purged generals) was going to have a hard time during the German invasion of 1941. The world was in the midst of rapid technology change (to radios, tanks, planes, etc.) -- so the 'old ways' weren't going to work the way they used to and the 'new' ways were still speculative and needing lots of refinement. Fighting in Spain showed some inklings of what was to come (but it was not a good template in many ways for what an industrialized European peer-on-peer war would be like) -- and things used during that war (planes, tanks, communications) changed rapidly since that point (or from Poland in 1939 as well). Finland showed all kinds of weakness in Soviet training and leadership and planning and supply -- but even if you eliminate those very real problems (because you assume away the purges etc) you still get a large Russian army fighting a 'new' type of war against a more experience German force (experienced in Poland, France and the Low Countries, Yugoslavia, etc.). The Germans were going into that war with a lot more useful knowledge and better honed operating procedures, war experience, etc. The peacetime Soviet army was just going to be going against a better prepared opponent (even if the numbers and equipment were a tie or Soviet advantage). It was going to difficult for them to do well under any operational scenario (short of German mistake and or incompetence).
The second problem comes from the effects of a retreat. If you knew in advance that the Germans would overwhelm your border forces and or your border forts, and that your counter-attacks wouldn't be effective (which is not something the Soviets could have known but assume for a moment that you know that for sure) ... then you would likely want your forces to retreat back to your Russian interior -- to trade time for space and bring you closer to your reserves and supplies (and draw the Germans farther away from theirs). The Germans had real problems supplying and supporting their forces the deeper they penetrated into Russia and Russia could have used that fact -- however, drawing inward and not fighting costly (but probably losing) battles was politically a problem for Stalin (as it was for Tsar Alexander during Napoleon's invasion in 1812). Could Stalin survive if so much real estate, people, industry, transportation nodes, supplies, etc were given up without a massive fight? What about when the stories of German atrocities emerged? In some ways, the best military response to the (short term) overwhelming German invasion conflicted with political common sense. The Soviets could very well have survived the German military invasion better than they did historically (by retreating) -- but who knows? Maybe that would have collapsed Russian support for the Soviet government or sparked all kinds of internal chaos (since the retreat might be perceived as betrayal of Russia).
Not sure that answered your question gt, but that's my attempt.
1. don't have troops bang up on the new border where they can be cut up and surrounded
2. Either man the forts on the 1939 border or the 1941 border but not both
3. Competent Commander in Chief
4. Don't shoot all your best generals in 1938
5. If you don't agree with Hitler to divvy up Poland he won't have a common border with you and mathematically can't invade you
"in general such discussions fail to differentiate between “preemptive” and “preventative” war"
There are some relatively new sources since the fall of the USSR that seem to indicate it actually was a pre-emptive strike.
https://www.wintersonnenwende.com/scriptorium/english/archives/articles/stalwarplans.html
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What Hitler should have done:
Instead of trying to conquer the USSR, he should have done what Germany did in WW1: knock it out of the war.
The USSR was a straw hut just waiting for someone to kick it over (or whatever AH said). The problem is that the USSR and the Russian people are anti-fragile. The more you press, the stronger they get. Even the most anti-Stalin general knew that to survive they needed Stalin to maintain the unity needed to fend off Germany.
So what AH should have done is to concentrate on blockading the Soviets. The first thing would have been to abandon the ridiculous idea of building battleships to be used as commerce raiders. Concentrate instead on subs and shore-based naval aviation, staged in Norway. On the land side push in as usual, but announce that if Stalin is executed and replaced by someone who renounces communism, becoming Russia once again, that Germany will declare peace and retreat to a defensive border. Depending on how far in they are, perhaps the Dnieper or Don to the Baltic.
Considering Stalin's quirks, at worst this would result in him executing even more generals than he did historically, with every general called back for consultation thinking some dangerous thoughts.
With the Soviets out of the way, the rest of war is much easier to win or negotiate a favorable peace.
If you treat Germany in WW2 like a single person strategy game (i.e. a game where you can determine the strategy and war decisions independent of history or ideology) -- then I can see why you might suggest this course of action. That said, I don't think that your approach would work if implemented (because of the economic strangulation Germany suffers long term being cut off from both Atlantic trade and from Soviet trade), but I understand your thinking.
The biggest problem, as I see it, however, with your suggestion is that there was a historical and ideological anchor that governed what Germany could have done in WW2 that you can assume away with your recommendation.
For example, I don't think that Germany without Hitler and National Socialism would have been able to wage the wars that it did wage (or win those wars if it did start them) against the various Western nations prior to 1941. Its Weimer coalition governments would not have gotten it to those points nor would a military dictatorship (led by the General Staff) or a restored Monarchist movement. Nor would a Communist or Socialist dictatorship have been able to make it work either. None of these pathways (aside from the National Socialist one) would have been stable enough or strong enough to fight against the slide into domestic civil war or overcome the various forms of civil and military opposition -- and none would have been fool-hardy enough to mortgage the economic future of Germany to the military present like the National Socialist were willing to do (i.e. when you look at what the German government actually did in the time period 1933-1938, it was literal economic suicide -- only a government totally 100% committed to 'faith' in its 'economic and military success' would basically sell the family home and bet everything at the roulette wheel like they did). So, the first point I am trying to make against your argument is probably only a National Socialist government with Hitler in charge gets you to 1941 like in the historical scenario. You need an insanely risk seeking individual (which doesn't imply that he was insane, merely supremely confident in his risk taking) and blindly loyal and fanatical party to take the leaps of faith needed to get to the historical German-Russia situation in 1941.
That sets up the second problem that I see with your argument -- it's basically impossible for Hitler and a National Socialist government and society to tolerate a Bolshevik, slavic Russia (in any form) for very long. The whole reason d'être of National Socialism was both elimination of inferior neighboring peoples (like the slavs and jews, and especially ethnically jewish slavs like many of the Bolsheviks) and the seizure of key land, resources, etc needed to make a sustainable long term empire. Germany (back then and still today) was technologically advanced but resource poor -- it could not feed itself, provide itself with sufficient coal or iron ore, it lacked most of the specialized minerals and raw materials needed for modern weaponry (e.g. tungsten, nickel, chromium, aluminum, titanium, uranium, oil, rubber, quinine, coffee) and it had insufficient amounts of other items (leather, wood, paper, copper, lead, tin, phosphorous, nitrates, tobacco, etc.). Taking Russian resources was really its only hope of being self-sufficient (given that it was blocked from importing outside of neutral nations in Western Europe / Turkey). It would be out-of-character to an extreme extent to be Germany in 1941 and not 'go for broke' against Russia (once a war starts). If Germany wins, then it may obtain 'what it needs to live'. If it fails, then Germany is crushed. If it doesn't try, it becomes an economic vassal of the hated Soviets or slowly withers away on the vine into inferiority and poverty. The best strategy for Germany in 1941 is to not be Germany in 1941 (or be the temporary economic vassal of the Soviets and hope for a reconciliation with the West before the Soviets turn on Germany) -- but once the war starts, Germany must either win bigly or die ugly. This became even more true once the Soviet war actually started and Germany treated the Russians the way it did (e.g. the civilians) -- at that point, there was no turning back or hope of a negotiated settlement in any realistic scenario with the Soviets.
Anyway, I can be wrong -- I just wanted to share with you my thoughts (even though they are critical of your points, I don't intend them to be critical of you personally).
"tolerate a Bolshevik, slavic Russia"
Hence my requirement that the new leader renounce communism.
You make a lot of good points, and I agree with some of them. Note that with my plan Germany would still have acquired vast swathes of farmland in Eastern Europe. Of course once the war was over and Germany recovered, peace agreements can always be renegotiated...
I disagree about the nazis #1 goal being extermination of inferiors; their #1 goal was to 'Make Germany and Germans Great Again'. So unite German-speaking nations and improve the bloodline with eugenic programs (similar to what the US was doing at this time, but no one likes to talk about that.)
Neighboring inferiors didn't cause the nazis to slavver with insane hate and bloodthirst, that is (mostly) post-war propaganda to justify allied war crimes. Even before the war started, the nazis were working with zionist organizations to deport jews to Israel, rather than exterminate them. Nazi Germany wouldn't have had a problem putting off invading slavic neighbors until the time was right.
There are lots of quotes from politicians and generals saying the goal is extermination, but it must be remembered that politicians lie to generals and generals lie to soldiers.
The whole racial animosity of National Socialism is a pretty big point to take issue with (it seems pretty clearly established to me) -- but even if you take that aspect out of the equation, you still end up with a pretty unworkable situation for Germany since it requires the removal of Communism in Russia (which was really the core element of its the USSR's government, military, secret police, schools, science, arts, entertainment, propaganda, secular religion, etc.). It would be going too far to say that Communism was Russia (for pre-Communist Russian culture and religion was still there under the surface) -- but at that point in time, Communism (and all that went along with it) was what was holding the USSR together (the various regions etc) and the whole basis of its economic and social model. Giving up Communism would threaten the entire leadership cadre (at multiple levels of society) and be like the Vatican renouncing Christianity. The Soviet Union was led by a ego-driven dictator (that is true) -- but he was supported by a whole system of similar beings that largely believed in what he believed and would have acted in rather similar manners on most issues. It wasn't a situation where removing one leader would have made the difference (like it might have made a difference in Germany in WW2) -- there was too much Party infrastructure and layers and layers of replacement leaders ready to step forward (in that sense the Russian Communist Party was much deeper and more consistent internally than the German National Socialist Party could ever hope to be -- after all, it had 25+ more years in power to perfect its hold on society).
I could see how your compromise peace proposal could have worked in an alternate 1917 or with a White Russian post war government in 1918 / 1919 -- accept peace and don't be an enemy and we can coexist with new borders etc (because face it you lost the war). But I can't see how that works in 1941 or later (because Russia had not lost the war). The USSR couldn't be blockaded (even if Germany had the air and sea forces to do it, which they didn't) - it was too self sufficient. And it wasn't beaten militarily in the field -- and it was out to reclaim its borders, avenge its deaths, demonstrate the superiority of its culture and secular religion, etc. And time was on the USSR's side.
One last point -- more of a personal suggestion from me to you (because I am starting to be an old man and I perceive you to be a rather young man, regardless of whether that is the case, and I want to offer you some sincere and well-meaning advice -- so please take it in that vein). It might be a good idea to spend some time better understanding the writings and details of National Socialism, Italian Fascism, Soviet Marxist-Leninist-Trotskite-Stalinist thought, and modern Third Positionism. I'd recommend the YouTuber TIK for a starter (he has lots of clearly presented, objective, and well-supported videos on those topics). It might be helpful for you to get to know what the political, cultural, and ideological influences were on those ideologies and on what their leaders and thought-leaders said and wrote in detail about economics, morality, society, and the future. You might be surprised by how similar they are in some ways (and the ways in which they vary and why). Furthermore, you might benefit from that investigation because you come across to me as a 'open' to some of those National Socialist talking points (or explanations / excuses). Now of course you are free to believe whatever you truly want to believe (and not every negative story you hear about something is true), but (as an old man potentially talking to a younger one), you might want to really dig into those ideas before committing yourself too closely to them. When you do so, certain light bulbs might 'go off' for you that change the way you think about those topics. Those insights might be in the area of economics (because you really start. to understand how those various systems worked in theory and practice) -- or they might be in the area of morality (once you start to understand where those lines of thinking lead you with regards to discussions of what is right / what is wrong) -- or they might affect your views of on a religious level (hint: National Socialism is very deep into the occult -- whether you believe in the occult or not, it certainly does). Anyway, just a thought. There are a lot of bad ideas out there in life -- and oftentimes the bad ones get dusted off and recycled from time to time and defended and re-presented. Just be careful what you latch on to as you go forward (for sometimes those things latch back on to you!). Safe travels and healthy investigations to you, and all my best to you!
Yet NS was still able to agree to the Molotov-von Ribbentrop pact. I generally agree with Prof John Meersheimer who says you can predict a nations’ actions with ~75% accuracy simply by assuming they’ll act as complete sociopaths in pursuit of power and resources. If pretending to be a friend to an enemy is needed, then that is what you do.
Neither of those parties (in the specific case you mentioned and prior to that Pact) had many other good options and both had pressing needs (so they cooperated) -- and the case in question did not question their national survival and merely postponed the ultimate clash. What you suggest does affect their national survival (i.e. once the Soviet-German war starts in is difficult to end -- because a clear cut victory is hard to achieve for either side -- which means it goes on and become an existential struggle and because the ideology of each sides system requires the other to be destroyed (and that does not even take into account the passions and anger of the people that happen once war and death and destruction occur). The issue whether isn't whether nations act in a sociopathic ways (they often but not always do) -- the issue is that a negotiated solution short of outright victory is the rational solution (not sociopathic one). Bottomline, you can believe in the validity and efficacy of your proposed strategy (blockade and or negotiated settlement) -- it's a counter-factual hypothesis after all - I am just saying that there are many reasons why it would not be considerable (in that era) or work. I like the fact that you are trying to 'think out of the box' -- but this may not be the idea / situation to keep doing so.
Thanks very much for your insightful comments on this piece Martin - I've learned a lot from reading them!
The Nazis should have built subs instead of surface ships and set up a blockade in the north of Norway. Wow, that's amazing! Yeah why didn't they think of that.
Sincerely, Someone Who Never Read A Book About WWII
Please tell me what history book claims the nazis didn't build the Bismarck, the Tirpitz, etc. and instead poured those resources into shore-based naval planes and subs.
I hope you can't find any, because it would ruin one hell of a good movie.
or just have Japan attack Russia rather than pearl harbor...
He tried, Japan refused. Japan and Russia weren't at war until the very end, when Japan was almost done and Stalin saw an opportunity to take Manchuria with little risk.
I think it is more complicated than just saying Japan 'refused' -- my understanding was that the Japanese were indeed open to the idea of a joint attack on the Soviets, but that bringing that openness to action required certainty from the Germans (on whether they wanted active Japanese support) and a certain amount of diplomatic prep work on the part of the Germans (which was lacking).
Inside Japan, the Japanese Army faction of the government was supportive of a Soviet war (the Navy faction against the idea) -- but the Hitler/Stalin non-aggression pact took Japan by surprise and Germany's subsequent ambivalence about Japanese involvement in things diplomatic, military, and economic raised all kinds of doubts in Japan about how far it could trust its German 'ally' (this in turn then led to the Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact). Had Germany handled itself better diplomatically with the Japanese, I think there was at least a chance that Germany could have invaded Russia in 1941 with some kind of Japanese assistance (or at least active menacing) in the East. From the German perspective, this was an unforced error.
When ?
August 1945.
When gaming it out, I always felt Leningrad in '41 was the pivot point.
Accepting that seizing the Romanian oil fields was the only possible knockout blow (Moscow would have simply relocated across the Urals if seized), do you not think the allies would have sent fuel to Russia via Murmansk? Admittedly with an impact on their own operations, further delaying the invasions of Europe and North Africa perhaps. And cramping America in the Pacific.
The allies sent an enormous amount of fuel to Russia via the Arctic convoys (so what you propose actually happened in real life). Soviet fuel production capabilities (pumping and refining) were working at full capacity but were both damaged and interdicted a lot by the Germans during the war (and Siberian production was not yet a big deal). So a lot of the fuel the Soviets used in the war was actually American (America was over 50% of world oil production at the time and had surge capacity to drill, pump, refine, and ship it to both Britain / the Commonwealth and the Soviets). Without American gasoline and trucks, the Soviets armored counter-strokes would have been less effective and its advance in 1944-1945 a lot slower.
Romanian oil production for Germany was critical (there was a tiny bit of oil production in Poland and Hungary and a bit elsewhere as well) -- but Romania really accounted for something like only 10-20% of German needs (I am going off of memory here so I can't be exact at this moment). Germany was in a perpetual fuel deficit starting the moment the Germany Soviet war started (and probably before that as well). German rationing and synthetic fuel production helped but never ever had a chance of making up the needed shortfall. Even Germany's attempts to capture oil in the Caucasus had a bit of 'desperation' to it (i.e. even if successful, capturing those oil fields and refineries and shipping the output back to Germany would have been a challenge -- even if those facilities were captured intact, which they were unlikely to be). Same with German dreams of pushing into the Middle East. The oil-rich Middle East that we take for granted today produced relatively little oil in the 1940's (except for Basra, Kirkuk, and Iran which were firmly under British control). When you are starving, going for 'something' becomes your objective for sure -- but the chances of getting those oil supplies and then being able to 'bring it home' and 'eat it' was such a long shot to be almost impossible for Germany in that war. Germany had to win the war quickly (for so many reasons) or it had to have military or technological miracles -- because it was doomed to starve itself out of petroleum and then eventually food and coal and raw materials (if it didn't collapse first like it did historically).
Siberian oil production was nonexistent in WWII
That's what I wrote -- (read it again)
(and Siberian production was not yet a big deal)
What does my written statement mean to you? To me (who wrote it) it meant that there was in the 1940's no significant amount of Siberian oil or gas production in the Soviet Union (unlike say in the 1970's or today). Now, I have to admit that my knowledge of Soviet oil field statistics is superficial, and if you want to insist that the exact amount of Siberian production was precisely zero (instead of some nominal amount practically equivalent to zero), then you 'got me'. But does that really change my point?
Seriously, if you want to be helpful (because you have deeper knowledge on the topic) perhaps you can respond differently and say something like 'the USSR's first Siberian fields were not brought onto production until 19XX .. so like Martin wrote Siberian oil production could not contribute to the USSR's fuel needs during WW2'. Or you can do it your way. Whatever.
As far as I understand, the problem with fuel in the USSR was not really the quantity, but the quality
The USSR did not possess enough capabilities to produce high-end fuel for aviation for example
That's a good comment. I definitely think it was an issue of both quantity and quality -- and although Soviet produced fuel quantity was substantial in quantity, the USSR's needs for fuel and its usage of fuel went up tremendously (especially once it went on the offensive in late 1943 and beyond). So it's not that the Soviets lacked fuel like the German did in 1943 and beyond -- it was that the Soviets needed vast amounts of fuel to move westward with its massive armies over the destroyed infrastructure of Western Russia (which required substantial truck based logistics) and that Soviet oil production alone could not meet that need if the USSR wanted to move as massively and quickly as it wanted to (or did historically). The USSR could have kept up the fight and advanced without the Western fuel -- it just couldn't do it on as broad a front or as quickly if the Western fuel was not flowing in as it did.
The quality issue did affect aviation performance a lot (and the Soviets lacked the high octane blending capabilities that you reference) -- but aviation on the Russian-German front was different than on the other theaters of the war, so in that sense although aviation fuel mattered in the Soviet theatre, it probably didn't matter as much as it did elsewhere in WW2 (where fighter versus fighter combat for air supremacy mattered more).
By 1943, German aviation was under strain in France and Italy and at home (which diverted German air resources towards interceptors and home defense and away from its eastern front with the Soviets) -- which changed the type of aircraft they deployed to the Soviet front (and how they were used). By 1943, German tactical bombers were increasingly vulnerable and obsolete in the West and in Italy, and fighters needed in those areas instead. So, increasingly German air forces in Russia began to be run down (in types and numbers of aircraft) and reoriented towards bombing and interdiction efforts (and resupply). Meanwhile, the Soviets were churning out vast quantities of very serviceable domestic aircraft (and using whatever the Western powers gave them) -- so they became a real and increasing threat to German forces in Russia (even with inferior aviation fuel). This change in the air war balance became more profound over time.
The nature of the air war over the Soviet Union also affected the 'aviation fuel' problem a bit. The Russian front was huge, air early warning systems virtually non-existent, and it was difficult to to defend (on either side) from tactical bombing strikes from the other side party (these conditions did not apply so thoroughly in Western or Southern Europe or the Pacific). So, it became possible to have some amount of air support in the Soviet theatre (for either side) without having complete control of the air (via fighter dominance). It was the fighter versus fighter aspect of WW2 air combat where the fuel quality really mattered (for a fighter, every ounce of additional performance it could eke out over its opponent really mattered and therefore having appropriate fuel could make a huge difference). And while fighter versus fighter combat did occur on the Soviet-German theatre, the outcome of the air war in that space didn't depend on it like elsewhere. Hence, while the Soviets wanted and needed and prioritized high octane aviation fuel, my argument would be that not getting it from the West would have not been as 'hurtful to them' as not getting enough regular fuel (for the tanks and trucks moving westward).
At least that is my understanding of the fuel and air combat experience in that theatre and my understanding of how fuel affects WW2 engine performance.
false. we provided them with the technology to make 100 octane avgas
It's not just a question of technology -- it's building and running and operating the plants at scale (during a war with tons of other things going on). You seem to be point out nits (and missing the bigger picture). The comment was that the Soviets were deficient in higher octane aviation gas. I said correct. It wasn't a question of technology but of installed industrial capacity able to meet military operational requirements. The Soviets needed help (and the US provided it).
that's why we sent them lend lease refineries so they could make 100 octane avgas
You mean Caucauses?
As far away as necessary.
Germany might have won WW2 if they hadn't tried to conquer the USSR instead of making it their ally.
The article explains why this was attempted but was impossible.
It is considered impossible because it didn't work for Germany.
That is not the argument Serge gives.
It was never claimed to be.
Define 'won'. If Germany had maintained its economic partnership with the USSR, could Germany have retained control of Europe (outside of Britain) -- likely yes (especially if the USA does not actively join in WW2 in December 1941). Would Germany (with Soviet support) been able to conquer Britain or control the Mediterranean if Britain wanted to keep fighting (and received the historical support it was receiving from the US and the Commonwealth)? Probably not (the naval and air forces essential for these two aspects of the fight were not in its favor and Italy was a mixed blessing as an ally --- very unstable politically, militarily, and economically - and very vulnerable to British air/land/sea attack along its exposed coastline). An eventual collapse in Italy (absent the Soviet German war) was a very possible scenario (it would just happen differently than it did historically but it would likely happen at some point) -- which leaves Germany in control of Europe but militarily tied down everywhere, facing the threat of continued local rebellion / British intervention in many places, and very dependent on the USSR for most of the essential food, fuel, minerals, etc it needs to 'keep the lights on'. This is not a good long term scenario for Germany (i.e. perpetual hot war in its south and west on the sea and in the air versus an opponent backed by sheltered overseas partners capable of massively outproducing it in those dimensions). Germany would have to rely on the U-Boat fleet and 'special weapons' even more (and technologically, this was NOT a race it was guaranteed to win). So, under these considerations, 'holding what it had' was not a great outcome for Germany in 1941. The most likely outcome was continued war and the economic destruction of both Britain and Germany (which would let the USSR win).
If you assume that the German-USSR pact falls apart (because the Germans can't stand it ideologically or because they fear giving the Soviets too much power over them long term) -- then you get the historical outcome Serge talks about. Same if Stalin decides to 'take the Germans out' later on at a point of his choosing (because he doesn't trust the National Socialists or senses an opportunity).
The only alternative you left is a 'mind meld' of Soviets and National Socialists -- a complete 'happy' alliance where they can use their combined resources to 'take on the world'. This was so not likely to happen ideologically or practically. At that time period, Germany and the USSR were very ideologically governed places. They could compromise on practical matters (when they had no better alternatives and pressing needs), but they really really hated what the other stood for. Hitler in particular thought that the threat of Bolshevikism and 'the Asian' was 'the' existential threat to his vision of the future -- and the Soviets knew that their greatest enemies lie in the various philosophies, traditions, and national strategies of the 'West" -- and both nations (Germany and USSR) were inherently expansionist and absolutist ('all or nothing' 'to the end' because it 'was inevitable') -- so a sustainable alliance of the powers of the Eurasian land mass was not in the cards then (and is hard to imagine in most other historical periods as well).
Through my ongoing studies of the Russo-German War 1941-1945, the German plan was never to conquer all of the Soviet Union. The plan was to get to the so-called “AA Line”, an imaginary line drawn from the port of Archangel in the north to the city of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea in the south. The hope was that by getting to that point The Red Army would have been decisively destroyed.
Advance units of German troops actually did get into Astrakhan in Spring 1942 during Case Blau.
Have your ongoing studies found a case where an invader successfully conquered a part of another country without needing to respond to a whole country defensive response?
I can think of a couple of examples: the moorish conquest of Spain in the 700's (which left a northern remanent in Christian hands) and the Turkish conquest of the Byzantine Empire (which left progressively smaller Byzantine rump states behind for periods of time). Same with the Turkish conquest of southeastern Europe (e.g. Bulgaria, Serbia, parts of Hungary and Austria, etc). Eventually, the Spanish and Austrians (and other locals) pushed back the invaders (but it took something like 700 years and 350 years respectively to do so and the Byzantines never came back) -- so, I'd 'call' those victories for the invaders (at least in the relative time range of the actual invasions).
The larger point however is that a 'successful' German invasion of the Soviet Union would have aimed for a couple of objectives (that were not totally unrealistic or unachievable at least in theory):
-- capture of the main industrial centers, resource centers, and transportation hubs (like the main cities of European Russian, the rail lines, the oil fields, the mines) so that the Russians could not have the means of effective resistance going forward (outside of partisan activity)
-- the destruction of the support for or effectiveness of the Soviet governmental system (either by provoking civil war, economic collapse, political coups, rebellions, independence movements, etc). so that an organized Soviet response was not feasible or coordinated going forward
Neither of these two conditions were met by the Germans (obviously) -- but if they had been met, the fact that 70% of the Soviet land mass was not under German control might not have been an issue (those regions were going to be too disconnected from each other, under-developed and under populated, too remote, too potentially open to rebellion or independence, etc) that it wasn't an insane hypothesis for the German's to entertain. It wasn't a wise course of action for the Germans to embark on (given the German's limited chances of success) -- but it wasn't insanely unrealistic objective for holding on to its conquest if those conditions could be achieved.
A lot depends on how 'guaranteed' you think the Soviet victory was destined to be. I think that the chances of the Soviets system surviving the German assault were pretty good but not guaranteed. I do believe that there was a chance that the Soviet system might have come down (through military action or economic collapse or internal rebellion) -- but just because it didn't happen in history doesn't mean that it wasn't a close run thing (or that if you ran the same 'simulation' a thousand times you wouldn't get a different outcome).
As for Russian nationalism and the Russian's long term will to resist, I do believe that an intensely patriotic and determined people make a huge difference in what happens, eventually (just ask the Medieval Spanish) -- but it isn't necessarily successful (ask the Byzantines) or quick. So, I think that there was a chance that the Germans could have met their goals (just not a good chance of doing so).
World War I: Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
That isn't much of a database.
Adolf wasn't a big Excel jockey
Excel didn't exist then.
Yes, German invasion of Russia in 1917
I often ponder about alternate ww2 history. I am most curious about what would have been if the U.S. threw all of its material support behind the nazis at the onset of barbarosa. I don't think the soviets could've prevailed in that alternate universe. With the current proxy war in Ukraine where the entire western block is shamelessly supporting modern day nazis in the hope of them being able collapse the Russian state. I wonder if the decision makers in the US wish they could go back in time to support Hitler instead of Stalin. The odds that they could've collapsed Russia back then is orders of magnitudes higher than it is now using Ukraine and I bet the neo-cons are kicking themselves over the missed opportunity.
The US threw all of its financial and material support behind the Third Reich by finding Hitler's military buildup and having the Big 3 build automobile manufacturing plants in Germany to supply his automotive needs. They didn't want to support Soviet communism because it wasn't the form of Marxism that they subsequently installed in the US through the US Congress' adoption of all of the planks of the Communist Manifesto besides the abolition of private property, which BlackRock is facilitating by buying all of the housing and converting it to rental units.
You are misunderstanding the actions of individual companies (e.g. Ford in the 1920's) with the 'US' (government or national interest).
The 1920's was a boom time in some ways for the US and for the world as a whole. New technologies (aircraft, automobiles, oil products, radio, 'talking' movies, consumer products) were taking off and companies and entrepreneurs scrambled world wide 'to make it big'. Ford built plants in Germany and Britain and even in the USSR (so did Fiat in the USSR as well). This was a relatively non-ideological age (compared to today) -- and while there was anti-Soviet views at that time, there were also a lot of pro-Soviet ones as well.
During Hitler's rearmament and during WW2, the Germans nationalized the Ford (and other factories) and repurposed them for their war effort (and because of their ideology of state control of production). It wasn't the case of the 'US' supporting Germany over Russia but supply Ford products (in fact, for a variety of reasons, the US 'deep state' such as it was at that time period was actually more pro-Soviet than anti-Soviet).
Looking at that historical time period with the lenses of today (e.g. the current US deep state and Black Rock) is an anachronism -- like projecting the influence of the the internet on the attitudes and decisions of Napoleonic Europe (it doesn't really apply or work very well as an explanatory or analysis tool).
All of the BIg Three went along with the US government's promotion of the next big war.
I don't think that your statement is accurate in any of the historical time periods we are discussing. The Big Three didn't support the US government's promotion of war in the 1920's and 1930's (because they as companies did not support war, the US population didn't support war, and the US government did not seek war). The Big Three were active in producing the weapons or war during WW2 (because their leaderships were supportive of that war, the American people were supportive of that war, and the government obviously were supportive of that war) -- but that was an actual war, not the next big war. The Big Three then scaled way back on 'war' support after WW2 (although they did some defense work in the 1950's and 1960's) but really it would be a mistake to say that they were promoting the next war (they were more focused on capturing profits in the domestic car business).
Overall, I think you are in danger of taking ideas and mindsets from today (e.g. 'that big business is supporting the next big war') and 'copying and pasting' that viewpoint to the past where it doesn't really apply.
Between the end of WW1 to WW2, virtually no US business made money off of 'war' (there really wasn't that much spending). During WW2 everyone participated in and profited from the war (although some portion of those profits evaporated do to rising costs). Post WW2-to the9/11, relatively few companies benefited from war or war spending (except during Korea and Vietnam). It's only after 9/11 that the general corporate appetite for war gets 'big' (and even then, it is concentrated in a a subset of tech and defense and advisory companies not general entities like the Big 3). The post 9/11 orgy for war has a lot to do with the policy changes made in the 1990's (the government's decision to seek regime change wars and to consolidate the post Cold War defense industries into giant, lobbying, behemoths capable of capturing Congress and administration spending priorities) -- as well as the propaganda and false flags that were used to goad the American people into supporting endless war.
"AI Overview
Based on the search results, here are some examples of companies that support war efforts:
Based on the search results, several types of companies can be seen as supporting war efforts. These include major defense contractors and weapons manufacturers, companies that have continued operations in or provided support to Russia during the conflict in Ukraine, and companies in other sectors that may have indirect connections.
Defense Contractors and Weapons Manufacturers:
Examples include Lockheed Martin, the world's largest arms producer involved in aircraft, electronics, missiles, and space technologies, and the largest federal contractor in the U.S.. Other significant U.S. military contractors mentioned are Raytheon Technologies Corporation, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing. European defense contractors like the UK-based BAE Systems and French companies Alsetex and Cheddite are also listed. SWORD Defense Inc., a veteran-owned company manufacturing advanced weapon systems, is also noted.
Companies Operating in Russia and/or Supporting Russian War Efforts (according to NACP):
Several companies are identified by Ukraine's National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) for their continued operations in Russia or perceived support of Russian war efforts. These include businesses from various sectors, such as retail (Auchan), food production (Barry Callebaut, Bacardi), construction (Buzzi Unicem, Knauf, Rockwool International), technology (Comnav Technology Ltd., SLB), manufacturing (Danieli, Vičiūnai Group), and consumer goods (Unilever). These companies' actions range from paying taxes to supplying goods or providing services that could be seen as supporting the Russian government or military.
Companies in Other Industries:
Companies in other industries can also be linked to supporting war efforts. For instance, Alibaba Group is mentioned through its AliExpress platform providing international goods in Russia, and the Houston Astros baseball team for broadcasting games in Russia.
Note: The information provided is based on the search results and is not exhaustive. The concept of "supporting war efforts" can be interpreted broadly, encompassing direct military supply to providing essential services to countries involved in conflict."
Companies don't support wars?
Look I was not arguing that 'companies don't support wars' -- I was responding to your comments regarding the Big 3 (which I know very well both presently and historically) and to the eras that this article is about (WW2 +/- 20 years). Certainly, some companies support war spending (because they profit from building the products) -- this is true even if the weapons just get built and go into inventory and never get used -- but there are a few people within those companies at different times that may go beyond that 'build it to be strong' attitude and go full-war-monger ('build it to use it then build and use some more etc.). This latter trend is more prevalent now (since 9/11) that in other times (although there is always some element of that going on in history).
The other issue I have with your comments is your use of general terms like the 'US', the 'US government' or 'companies'. These are collective nouns that don't have (or rarely have) opinions or plans. Certain people in important parts of the US government may want regime change - but that is not the same thing as the 'US wants' regime change (although for short hand reasons we might casually refer to things that way, it's literally a false statement because it reflects the attitude of a subset of the government and not necessarily the people as a whole). Same with using phrases like 'companies' want -- a certain CEO or executive might want a certain thing -- but do the rank and file workers and managers, the investors, the creditors, etc. want that as well? (or do they just want stable and increasing employment, profits, repayments, etc). It's a logical mistake to infer 'meaning' to one person in a causal chain (the defense company CEO) and then infer those same thoughts, feelings, and plans to the all the people, suppliers, investors, further down the chain (and that collectively make up 'the company').
Futhermore, I encourage you to avoid general statements like saying 'companies want war' (and meaning that in a literal sense). It's the kind of juvenile thing a student leftist might chant during a protest march ('all companies are war-mongers .. all cops are bad ...'). It may have an element of truth to it because some people controlling a particular company are war-mongers and because some particular cops or even certain localized police departments are bad -- but it's also wrong and misleading because it over-generalizes and makes specific, individual failures feature of the whole. No system -- capitalistic, socialistic, communistic whatever can survive that kind of over-simplification and condemnation. If you want call out Lockheed Martin (since 1995) -- I'll agree with you. But if you want to make all kinds of generalizations (that can't possibly be supported), I object.
nothing that you wrote is correct
nothing that you wrote contradicted it evidentially
Using this logic the US sent Ford to build Soviet truck factories (which ended up being really important in the war)
Proving that the US has always played both sides of every war it has engineered its entry into, having eliminated the constitutional requirement that Congress declare them, with the active abdication of its military members, in ignorant treason.
Sure but that contradicts your point that American's only backed Hitler and the Nazi's.
I never said any such thing
You need to be careful in your use of the word "only."
You didn't explicitly saying but you were clearing implying American forces backed the Germans over the Soviets, which even ignoring lend lease is a silly argument.
There are some really important difference between the US (in the 1920's and early 1940's) and the post 9/11 world we live in today that affect your question.
The US population on the eve of WW2 was very very isolationist (even pacifistic). Aside from a belief in a 'strong two ocean navy' to guard the Atlantic and Pacific 'moats' and the 'former' colony of the Philippines (which the US was in the process of divesting itself from very very slowly), there was little support for a US military or military adventures outside of Latin America, which was perceived as a sphere of US influence -- i.e. in Latin America it was 'ok' to use a little bit of force from time to time to 'restore order' provided that the expedition was very short term and low cost -- e.g. the various US Marine excursions to Nicaragua, Haiti, etc. but even those efforts had little support outside of the the US Senate and corporate board rooms).
The population in the US after WW2 (and particularly after the Berlin Blockade, the Soviet atom bomb, the creation of the 'Iron Curtain', the 'overthrow' of the 1948 Czechoslovak government, and the Korean War) reluctantly (and then rather enthusiastically) embraced a standing military with worldwide defense obligations. This military was very navy and air centric (and heavily reliant on nuclear weapons), and its land army was not in and of itself much to write home about in terms of training and real capabilities during the 1950's to mid 1960's. The US defense production base was in place, many reserve and active duty units were part of the order of battle, but the US military pre-Vietnam was not all that ready for overseas wars or major conflict (in part because the belief that any major conflict would quickly move to a nuclear war and hence make the kind of army or tactical Air Force of 1945 pointless).
The mid 1960-s to mid 1970's Vietnam war totally screwed up this US military system (and called into question its willingness to fulfill its defense treaty obligations to foreign nations let alone undertake 'wars of choice'). As a result, US military in the late 1970's was run down, unpopular, and not very mission capable (e.g. the failed Iran-hostage rescue attempt in 1979/80) and the popular opposition to Reagan's efforts to support El Salvador and Nicaragua against Marxist guerrillas in the early 1980's.
Reagan (with an eye to Europe and countering the Soviets) rebuilt US convention and unconventional forces massively and had a huge impact on how the US population saw its armed forces -- but even after the Reagan era there was still little appetite to 'use' that force unless absolutely necessary. However, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait (and the successful US war effort repelling that invasion) massively boosted US support for and confidence in its military. The relative 'ease' of that victory then helped create the story that modern 'smart-bomb' centric war, at least for the US, was now 'costless' (at least in terms of US lives).
The mid to later 1990's was then a period of debate. The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact was finished -- should the US pull back and demobilize (to capture the 'peace dividend' like Europe opted for) -- or should it use this massive power (hyper-force) to drive the 'rules based international order' (i.e. regime change / globalization / 'democracy' / human rights). This was also a period of generational change in US politics. Leaders who had been around for (and fought in WW2) like Bush Sr and Reagan were replaced by baby boomers who came later (Clinton, Gore, Bush Jr, Cheney, Biden, etc.). These new leaders wanted to pursue interventionism and kept the military capabilities largely in place. They also started to use those forces often (e.g. Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Haiti), although it was not until 9/11 when the 'leash came off' and US forces began to be used massively throughout the world. It then took twenty years before the US public really began to understand the costs, lack of benefits, and senselessness of those wars to get to where we are now (swinging back towards non-interventionism or even out-right isolationism, at least at the grass roots level).
So, your question puts a question that the post 9/11 generation took for granted (i.e. the 'let's do regime change') and transposes that recent attitude back to a very different America in summer of 1941 (very isolationist, still relatively poor compared to today, very religious, very militarily unprepared, and burned by the senseless waste of WW1).
Based on those profound differences in time period and mindset, it would seem impossible to me that the US public (or Congress, which at that time period better reflected the sense of the US public than it does today) would support a National Socialist (or British or French) war against 'Communism' and the USSR. The overwhelming US response at that time would have been 'a pox on all of their houses'.
The other complicating factor in all that is that in the 1930's and 1940's, a lot of the State Department and intellectual elite of the US (the nascent 'deep state' of today) was openly or passively pro-communist in outlook (or at least sympathetic to it). The same was true in Britain and France as well. France had a somewhat strong fascist element to its society in 1940 (but less so Britain and a lot less so in the US). So, if there was a side the US would have taken (and as I mentioned above, the US would not have taken sides), it might have been on behalf of the Soviets (not the Germans) if the 'deep state' of 1940 could have its way.
Of course, if the US did support Germany (and not provide Lend-Lease to the USSR), then the outcome of the German war in Russia might well have been different -- but that scenario was just slightly more realistic than a Martian army landing in Munich and doing the same thing. It just wasn't going to happen in the America of the early 1940's.
If possible, could you point me to anything (articles etc) you might recommend about the pro-communist feeling amongst the bureaucracy in the US and UK/France? I'd read quite a bit of WW2 history and don't recall this being brought up much, so am quite intrigued to understand better. Cheers!
I can't think of any specific books regarding those two topics that I would recommend off hand, but I can make two alternative suggestions. The first, which I referenced somewhere earlier, is in TIK's WW2 Youtube channel -- he covers many topics (including some that are close to what you are asking) -- and he also shows a very extensive set of footnotes and references for his work (so you could work off of that).
The other alternative is actually a modern, on-line (or downloadable) war game called Hearts of Iron (IV). Now there are many things to hate about that particular game -- it promises so much (and if you are serious about history and play it) it really fails to deliver on those hopes and expectations. It may or may not be 'fun' to play (by yourself or with others) as a 'game' (I find it uninteresting and predictable after you figure out how it works) -- and as a military simulation it has aspects that are amazing (and others that totally destroy its utility as a 'what if' model of history). Every couple of years I start using it (perhaps because some new module or version comes out) .. get my hopes up or try to modify it to better suit my needs and expectations --- only then to run into some the same limitations that damned it the last time I looked at it. So, based on that you might be wondering why I recommend it -- well, it (and the cottage industry of history buffs and computer nerds that like it) have developed a whole lot of well-researched content / modules / add-ons for the base game that can really teach you history if you play it with that in mind. You have to be careful and selective in what you mods you play (and what information you take at face value) - but if you are interested in what was going on in Britain or France in the 1930's (pro-communist, pro-fascist, historical Tory, alternative Tory or Labor etc) there is a mod for that that will take you through historical events, give you decision trees to choose from etc that really help you understand that perspective. For example, for Germany, I wasn't (at that point in my life) terribly interested in German financial and economic policy during the Third Reicht -- and I certainly hadn't heard about MEFO bills. Playing a particular good 'mod' of the game, that went through all that, opened my eyes to the importance of all that (so that when other books and content came along referencing that topic I paid attention / sought better information out). I also learned a great deal about what was going on inside the Polish government of the 1930's (and the various factions and alternative parties and their interests / goals / constraints etc) by playing 'Poland' in a particular mod or mods. Same with Finland or France or Italy or whatever. Now, the quality of those mods varies greatly (and some that existed 10 years ago most certainly aren't around today) -- but it can really help. So, check it out if you are so inclined (it's not terribly expensive in terms of dollars but very time intensive with regard to learning curve -- just to master the basic game -- and then understanding and using mods is yet another hurdle -- but you may be so inclined). Remember that like all things crowd-sourced -- be wary and test what it tells you (it may be gold or it may be bull-shit, it depends). That game also can help a person understand logistics and the constraints of geography as well (it is simplified in relation to reality but way more automated and sophisticated than most table top games can simulate or books / videos alone can demonstrate).
The condensed version of what I learned regarding Communist influence in Britain in France is something as follows:
For both Britain and France, non-Marxist versions of socialism arose somewhat spontaneously in the mid 1800's (either from Christian-aligned sects or from enlightenment 'liberal' philosopher types hoping to offset the poverty, inequality, and misery of industrialization, enclosure, urbanization, etc.). These groups affected popular culture to some extent, but were often only local and self-limiting (and basically went no-where).
Marxist versions of Socialism started to emerge around 1850's and in the decades after it. Marx was in England at the time and Engels was the rich offspring of factory owners who financed Marx's writings (and debauched lifestyle -- but that is another story). Marxist thought in England was somewhat limited in its rate of expansion, but Marxist and similar thought (e.g. the Paris Communards) were pretty influential and politically active in France at this time. The French government (under Emperor Louis Napoleon) was conservative (as were its military and police and much of the countryside) so they kept that Communard element in check (although Napoleon's liberal opposition in Parliament flirted with it). That Communard element then revolted and seized control of Paris after Napoleon III's defeat at Sedan (the infamous Paris Commune of 1870). Eventually, the new liberal 'Republican' government (that replaced Louis Napoleon's Empire) suppressed that rebellion with force and restored order. That legacy of open communist revolt and government suppression left a firm legacy on French left, right, and center -- although the dominant thread of French politics up to the First World War was conservatism / Catholicism versus socialism / secularism (not Communism).
After the Paris Commune, the Communard element of communism faded and the socialist and Marxist versions of it became ascendant internationally in Europe not just in Britain and France. The people involved in these movements tended to be intellectuals and lawyers and philosophers -- so they tended to have endless debates about their beliefs, priorities, plans of action (as opposed to the more direct action Communards or shop level worker rights movements -- those kinds of movements existed in parallel although the leadership of the movements tended to be fractious and contentious intellectuals. The end result was the various groups that made up the various 'Internationale' movements of socialist and communist groups across Europe and UK and elsewhere. At various points and times, these movements tended to fragment and form 'heresies' (or new, more correct versions of the true communism) -- and some of the groups were more inclined to work with the reigning governments (like the Social Democratic Party in Germany or the emerging Labor Party in Britain) -- while others did not. The First World War was a huge disappointment for these parties -- they expected the workers of Europe to unite in their refusal to fight capitalist wars -- but towards the end of WW1 all of those left and communist parties took new hope with the emergence of Bolshevik Russia and Lenin in the USSR.
The dire economic conditions of post war Europe and the institutional hang-over of the WWI which destroyed many people's faith in governments, parties, religion, private enterprise, patriotism, empire, etc was fertile ground for home-grown (and Soviet sponsored) Marxist parties, propaganda, and political activism in 1918 and beyond. A significant number of WW1 veterans were socialist or Marxist going into that war -- and had put their Marxism or Socialism aside during the war -- but upon war's end, many of these pre-war Socialist became very politically active (Mussolini in Italy would be an example). More significantly was the rise of socialist and communist belief in the younger generation that did not fight in the war (because they were too young). I was reading something recently about how relatively few active veterans of the First World War in Britain 'thought badly' about the conflict -- where as their younger brothers / sons outright rejected everything to do with that war (and fully bought into the 'lions led by donkeys for the capitalist and imperialist' benefit' line of thinking).
The French Government in the 1920's and 1930's was one revolving door of politicians, elections, and parties (some lasting mere weeks or months) (as was Italy's) -- and the instability of the governments, their ineffectiveness with dealing with social and economic and financial impacts of the First War, and the rise of Soviet inspired and funded press, political parties, and activism totally eviscerated most of the French (and the British Liberal) parties by the early 1930's. The French Popular Front government of 1936 was famous or infamous (depending on your point of view) because it was the first time the unabashedly Communist left parties were in coalition with the more tradition Socialist and Left parties in French Society. The tensions of the Spanish Civil War (which pitted nationalists and traditionalists and out-right fascists against democrats and socialists and anarchists and communists) exacerbated the French government's (and French society's) fissures and nearly brought France to a civl war / coup.
The British Labor Party - which was trying hard to be 'respectable' and not radical, struggled to govern in an difficult situation two different times during this period (and had some success in enacting parts of its agenda when in power and when in out of power but it was not revolutionary in nature) -- but more radical elements of socialism, syndicalism, communism, anarchism, etc. spread readily across industry and college campuses. Given Labor's relative strength electorally (and the conservative nature of Britain as a whole and of its government institutions), Communism was unlikely to come to Britain electorally before WW2 (but institutions that had large numbers of upper and middle class British public school and Oxbridge graduates -- like the Foreign Office, Intelligence Services, etc) were very populated with Marxist or Marxist adjacent thinkers.
At least that is my take on it --
The other place to look for what you are looking for is in post WW2 'exposees' about Soviet spies high up in British government service (e.g. Ken Philby). After WW2, damning evidence began to be revealed about just how compromised certain Oxbridge graduates were in British service by the Soviet Union. The US had similar scandals (as I supposed did the French). Learning about those cases and investigating them will also show you how the process worked, why certain individuals were open to it, how deeply it had spread, etc. You can catch glimpses of that in the recent movie Oppenheimer and in the 1950's US Senate committee investigations on 'who lost China' and why "Hollywood was Red', etc. as well.
the Jews controlled FDR and Churchill so it would have never been other.
A great piece of analysis but I will throw in a few thoughts here – the topic being a long standing interest of mine – to the point where I have tried to model events via serious computer simulations. And this is much harder than you might think. 1% wrong on attrition/replacement rates per week has a serious impact after a year.
1 The original decision to invade was taken in July 1940 (ie before the Battle of Britain) and came from OKH in response in the clumsy Soviet invasion of Bessarabia (Rumania was a French ally at the time) which brought the Red army perilously close to Ploesti. See the Halder diaries. This occurred whilst the Wehrmacht was fully engaged in France in June 1940. This caused Germany to reformat its strategic war plan away from a Naval/Air confrontation with the British (and ultimately they thought the USA) towards building an army capable of defeating Russia. They did not have the resources to do both.
2 As Tooze points out, Nazi Germany was always going to attack the USSR as it needed to eliminate what it defined as the Bolshevik/Jewish threat, gain resources to fight a global war with the USA and create lebensraum. It could only achieve these things by defeating the USSR, and none of them without doing so. Tooze also describes how much of the industrial capacity that was used to build the weapons we see produced in volume later in the war was actually non-existent in 1940 and 1941 and was being created over this period.
3 OKH had a major intelligence failure and identified maybe 180 divisions and c 36 brigades in the Red army. Actual numbers were 303 with around a dozen brigades, plus up to 50 fortified regions – backed by hundreds of thousands of NKVD troops in hundreds of regiments along with several combat divisions. Mobilisation potential ran to hundreds more divisions, all of which were formed on pre-war plans. The starting point for any alternative history covering the defeat of the USSR is a more accurate intelligence assessment.
4 Stahel writes at length about this period in a series of books. His basic hypothesis though is that, based on this faulty assessment, the German Army was created to perhaps the economic limits at the time, to defeat it in its forward deployment west of the Dvina/Dnieper line. When this was broadly achieved in the first few weeks OKH/OKW thought they had won the war. They were surprised that the Red Army had such a depth of reserves east of this position. AGC really did not advance at all between July and October 1941 as it could not, and was subject to constant counter attacks (see Glantz).
5 Re Soviet plans to attack, I take the view based on deployments and the on-going mobilisation that the Red army was deploying into attack positions per the May 41 plan and were mobilising to fill out understrength units. The German attack caught them partially mobilised and moving into these positions. This is basically the Suvorov/Rezov hypothesis. Glantz does a good job in describing the weaknesses and deficiencies of the Red Army at this juncture in Stumbling Colossus but actually provides a wealth of evidence that backs up my views. This is not to say that Stalin would have ordered an attack, just that he was trying to put his forces in a position to do so. Given the well-known weaknesses of the Red Army, it is hard to claim that such an attack would have been successful, but surely the Red Army would have been in a better state than its rout under a surprise attack. Weeks in Stalin’s Other War provides a scholarly analysis of the competing theories here.
6 On the subject of a surprise attack, there is again much conjecture of what the Russians knew or suspected. The best analysis in my view is given by Murphy – What Stalin Knew. Perhaps summarising here, Stalin was largely fed information that fed his pre-existing views as to contradict the boss was lethal. Murphy provides an intriguing theory backed by some credible evidence that Stalin might have believed that the Wehrmacht was going to do a June 1941 Seelowe and so was putting the Red Army in position to take advantage of its redeployment. Sergei Beria (son of Lavrenty) wrote that everyone knew about the German attack plans (but did not necessarily inform Stalin) and the surprise was not the attack on 22 June but the fact the Red Army crumbled. Lots of conjecture here but fits the facts.
7 The author is correct in that it was probably not possible to defeat the USSR in one summer campaign and this would need two years along with an element of German force generation/conservation and logistical/industrial effort beyond the history. The official Russian position (Krivosheev) on Soviet losses is bad enough but recent works by Zetterling on Typhoon and Lopukhovsky et al on Soviet losses demonstrate that losses in this period were in fact much worse than admitted. In the first year of the war Red Army permanent losses were between 3 and 4 million higher than official Russian figures say. This matched my own accounting. The USSR came perilously close to defeat. In one month between mid-September and mid October 1941 between Kiev and Bryansk/Vyazma and elsewhere the RKKA lost around 2 million men KIA/MIA. No army in history has ever suffered such losses and survived, and it is no wonder that OKH pushed every last battalion to try to take Moscow and inflict a political and military defeat whilst it perceived there was an opportunity to do so. However it all comes back to the faulty intelligence assessment – Soviet mobilisation and industrial potential, along with what I will euphemistically call political stability – ensured its survival and ultimate victory. The USSR was underestimated by Hitler. It seems we in the West may have done the same with modern Russia.
marcjf -- you always make good points and support them well
Excellent rundown showing the complexity of massive military operations and the small margins that often make the difference. Did not realize the Soviets had performed so well in 1941. Having looked at German options, would be interesting to also review the Soviet performance and likewise ask how they could have turned the tide sooner.
A more fascinating analysis would be of what the Soviets could have done differently to avoid the disasters of 1941. As it were, everything pretty much went the Germans’ way, and yet things still ended in disaster. It is not too difficult to imagine a universe where Stalin takes heed of an impending German attacks, prepares defenses and puts his armies on alert. Or a universe where Soviet forces retreat in good order, preserving USSR’s most professional and best equipped forces to fight another day.
Like Germany in World War 2, the United States is "geostrategically cornered" in the US/Russo conflict. The core dynamics between the United States and Russia are the same today as they were in 1940 and are characterized by the abject dependence of the United States on Russian raw materials.
Russia holds vast reserves in natural resources -- in real coal, real natural gas, real crude oil, real minerals, and real rare earths -- in an "embarrassment of riches." These are all resources that United States has either exhausted or will shortly, or has completely run out of. This goes for Europe and all of the West.
Some have said how World War III began after World War II, when the United States (and the West) picked up where Nazi Germany left off in 1945 -- by treating Russia and the Russia people as sub-humans, undeserving of huge reserves of natural resources and geography.
Today, it has become pretty obvious that having encroached all it can on Russia's borders that Ukraine is being terraformed into the next front. NATO (the United States is NATO), will wait until the last Ukrainian is dead and then come to the aid of their fellow martyrs for their democracy.
The situation and the outcome of the current US/Russo conflict is unclear. I am just as terrified by the idea that the United States might actually win World War III as I was that Germany might have prevailed in World War II.
I think you are very mistaken on the US's imminent mineral poverty. The US does import certain raw materials from Russia today (mainly uranium, heavy-ish oil, titanium, and certain scarce minerals). However, it does so not because it lacks those resources or alternatives - but because it has been less expensive to buy Russian resource rather than go with the alternatives. For example, the US had more than enough uranium during the Cold War to develop its massive nuclear arsenal and substantial civilian nuclear power industry. After the Cold War, it shut down a lot of its uranium mining and refining assets (because they are environmentally nasty and expensive). Would it prefer to continue to buy Russian uranium -- yes -- but if it had to, it can go back to what it did before. As for Russian oil, the US imports Russian oil not because it lacks sufficient oil reserves (it has plenty) -- instead it imports Russian oil because its chemical composition makes it a better feedstock for making diesel fuel than the domestic 'sweet light crude' that the US produces in abundance (which is better for gasoline). If the US didn't import Russian crude, it could buy more Mexican, or Canadian, or Venezuelan heavy crudes (or change its refineries to better utilize the domestic oil production). The rare minerals would be the hardest to fix however the US could open its long closed US mining facilities or it could go back to its 'go-to' sources in the Congo and elsewhere for those resources. The point is that the US is not resource poor (Europe and Japan and to a large extent China are).
You can still believe that the US's worldwide goals are grasping and dominating and evil if you want (I think that is too much of an over-simplification but you do you) -- it's just that it isn't driven by resource poverty (there would have to be other reasons).
End of 7th paragraph: "While preemptive action is forced by a specified immediate threat, preemptive war is predicated on longer-term strength calculations and the fear that the other party will initiate war at an unspecified later date under more favorable conditions." The second 'preemptive ' should be 'preventive'.
That was indeed a misspelling. Felt the same. The second preemptive should have been preventive. Happens sometimes.